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ABSTRACT 
The organisation of ex-service men into a mass membership movement was a 
new departure in British life. Four main groups came together in 1921 to form the 
British Legion. On its establishment, the leadership, who were predominantly high-
ranking ex-officers, had high hopes of forming an extremely powerful and influential 
organisation. Due to a number of inherent flaws in the Legion's ideology, 
composition and character, the organisation never became a truly mass movement of 
all ex-service men. This work looks at the dynamics of the movement and provides 
insights into the motivations of its leaders and their impact upon the organisation. It 
provides a detailed account of the structure of the Legion and explores the strengths 
and weaknesses of the movement. The existence of a semi-autonomous Officer's 
Benevolent Department, a subordinate Women's Section, and an independent Legion 
in Scotland reveal the serious rifts within this superificially unified movement. The 
paradox of low officer involvement combined with an almost exclusively officer 
leadership contributed to low membership and other factors such as geography, 
unemployment and finance are considered in the discussion of Legion membership. 
Divisions between leaders and led on policy and methods are explored in an 
examination of Legion democracy. A full examination of the Legion's practical work 
and the attitudes which underpinned that activity confirms the Legion's position as a 
voluntary society with traditional charitable views. A detailed examination of the 
Legion's struggles over pension legislation gives an insight into Government attitudes 
towards ex-service men and also reveals the inherent weakness of the Legion's 
position when dealing with politicians. An analysis of the Legion's contacts with 
foreign ex-service men penetrates the Legion's rhetoric and reveals the real 
motivations and attitudes of the Legion leaders who developed and executed the 
Legion's foreign policy. Ultimately, this study provides important conclusions about 
the nature of the British ex-service movement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Many people expressed surprise when informed that my chosen subject was 
the British Legion. This attitude stems from the belief that the Legion was, and is, an 
insignificant organisation with little influence and no power whatsoever. Duff 
Cooper ably propounded this view of the Legion in 1938: 
Our British Legion is simply a collection of middle aged and elderly men 
who have been at some time in one of the Services and who meet together 
occasionally with the laudable purpose of wearing their medals and 
drinking beer. They differ in hardly any respect from a collection of 
Conservative working men's clubs. They have no uniform ... and they have 
no organisation or officers.! 
This view of the Legion is entirely inaccurate. The British ex-service movement was, 
and is, much more than a collection of social clubs and drinking dens. The Legion 
was formed in 1921 out of a number of smaller, rival groups of veterans as a 
voluntary movement based around the ideal of comradeship and its major aim was to 
assist all ex-service men who were in distress. Far from being unorganised, the 
Legion maintained a highly efficient structure to co-ordinate its various functions. 
Although never encompassing more than ten per cent of the total number of ex-
service men, the Legion was a multifaceted organisation with many interests and 
activities. 
The Legion has been described as a movement with four distinct elements: 'a 
benevolent society, an Old Boys Association, a quasi-religious cult and a [political] 
pressure group of considerable vigour'2. The Legion's main ideal of comradeship was 
sustained through social activities at branches and clubs, but Legion members also 
devoted a great deal of time and effort to practical schemes which assisted 
unemployed and disabled ex-service men. The Poppy Day Appeal raised the funds 
! Duff Cooper, Admiralty, to Viscount Halifax, Foreign Office, 29 September 1938, Public Record Office, Kew, F0371.21783. 
This was a somewhat uncharitable attitude for a former biographer ofHaig who had listed the foundation of the Legion as one of 
Haig's crowning achievements. 
2 Graham Wootton, The Politics ofInfluence: British Ex-Servicemen, Cabinet Decisions and Cultural Change 1917-57, london: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963, p.65. 
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for these schemes and the rituals of Remembrance were taken very seriously by 
Legion members. The Legion also attempted to put pressure on Government to 
improve pensions legislation and develop large-scale employment projects. A more 
unusual and less well known facet of the Legion's activities was its cultivation of 
contacts with foreign ex-service men which gave the Legion a high national profile in 
the late thirties. It is this very diversity which made the Legion an important 
organisation allowing it to harness the energies of thousands of ex-service men who 
had served in the Great War. The creation, development and maintenance of a mass 
ex-service movement after the Great War was an important feature of inter-war life 
and is a subject well worthy of study. The aim of this thesis is to explore the true 
character and importance of this organisation within the context of British life 
between the wars through an examination of the Legion's leadership and membership 
and their impact on policies and events. 
Perhaps because the British veteran seems to have readjusted to peacetime 
society quite smoothly, the role of the British ex-service movement, and its 
contribution to that readjustment has not received significant attention from 
historians. Eric J. Leed and George Mosse3 have concentrated almost exclusively on 
German veterans' experience which was one of disillusionment and violent political 
action. Their studies provide valuable material for comparison, but are not intended 
as a description of the British experience. By way of contrast, Antoine Prost, in his 
seminal work on French veterans, has shown that French ex-service associations were 
moderate supporters of the Republic and were well integrated in French society.4 In 
France, as in Britain, the majority of ex-service organisations represented integration, 
not disillusionment. There are similarities between the French and British experience 
but the differences are more striking. As a unified, national movement with no 
3 Eric J Leed, No Man's Land: Combat and Identity in World War One, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; George L. 
Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars, New York: Oxford University prp • '''Q{\ 
4 Antoine Prost, In the Wake of War: Les Anci,ms Combattants and French Society 1914·1939, C \992. 
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political affiliations, and a distinctively low percentage of the total ex-servIce 
community within its ranks, the Legion was unique within Europe. 
A number of historians have studied Britain's ex-service movement in detail. 
Graham Wootton produced the first proper study5 which gave an admirable narrative 
history but, as an official historian, Wootton inevitably shied away from serious 
criticism. His second work6 explored the Legion's political tactics and described in 
detail the techniques of influence used by the Legion in its relationship with 
government. Wootton did not, however, have access to the full range of 
Government documents and this limited the scope of his work. Wootton credited the 
Legion with greater influence upon Government policy than was the case and was 
unable to explore the Government's view of the Legion. Much of his work, while 
setting the Legion's political efforts within the context of inter-war politics, does not 
reveal the motivations behind Legion policy or government attitudes towards the ex-
service movement. 
More recently, Charles Kimball has produced an important thesis on the 
British ex-service movement. Kimball argued that the Legion did not reflect 
disillusionment and was a social and charitable institution closely integrated within 
the patterns of British life. 7 He was able to trace the origins of the Legion, and its 
early development, but many important events occurred during the 1930s which lay 
outside the scope of his thesis. As with previous historians, Kimball's work was 
hampered by a lack of government documents and personal papers which would have 
allowed an examination of the internal politics of the Legion. While this dissertation 
agrees with the broad conclusions of Kimball's work, there are many specific 
assertions which cannot be accepted. In particular, this thesis cannot agree with 
Kimball's conclusions about the Legion's foreign policy and its effect on the 
5 Graham Wootton, The Official History of the British Legion, London: MacDonald and Evans, 1956, (hereafter referred to as 
OHBL). 
6 Wootton, The Politics ofInflllence. 
7 Charles Kimball, The Ex-Service Movement in England and Wales 1916-1 930, lJr~ .. hl:<"'~d Ph.D. Thesis, Stanford University, 
1990. 
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movement. Although much of the Legion's foreign policy was outside the scope of 
his thesis, Kimball stated that the Legion's development of foreign contacts in 1935 
was due to a 'desire to expiate their jingoistic past'. He also suggested that contact 
with Nazi Germany signified a 'major shift in the Legion's political and ideological 
outlook' and that this was a 'newfound interest in international affairs'8. In fact, the 
Legion developed many international contacts from its inception, and the desire 'to 
shake hands' with the ex-enemy organisations, while controversial, had been a plank 
of Legion policy since at least 1923. The contacts developed after 1935 were simply 
a logical conclusion of long-stated policy because, for the first time, that policy fell 
on receptive ground in Germany. 
The new approach of this dissertation is made possible by the use of 
important new sources. Every historian of the British Legion has to rely largely on 
the National Executive Council Minutes, the verbatim reports of the Annual 
Conferences, the monthly issues of the British Legion Journal and the General 
Secretaries monthly letters to the branches. These are important documents which 
chart most of the major developments of the Legion and can be used to construct a 
narrative history of Legion endeavours. Of their very nature, these documents can 
only provide an impression of the Legion as a national organisation. The view is 
exclusively of the national headquarters and cannot give an adequate history of the 
ordinary branches - the grass roots of the Legion. Care has to be exercised when 
using these documents because they present an exclusively positive impression of the 
Legion. It is therefore necessary to use other sources to gain a balanced picture. 
Unfortunately, none of the Legion Chairmen's correspondence is available and 
the papers of the various Presidents of the Legion are also scarce. Earl Haig's 
correspondence concerning the Legion is, unsurprisingly, taciturn, with only a few 
snippets of information concerning the Legion. While Haig was kept informed of 
major developments, and certainly delivered many speeches on behalf of the Legion, 
8 ibid, p.28~. 
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he was not involved in the day to day running of the organisation.9 Earl Jellicoe's 
presidency was brief with frequent bouts of illness, while General Sir Frederick 
Maurice, who is reputed to have accumulated a vast and interesting correspondence 
concerning the Legion, had all his papers destroyed after his death. 10 
One other prominent member of the Legion, General Sir Ian Hamilton, 
fortunately kept all of his voluminous Legion correspondence. ll Part of Hamilton's 
popularity within the movement derived from the fact that he had had a long and 
distinguished military career. Just as importantly, Hamilton was an entertaining 
writer and speaker who worked extremely hard for the Legion. Hamilton first 
became involved in the ex-service movement during 1918 and 1919 with the Empire 
Services League Scheme and later maintained this connection as President 1921-
1935, then Patron 1935-1947, of the Metropolitan Area, and as President of the 
British Legion (Scotland) 1932-1947. Hamilton, as an active and important member 
of the Legion hierarchy, carried on a large amount of correspondence with each 
successive National President and Chairman. 
This is the only study to make extensive use of these documents which 
provide a clear internal view of many Legion events. The Hamilton papers can also 
be trusted to give an accurate account of these developments, even though there are 
few, if any, other personal sources which can be used to check the information. As 
one of the 'founding fathers' of the Legion, he occupied a position of trust with the 
national Legion leaders and consequently, the correspondence is open and frank, 
giving a unique insight into the attitudes and methods of many of the Legion leaders. 
Many of the letters which discuss controversial events or opinions were marked 
'confidential please destroy'12 by their authors, but Hamilton retained them and often 
9 Haig corresponded chiefly with Colonel Crosfield but much of Haig's writing is limited to comments in the margins ofCrosfield's 
letters. Haig Papers, National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh, here after referred to as Acc3155. 
10 Maurice's only remaining correspondence deals with the Maurice debate of 1918 held at the Liddell Hart Centre for Military 
Archives, King's College London. There are no existing papers for the British Legion. 
11 Hamilton's correspondence fills 37 large boxes, while he delivered over 650 speeches for the Legion in the interwar period 
alone. Hamilton Papers, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College London, hereafter referred to as IH29/. 
12 See chapters three and four, in particular the correspondence concerning the selection of the Legion President, IH29/37/4, 
IH29/15; also that dealing with the Pensions C"~lrn"o ... y in 1933, IH29/18; also Crosfield's attprro~l" 10 find a challenger to 
Francks for Metropolitan Area Chainnan IH2S 
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added notes of his own to the letters. It is clear that Hamilton kept his 
correspondence for personal use only and was trusted not to reveal the controversial 
contents of many of his letters. Many of the leaders came to Hamilton, as a trusted 
member of the Legion, for advice and discussed their personal views of the Legion 
and its policies with him. Through the Hamilton papers it is possible to penetrate 
Legion propaganda and understand the personalities and personal views of many of 
the Legion leaders. 
Without official government records it is very difficult to judge the true effect 
of Legion pressure upon the government. This study is the first to make extensive 
use of the Ministry of Pensions Files, the Premier's Papers, and the Foreign Office 
Files. These reveal a very different picture of the Legion in its negotiations with 
Government, a picture which does not agree with contemporary Legion rhetoric. 
The records of the most important Legion deputations, which show Legion leaders in 
the act of negotiation with government ministers, have also survived. The Legion 
claimed that it was able to exert effective pressure on government, and particularly 
the Ministry of Pensions. In reality, government was able to control the Legion and 
resisted all of its major policy campaigns. Through these papers we can accurately 
examine the way Legion leaders approached and discussed issues with government, 
but just as importantly, we can discover how government viewed the Legion. 
The British Legion's controversial links with foreign ex-service men and, in 
particular, German National Socialist veterans after 1935, have also not been 
discussed fully in previous studies. This thesis does not attempt to give a full 
chronological discussion of the Legion's foreign policy but does provide a revealing 
analysis of Legion motivations in this area. Foreign office officials maintained a close 
watch on Legion activities and their records and correspondence give a fresh view of 
Legion foreign policy. Their detached viewpoint gives critical information about 
these contacts and allows us to develop a more objective perspective on this 
controversial area rJ:'- . '1 policy. 
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This dissertation breaks new ground in many areas. It is the first to explain 
the complex organisational structure of the Legion, without which a full 
understanding of the movement is impossible. It also examines the hidden hierarchies 
and conflicts which formed a crucial part of Legion organisation. The existence of 
semi-independent bodies within the Legion, such as the Officer's Benevolent 
Department and the Women's Section, are important to this discussion. Previous 
studies have confined themselves to an evaluation of the British Legion in England 
and Wales - and with good reason. The Legion in England and Wales was the most 
powerful, and its documents more extensive and readily available. The Legion in 
Ireland, while nominally integrated with London Headquarters after 1925, presents a 
very complex picture and raises many issues which are not relevant to a discussion of 
the movement on the mainland. The problems of sectarianism, civil war and 
nationalism were unique to Ireland and the Irish ex-service movement requires a 
study of its own. However, all previous studies have also shied away from even a 
brief examination of the independent organisation in Scotland, the British Legion 
(Scotland). This study explains the reasons for the existence of a separate Legion in 
Scotland and examines the relationship between the two British Legions. By 
examining the organisational rifts within the Legion we can explain why the British 
ex-service movement did not become fully unified even after the foundation of the 
Legion. 
An exploration of Legion membership puts flesh onto the administrative 
bones. Regional differences and the problems of unemployment and deprivation help 
to explain the low numbers of veterans who participated in the Legion. It is also 
clear that Legion membership was defined by a clear set of aims, ideals and beliefs 
which were not attractive to all veterans. By examining both sides of the equation we 
can determine the character of the movement. At the same time, the ex-officer 
leadership had an enormous influence on the development of Britain's first mass ex-
servIce 1 It. However, their mEthol' ,e not always compatible wid- those 
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of the membership, and the gulf of understanding between the leaders and the led is 
an important theme which runs throughout this work. 
An examination of the Legion1s practical work, political pressure, and foreign 
contacts shows Legion aims and ideals in practice. Legion rhetoric promised a 
utopian vision of a IBrighter Britain., where all ex-service m~uld gain employment, 
adequate pensions and decent housing through Legion action and through powerful 
pressure on government. Just as importantly, Legion leaders claimed that peace 
could be secured through ex-service co-operation. As might be expected, the actual 
result of these policies fell far short of the expectations. By charting Legion views 
and arguments on these issues over the twenty year period, this thesis demonstrates 
that Legion attitudes did not move forward but actually became more archaic over 
time. On a number of occasions, the leadership actually hindered the successful 
implementation of Legion policies. Through an examination of the motivations and 
methods of Legion leaders we can analyse their consequences for the movement as a 
whole. 
Even in a work of this length it is impossible to explore every area of 
Legion activity. This study looks at the Legion from an essentially national viewpoint 
as the existing sources do not give a complete picture of the local organisation. The 
involvement of the Legion in the development and maintenance of the rituals of 
Remembrance is only briefly discussed. Even in the areas of practical work, politics 
and foreign policy, this thesis can only examine the most important and salient 
developments. Nevertheless, even with these omissions, this work provides an 
important and fresh view of the British Legion. The Legion is presented as a living 
organisation with the many different considerations, people and ideas which 
competed for influence within the movement. Closely integrated into society, the 
Legion played an important part in maintaining stability and social harmony during 
the interwar years, and eventually passed on its beliefs to a new generation of 
·~ans. Through these them( .. study will not clnly assess the -'1aracter of the 
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British Legion, but also evaluate the importance and impact of the ex-service 
movement on British life and society during the inter-war years. 
PROLOGUE: 
'THE CREATION OF 
EX-SERVICE ORGANISATIONS 
IN THE BRITISH ISLES' 
The creation of Ex-service Organisations in the British Isles on a National 
scale will always be intimately connected with the world's greatest tragedy 
- the sacrifice by death and maiming of the flower of our manhood. 1 
10 
Britain's first ex-service organisations established from 1917 to 1920, owed their 
existence to Britain's first mass modern war. It was the Great War which exposed a 
large proportion of the male population to the rigours of war and which provided the 
impetus for mass organisations of men who identified themselves, in at least some 
senses, as ex-service men. This prologue provides brief details of the early history of 
the British ex-service movement because it is important to understand the reasons for 
the creation of a unified veterans' organisation and the influences that shaped the 
eventual character of the British Legion. 
Prior to the Great War, the position of the discharged veteran was precarious 
indeed. Due to society's prevailing attitude of suspicion and hostility towards the 
army and the soldier, there was no official help except for the odd campaign or 
disability pension and once a soldier was discharged, he ceased to be a concern of the 
state.2 The position for army wives was even more precarious. Even when their 
husbands were on active service, the army officially ignored the plight of the army 
wife - and the soldier's widow. Due to the practice of maintaining only a small 
number of wives on the muster, wives or other dependents had no official status, and 
thus no means of support. It was not until the Boer War that soldiers widows 
became a charge upon the state and even then, disabled men's wives received no 
1 E.C. Heath. The Position o/the Legion, British Legion Summer School, 1926. 
2 Wootton, 7J1e. P.liticso/lnjluence. p.12. 
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consideration. It was only in August 1914 that responsibility for soldiers' wives and 
families was first accepted by the army authorities.3 
Without any state provision, the old soldier could only look for help to a 
number of important charities; among them the Soldiers and Sailors Families 
Association, the Soldiers and Sailors Help Society and Lloyd's Patriotic Fund.4 
These charities were organised and run by wealthy citizens in the time-honoured 
traditions of benevolent paternalism. Ex-service men themselves took little part in 
them. These voluntary efforts were patchy and unreliable and the low social status of 
veterans, lack of public concern and paucity of funds generally left ex-service men to 
their own devices or to the Poor Law.s The Report of the Commission on the Poor 
Law in 1909 stated that 
It is the men who have left the permanent situation afforded by the Army, 
and who, after more or less interval, have abandoned hope of getting 
employment of a permanent character, who furnish the largest contingent 
of the floating population of the casual wards. 6 
On the outbreak of war, enthusiasm and recruiting promises glossed over the 
problems which might occur when a man found himself discharged. Volunteers had 
been promised that they would be retrained, given adequate pensions if disabled, and 
that neither they nor their families would suffer as a result of their services. W.G. 
Clifford, an old soldier himself, asked prophetically in 1915: 
It will be granted me that the old type of ex-soldier deserved better of his 
country than the fate which was too often his, and it will also be impressed 
on me that the men who have made up by far the greatest army the British 
Empire has ever seen will most assuredly never be subjected to the same 
treatment. May I ask why?7 
In fact, the voluntary efforts of the main charities were placed under immense strain 
almost as soon as the first wounded soldiers returned home in September 1914. 
3 ibid, p.18. 
4 ibid, p.16. 
S ibid, p.13. 
6 W.G. Clifford, The Ex-Soldier: By Himself' A Practical Study of the Past and Future of the Ex-Soldier with Special Reference 
t~ the Situation Created by the Great War, Lond"t1: Black 1916. p.3 . 
. bid, p.IS. 
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Although the Princels Fund and myriad smaller charities raised considerable sums for 
ex-service men during 1914 and 1915, and a statutory committee of the Royal 
Patriotic Fund incorporated and expanded much of the work of the charities from 
November 1915,8 the voluntary system of provision could not cope with the 
unprecedented numbers of discharged and disabled men who returned to Britain 
during 1915 and 1916. 
Discharged men found that there was little or no provision for re-training and 
little help for men with serious disabilities. Further, the scale of pensions was entirely 
inadequate particularly after the high inflation rates experienced in 1916. The lack of 
assistance on discharge, combined with meagre pensions, compared very badly with 
the grand gestures and promises made from recruiting platforms when these veterans 
had volunteered in 1914 and 1915.9 The growth of veterans associations owes a 
great deal to the sense of grievance felt by thousands of discharged soldiers during 
the war. The veterans of the Great War were very different from the lold type of ex-
soldierl who Ideserved better of his countryl.IO Men from every background and class 
in society had joined the army during the war, who were used to organising 
collectively to overcome their problems and gain redress for their grievances. Unlike 
pre-war old soldiers who returned to civilian life in small numbers, and were quickly 
diluted amongst the civilian population, there were enough Great War veterans to 
organise informal local groups to discuss their grievances over discharge, pensions 
and employment prospects. I I As Colonel Heath remarked at the 1926 Summer 
School: lIt will be realised that although before the War there had long existed 
societies for ex-service men of national or semi-national character, never before had 
there been any societies of ex-service menl. It is not surprising that the first national 
group, The National Association of Discharged Sailors and Soldiers, cultivated links 
8 Wootton, ThePolilics of Influence , p.3l. 
9 ibid, p.19. 
10 Clifford, The Ex-Soldier, p.17. 
11 OHBL p.2. 
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with the trade union and trades councils movement. 12 The first veterans who saw 
organisation and protest as a way of righting their injustices were predominantly 
working men accustomed to the traditions of the Labour movement. The majority of 
ex-service men were, after all, working men with many of the same interests and 
needs as workers in the mines and factories. During the summer and autumn of 
1916, informal and disparate groups of ex-service men coalesced into a national 
organisation. 13 Early in 1917, a Conference held in Blackburn established the 
National Association of Discharged Sailors and Soldiers. Its main aims were a 
demand for employment training, better pensions and greater Government 
consideration for the problems of discharged men. 14 However, the interests of the 
trade union movement and the new ex-service organisation did not always coincide. 
James Howell, the President of the National Association, touched upon these 
problems in a letter to Major Jellicorse, who was independently involved in ex-service 
affairs: 
Horrors! I presented a programme on behalf of the discharged men in one 
of our constituencies this week, to the I.L.P. candidate: I was met with the 
information that he had as much sympathy for the "Conchie" as he had for 
the disabled men. is 
While ex-service men had many similar interests with the Labour movement there 
were also significant differences. Left-wing elements within the Labour Party, like 
the I.L.P., believed in pacifism and had a great distrust of the military, which were 
incompatible with the attitudes held by the men who had volunteered to fight for their 
country. At the same time, many Labour activists could not understand the need for 
a separate veterans organisation and the mainstream trades councils wished to keep 
the National Association as an adjunct to its work 16 Although the Labour movement 
was not pacifist, ex-service men did not always make a distinction between the 
120HBLp.2. 
13 ibid. 
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different sections of the movement and these misunderstandings continued on the 
establishment of the British Legion. Continued argument over the role of ex-service 
men in the Labour movement continued until early 1918 when the Association 
severed its links with the trade union movement. 17 
In January 1917, the National Federation of Discharged and Demobilised 
Sailors and Soldiers was formed out of a number of London groups incensed at the 
Review of Exceptions Act. 18 This Act was an attempt to comb out yet more 
manpower for the army by reviewing the one million men who had previously been 
passed unfit for service. However, the Act also made it possible for discharged, 
disabled men to be reviewed to discover whether they were still fit to fight. 19 Not 
surprisingly, the provisions of this Act provoked a storm of protest from veterans 
across the country and the newly formed Federation's cry of 'Every man once before 
any man twice' gained a great deal of sympathy and popularity.20 Although senior 
military officers were invited to its first demonstration and meeting at Trafalgar 
Square, none attended,21 and it was two radical Liberal M.P.s, James Hogge and 
William Pringle, who assumed the leadership of the organisation.22 The Federation 
owed a great deal of its early success to the zeal and inspiration of Hogge who, 
although not an ex-service man, became its Honorary President. With a politician as 
leader, the Federation was connected intimately with radical Liberal politics23 and 
from its inception, Hogge and the Federation were well aware of the usefulness of 
political pressure and persuasion. The Federation's main aim was for statutory war 
pensions based on right, rather than the grace and favour of the existing Royal 
Warrant. The Federation strongly believed that ex-service men should not be left to 
the vagaries of charity but should be provided with statutory assistance from the 
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Government and should have a say in that provision;24 it demanded representation on 
Government committees dealing with ex-service questions of employment and 
pensions. The barring of officers, other than those who had risen from the ranks, 
from membership was also indicative of the Federation's rejection of the traditional 
treatment of ex-service men. 
Both the Association and Federation and many other smaller, local 
associations had come into existence without any central control or prompting from 
the establishment. The Comrades of the Great War, on the other hand, was formed 
in direct response to the success of the Federation's campaign over the Review of 
Exceptions Act. The stridency of the Federation in its call for 'Justice Not Charity' 
alarmed many members of the establishment who confused its demand for justice 
with subversion and revolution.25 The Comrades was established after Colonel Sir 
Norton Griffiths wrote a letter to The Times in 1917 with the prompting of Lord 
Derby, arguing for a new, conservative ex-service association which would form a 
buttress against bolshevism while Colonel Wilfrid Ashley, a Conservative M.P., had 
been working along similar lines. 26 From the outset, the Comrades were linked with 
the Conservative Party, and gained a great deal of financial support from many 
wealthy benefactors. Although the Comrades claimed to be a democratic 
organisation, its first Executive Committee was filled almost entirely by M.P.s and 
officers27 and, unlike the other ex-service organisations, the Comrades had no 
objection to traditional forms of charitable activity. After the formation of a more 
egalitarian Council in 1918, the Comrades began to make notable progress, even 
converting some Federation branches to the Comrades en masse. Hogge portrayed 
the Comrades as an attempt to 'gas' ex-service men, with officers and members of the 
24 Wootton, The Politics of Influence, p.84 
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establishment offering beer and buns in Comrades clubs as a means of silencing 
protest. 28 
Given the characters of the three ex-service groups, and their different 
responses to the needs of ex-service men, there were numerous points of friction 
between them. In particular their differing political affiliations created a sense of 
rivalry, with the Comrades and Federation particularly suspicious of each other's 
motives. Although there were serious differences between the organisations, the 
friction and conflict between them can be exaggerated. In general, the various 
organisations simply got on with the important task of ex-service welfare. Thomas 
Lister, the second President of the Federation, later claimed that the Executive 
Committee did not 
expend an average of 15 minutes per Executive Meeting (which generally 
lasted two days) in discussing rival organisations. There were too many 
other important problems to consider, and in a very large percentage of 
districts there only was one organisation because the organisations became 
localised and only in a certain number of places was there any real 
rivalry. 29 
Far from the three organisations being truly national, each developed its mam 
strength in a different part of the country. While the National Association's major 
strongholds were in East Lancashire, Yorkshire and South Wales, the Federation, 
although having branches all over the country, was concentrated mainly in and 
around London. The Comrades found their main source of support in the rural 
districts and provincial towns of the South East and South West.30 Thus, 
competition only developed in some places where more than one organisation was 
present. 
Indeed, the similarities between the various groups were perhaps more 
important than the differences. All the organisations were 'intensely loyal to the 
28 Wootton, The Politics oflnjlllence. pp.85-86. 
29 Lister to Hamilton, 3 March 1930, IH29/12. 
30 E.C. Heath The Position of the Legion, Sununer School 1926. 
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Crown',31 although the Federation and Association combined that with a great 
distrust of Government and the authorities. All Were based on fellow-feeling, or 
comradeship, and all were concerned with alleviating ex-service distress to some 
degree or another. Apart from the National Union of Ex-Service Men (N.u.x.) 
which was formed in 1919, none of the groups were Bolshevist or rejected the basic 
framework of parliamentary government or existing structures of society.32 Another 
aspect that characterised the organisations was the lack of control which the 
Executive Committees had over their branches. This lack of control led to incidents 
such as the Westminster Bridge riot in May 1919. This march to Parliament Square, 
when ex-service men were baton-charged by police, had been organised by the 
Woolwich branch but did not have the approval of Federation Headquarters. 33 Many 
of the disturbances caused by ex-service men in 1919 were the result of individual 
branch initiatives without the sanction or approval of Headquarters. In September 
1919, the Federation Organiser's report of his visit to the Eastern Division 
commented that 
there must be a stronger hand placed on the speakers of the Federation 
here. Their methods are not those which will tend to help, but in most 
cases lead the public to believe we are an extremist body. Too much of 
their time is taken up expounding Trade Union principles instead of 
sticking to Federation matters.34 
Much of the trouble between the organisations stemmed from local branches 
expounding policies which were not endorsed by Headquarters. Isolated incidents 
and local rivalries heightened the apparent differences between the organisations, 
when, below the surface, there were already movements towards unity. 
Although unity was not achieved until 1921, the theoretical desirability of 
amalgamation was recognised by all the organisations as early as 1918. In the 
summer of 1918, Sir Edward Bethune, Major Jellicorse, and W.G. Clifford attempted 
31 Lister to Hamilton, 3 March 1930, lH29/12. 
32 OHBL p.l0. The N.U.X. was excluded from the U.S.F. and refused to amalgamate with the other organisations in 1921 and, by 
1922, had disappeared. 
33 Wootton, The Politics of Infillence, p.125. 
34 Federation NEe Minutes, 21 September 1919. 
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to bring members of the Executive Committees of the three organisations together to 
discuss the possibility of amalgamation.35 Eventually a meeting was held in the 
Central Hall Westminster, under the chairmanship of General Sir Horace Smith-
Dorrien, on 30 July 1918 between 30 members of the various executives. The 
speeches made were amicable and favourable to amalgamation, although the divisive 
issues of officer and female membership and political affiliation were shelved for later 
discussion. However, Hogge's declaration that the Federation would run 20 
candidates at the forthcoming General Election broke up the meeting.36 
Perhaps the most important failed attempt at amalgamation was the plan for 
an 'Empire Services League' which was produced in early 1919. A Consultative 
Committee was convened in October 1918 by the Board of Admiralty, Army Council 
and Air Ministry to consider the formation of a unified League of ex-service men and 
to decide upon the administration of the canteen profits. The Service canteens run 
during the war had accumulated profits of nearly £8 million and it was decided that 
this money should be given back to the men who had spent their money in the 
canteens.37 The Committee was formed with General Sir Ian Hamilton, an appointee 
of the war office, as chairman, and equal numbers of officers and men as members. 
James Howell, the President of the National Association was very enthusiastic about 
the need for an amalgamated body of ex-service men. He wrote to Major Jellicorse, 
a member of the consultative committee, in November 1918: 
The news of the formation of such a comprehensive committee is good and 
to know that such men as you and Clifford are pillars of that corporate 
body is indeed gratifying. I hope your labours will be crowned with 
success. God knows! There is need for success. 38 
Howell, almost as much as the more conservative leaders of the Comrades, believed 
that ex-service grievances must be dealt with quickly to block the 'way to anarchy 
35 Jellicorse, The ex-Service Officers and Men and rhe Organisations looking after rheir Welfare. 
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and Bolshevism'.39 He also believed that the best way of having those grievances 
dealt with properly and fairly was through a large unified ex-service organisation. In 
a long letter to Jellicorse, Howell asked: 
Will the new amalgamated body partake of the nature of a Trade Union? 
Prima facie, the question seems absurd but how is it going to be new 
otherwise without banging into the Scylla of a Charitable institution or the 
Charybidis of a Party-Political League of Khaki and Blue - and 
Petticoats .. .!t certainly will have to be run on democratic lines ... and ... the 
success of the new organisation will depend upon the quality of its basis or 
foundation, ie Camaraderie. We know this: what more do we want? 
Something in common! Must that something in common stop at the 
alleviation of an Ex-service Man's Distress? .. Must it hold itself responsible 
for finding only employment for the class to which we belong? . .Is it going 
to give a beanfeast to the veterans? ... Obviously then, we must start with 
an avowed aim and must operate within certain limits or boundaries.4o 
Howell was groping towards the different elements that would find a place in the 
British Legion. There was general agreement among the consultative committee that 
any unified organisation of ex-service men must be founded on comradeship, with a 
democratic structure, and provide assistance for needy ex-service men, but it was 
much more difficult to decide the emphasis which should be placed on each area of 
interest. Each of the three ex-service associations was interviewed by the committee 
and their views recorded. Thomas Lister, the new President of the Federation, 
expressed his strong objections to any governmental interference and inquired 
whether 'the League would carry on if the three discharged ex-service men's 
organisations refused to come in?'.41 It became clear to each of the groups that, since 
this was a government-inspired scheme, there would be government control. 
Although the 'permanent organisation' was to be 'fully formed under the elective 
principle' and 'fully self-governing', the Executive Council would be established 
through the authority of the Board of Admiralty, the Army Council and the Air 
Ministry.42 Further, those three bodies could appoint one representative on the 
39 Howell to Jellicorse, 15 December 1918, IH29/37/4. 
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Central Council. More importantly, the Empire Services League was to 'co-ordinate 
the work of all Voluntary and Un-official bodies both inside the Services and outside 
of them which are working on behalf of those who have served'.43 Clearly, the War 
Office was not prepared to lose control entirely of the Canteen profits and the scheme 
provided a means of subsuming the three rival and politicised organisations into a 
docile, government controlled movement. Not surprisingly, the Federation saw this 
as another attempt to 'gas' ex-service men, while Wilfrid Ashley, the President of the 
Comrades, was offended by the suggestion that politicians should have no place in 
the ex-service movement. In the atmosphere of early 1919, when soldiers were 
rioting over demobilisation, and most ex-service men harboured great suspicions of 
government intentions, it was unlikely that the three ex-service organisations would 
agree to lose their independence or accept any degree of governmental control over 
their affairs. 44 Without the support of the three membership organisations, the 
government-sponsored League had little hope of becoming reality and Winston 
Churchill, the Secretary of State for War, 'disbanded the committee at the numerous 
and united requests of all ex-service organisations'.45 
In its place, Churchill set up another committee, under General Lord Byng, 
which eventually did come to fruition as the United Services Fund. Byng insisted 
upon, and obtained, the concession that there should be no governmental interference 
with the Committee and instead the United Services Fund was entirely self governing 
with 75% of the places on the Executive Committee occupied by the three ex-service 
organisations. 46 The Committee consisted of 12 members, 9 from the three major 
associations, and 3 representatives of unorganised ex-service men. With an 
organisation of District and Area Committees, on which the three organisations were 
all represented, the United Services Fund set about administering the huge profits of 
the Canteen Fund to the general benefit of ex-service men, their wives, widows and 
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dependents.47 It was not until 1934 that the Legion and U.S.F. were actually 
amalgamated. However, although the United Services Fund provided a fair and 
suitable means of disposing of this surplus, it was not a membership organisation, and 
did not advance the cause of unity between the various organisations. Although the 
Westminster Conference in 1918 and the Empire Services League scheme in 1919 
had failed, the leaders of the three organisations did at least accept in theory that 
amalgamation would bring many advantages. Eventually, all that was needed was the 
right conditions and, more importantly, the right scheme to bring about unity. 
With the alarming growth in ex-service poverty and unemployment during 
1920, all three organisations had to deal with ex-service hardship and with problems 
of their own. There was a falling off in membership and a greater display of apathy 
towards the ex-service movement by the general public and by the veterans who were 
potential members.48 The slump placed great financial pressure on the organisations, 
who lacked money both for their administrative needs, and for the demands of ex-
service men in distress. By 1920, the differences between the three organisations 
were more muted than during the earlier years of their existence, and the similarities 
became more prominent. The complete failure of the Federation and Association to 
gain any seats in Parliament at the 1918 election cooled their enthusiasm for direct 
political representation. The Federation lost its explicit connection with the Liberal 
Party in 1919, when James Hogge had resigned his position as Honorary President 
and Treasurer to accept the post of Chief Whip of the Asquithian wing of the Liberal 
Party.49 The Federation had also decided to remove another bone of contention with 
the Comrades at their May 1919 Conference by allowing all officers to join the 
organisation. 50 In the face of great ex-service hardship, the Federation also had to 
abandon its complete rejection of voluntary and charitable activities. Many 
Federation branches, often without the approval of Headquarters, began to set up 
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soup kitchens and rest centres for homeless veterans or those tramping for work. 
They also began to adopt and actively seek the help of wealthy benefactors for branch 
efforts, and the appearance of many wealthy ex-officers as branch Presidents or 
Patrons was indicative of the change of mood and direction in the Federation. 51 
Meanwhile, the Comrades were beginning to concede that greater government efforts 
were necessary to alleviate distress. 52 After severing its links with the trade union 
movement, the Association under James Howell, and later under Arthur Jackson, 
became more conservative and thus closer to the Comrades in outlook. 53 
Ironically, it was the emergence of the Officer's Association, as the fourth 
major ex-service organisation which spurred the other three organisations towards 
unity. During August 1919, a meeting under the Chairmanship ofField Marshal Earl 
Haig planned an Officer's Association which would amalgamate the eleven voluntary 
societies working for ex-officers. After the meeting, Haig wrote to a friend, H. 
Baird, saying: 
my ultimate aim is to form One Association to include all who have served 
in H.M.s service, regardless of their rank or present position. I hope that 
the meeting which was held at Cowley Street may be the beginning of the 
'Ex-Officer branch' of that Great Association. 54 
Haig had interested himself in the ex-service movement since joining the Comrades 
during the War, and had been represented at the 1919 Consultative Committee by his 
military secretary, General Ruggles-Brise. 55 It is clear that Haig wanted a unified 
organisation of all ex-service men which he would lead and he saw the amalgamation 
of ex-officers' associations as the first stage. But the new Officers' Association was 
not similar in character or function to the other three ex-service organisations. The 
Officer's Association took the form of a charity composed of wealthy benefactors 
who were interested in donating to help needy officers; it was not a membership 
51 Kimball, The Ex-Service Movement in England and Wales, p.72. 
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organisation of the ex-officers themselves. 56 Consequently, its five branches were all 
based in London, with a network of voluntary helpers throughout the country. The 
Officers' Association was an amalgamation of fifteen smaller societies which collected 
funds to assist ex-officers and their families. 57 This rationalised the collection and 
distribution of funds for ex-officers through five separate committees which oversaw 
different areas of interest; Appeals, Employment, Housing, Families and 
Disablement. 58 As might be inferred from these categories, the Officers' Association 
reflected societal assumptions that officers should aspire to, and maintain, a solid 
middle class status. Ex-officer3 were expected to obtain highly paid employment, live 
in good accommodation and send their children to public school and university. 
Consequently, the amount which an ex-officer could expect to receive from the 
Officers' Association was substantial. On 30 January 1920, Haig, along with many 
other senior military figures, launched an appeal for the Officers' Association at a 
dinner in the Mansion House. 59 This appeal was extremely successful and gained 
donations from many wealthy people. During 1920 alone the Association received 
£637,000 in donations from the public and of this, £288,000 had been subscribed 
from four large companies.60 However, the Officers' Association's great success in 
obtaining financial support pre-empted an appeal by the Comrades who were, by 
early 1920, desperately short offunds. 61 
By February 1920, the Comrades Grand Council had decided to support an 
initiative for amalgamation between the four main ex-service organisations and in 
May 1920, the Federation's Annual Conference also decided to support 
amalgamation. Once the various groups had decided to pursue negotiations, the new 
organisation was formed quickly. Nine months later, on 1 July 1921, the British 
Legion was officially established.62 The speed and urgency with which amalgamation 
56 Wootton, The Politics oflnjlllence, p.105. 
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occurred demonstrates the desire for unity amongst the executives of the various 
organisations, but also gives an indication of the serious nature of the problems which 
were facing the separate organisations. In July 1920 the Federation Executive issued 
invitations to all the major organisations for a Conference that August between 6 
delegates from each association with their respective General Secretaries.63 
After the first Unity Conference, held at the Royal United Services Institute, 
on 7 August 1920, the drafting committee met on 21 August to decide the general 
principles of the new constitution. J. R. Griffin, then General Secretary of the 
Federation, and soon to become the Assistant General Secretary of the British 
Legion, was appointed to draft a constitution which he completed in little over a 
week. 64 This was approved by the drafting committee on 4 September and the 
second unity Conference held on 18 September then hammered out a more or less 
final copy.65 
'Rule 1 - Principles and Policy', contained in a few key paragraphs the main 
beliefs and ideals which set the character of the new organisation.66 Rule 1 (A) stated 
that 'The Legion shall be democratic, non-sectarian and not affiliated to, or connected 
directly with, any political party or political organisations'.67 This rule was an 
important provision which ensured that the Legion could fulfill its role as the 
spokesman for all ex-service men. It was also the answer to prevent organised ex-
service men from banging into the 'Scylla of a Charitable institution or the Charybidis 
of a Party-Political League of Khaki and Blue'.68 To embrace party politics would 
have led to factions within the Legion, or the break-up of the new organisation, but 
to ignore politics altogether would have relegated the Legion to solely a charitable 
role. The Legion adopted a political stance which, although repudiating party 
politics, gave enough room for maneouvre on wider political issues. It ensured that 
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the Legion could be broadly attractive by offering democracy without attaching the 
Legion to any particular political creed. Although the Legion was not connected to 
any political party, this did not limit the Legion in any wider political sense, and Rule 
1(0) made this explicit: 
There shall be nothing to prevent the Legion from adopting a definite 
policy on any question directly or indirectly affecting ex-service men and 
women nor from taking any constitutional action considered necessary in 
pursuance of such policy.69 
From the outset, the Legion leadership gave themselves the freedom to engage in 
pressure tactics which would influence the political process. This rule was a direct 
descendant of the Federation policies which had had success in exerting pressure on 
government - notably with pension increases in 1919. 
Rule 1 (B) was taken directly from the Comrades' Constitution since each of 
the organisations agreed that comradeship should be, and was, the basis of their 
movement. The additional phrases were merely a restatement of a number of the 
principles of the Comrades in a clearer manner,7o Rule l(C) was an almost direct 'lift' 
from six of the principles of the American Legion.71 The Federation had wished to 
include the phrases 'To inculcate a sense of individual obligation to the community, 
state and nation' and 'To combat the autocracy of both the classes and the masses' 
unchanged, but under pressure from both the Comrades and the Association, these 
became 'to inculcate a sense of loyalty to the Crown, Community and Nation' and 'to 
promote unity amongst all classes'.72 The inclusion of the Crown as the primary 
focus for ex-service men's loyalty accorded with the views of the Officers' 
Association and the Comrades while the inclusion of, 'the promotion of unity between 
all classes', perpetuated the Victorian and Edwardian ideals of social harmony and 
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order. Both provisos ensured that the new organisation would ultimately be 
supportive of the existing social order.73 
Once the draft constitution had been accepted, each of the associations 
informed their branches of the negotiations and held special conferences and meetings 
to authorise the constitution. The next Unity Conference not only accepted the draft 
constitution in principle, but set up a Provisional Unity Committee, composed of six 
members from each of the organisations to settle the arrangements for 
amalgamation. 74 During December 1920, this Provisional Unity Committee arranged 
the foundation of a Unity Relief Committee to administer a grant from the National 
Relief Fund and various other smaller bodies. This Fund provided a practical 
demonstration of the intention to amalgamate and Local Unity Relief Committees 
began to deal with distress amongst ex-service men in a more efficient manner than 
was possible with the separate competing organisations.75 By the time the Unity 
Conference was held at the Queen's Hall in London on 14 and 15 May, most of the 
contentious issues had been resolved; as the Federation's Bulletin observed, 
'amalgamation was a foregone conclusion'.76 However, this conference, of 700 
delegates, represented ex-service men from across the country who gave the 
memberships' views on amalgamation. The Conference considered and amended the 
Constitution, decided upon the name of the new organisation and elected the 
principal officers. There had been many suggestions for the new title, including the 
Warrior's Guild, and British Empire Services League, but the name 'British Legion' 
was unanimously adopted.77 The Prince of Wales became Patron, and Earl Haig was 
elected President.78 Thomas Lister, who had distinguished himself as Chairman at 
every Unity Conference, became the new Chairman, while George Crosfield, who 
had been the main negotiator for the Comrades, was elected Vice-Chairman. Thus 
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there was a great deal of continuity between the Legion and the previous 
organisations and most of the members of the first National Executive Council of the 
Legion had gained their knowledge of ex-service affairs on the Councils of the 
Federation or Comrades. 
With the conclusion of this last Unity Conference, 'the avowed aims'79 of the 
new organisation had been set. The British Legion would operate within clearly 
defined 'limits or boundaries'. 80 The character of the British Legion was indeed a 
composite of each of the previous organisations. The new organisation would stand 
for the accepted order of British government, establishment and society. The 
potential for protest and demonstration was muted, but the Federation's aim of using 
political pressure to gain concessions was not entirely discarded. Ex-service men 
could now join a voluntary movement with the characteristics and potential of a 
'charitable institution' and 'a trade union'81 which, combined with the many branches 
and clubs already in existence from the previous groups, was based on the ideal of 
comradeship. 
It was not until 1 July 1921 that the British Legion officially came into 
existence but on the Sunday morning of 15 May, the last day of the Unity 
Conference, the delegates trooped from the Queens Hall and assembled at the 
Cenotaph. Four men laid a laurel wreath containing the four emblems of the separate 
organisations and with this symbolic gesture amalgamation was complete.82 
79 Howell to Jellicorse, 15 December 1918, IH29/37/4. 
80 ibid. 
81 ibid. 
82 OHBL p.29. 
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'UNITY OF ACTION ON THE FIELD OF PEACE': 
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BRITISH LEGION 
On 3 April 1922, Earl Haig spoke to a large meeting in Birmingham on the 
advantages of a united veterans' organization: 
It was unity of action, combined with the heroic devotion of officers and 
men, which finally achieved victory on the field of battle, and it is surely 
only by a like unity that we shall win victory on the field of peace. I think, 
therefore, that the leaders of the four great ex-service men's organizations 
which have come together throughout the country can point with 
legitimate pride to their successful efforts in promoting unity, and this 
united action on the part of ex-service men must inevitably foster and 
develop unity of action throughout the whole nation. 1 
Unity of the British ex-service movement had been a constant theme of Haig's 
speeches since 1919, and with the formation of the British Legion in 1921, it 
appeared that Haig had been proved right. However, even after 1921, much of the 
vaunted unity of the British ex-service movement was only skin deep. Although the 
three main membership organizations (the Federation, Comrades and Association) 
did amalgamate to form the foundation for the British Legion, both the Officer's 
Benevolent Department and the Women's Section maintained a semi-autonomous 
existence. This chapter examines the organization and administrative structure of the 
Legion, but also looks at the divisions and rivalries within the movement, which 
caused tension and disruption quite at variance with Haig's idealistic picture. 
During and after 1921, in places where the four original organizations 
were present, their branches amalgamated or were allocated in different districts and 
the old rivalries between the organizations did not seem to hamper the development 
of the new movement. Thomas Lister, now Chairman of the British Legion, 
remarked in August 1921 that: 
1 Haig, Speech at Binningham, 3 April 1922, Acc.3155, No.235.c. 
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Only five weeks have elapsed since the opening of the headquarters of the 
Legion, and already the response has been worthy of the cause - 690 have 
been formed .... This result is a tribute to the solidarity of the new body 
and the loyalty of the old ex-service organisations throughout the country.2 
By the end of 1921 1,478 branches had been formed although membership was only 
18,000.3 However, during 1922 the growth was nearly two branches a day and the 
Legion grew from 1,500 branches in 1922 to over 5,000 in 1939.4 Although the aim 
of having a branch within three miles of every ex-service man's home was never 
attained, 5 the continued growth of branches meant that, even by the end of 1922, the 
Legion was a truly national organization with branches all over the country. 
Perhaps the greatest difference between the previous organizations and 
the Legion lay in the power and control of the National Executive Council and 
National Headquarters. While the earlier groups had national Executive Councils, 
and often regional groupings, they had not been able to exert much influence over the 
individual branches. The National Federation was criticised in Home Office 
Intelligence reports for being 'merely an aggregation of local branches' with no central 
organization or concrete policy'. 6 With the formation of the Legion, the position 
became entirely different. Unity had been achieved through negotiations with the 
various controlling bodies of the Comrades, Federation and Association, and the 
strength of the Executive Council was vastly increased. The National Executive 
Council controlled the funds of the Legion, and was able to order the expulsion of 
individual members and even entire branches. From the National Executive Council 
and Headquarters Departments, authority ran to the 13 Area Councils which were the 
main administrative units. These had first been used by the Federation and covered a 
region; for example, the South Eastern Area encompassed the counties of Kent, 
Sussex, the Isle of Wight, Surrey, Hampshire and Berkshire. It was then within the 
power of the Area Council to delegate certain responsibilities to a County or District 
2 British Legion Journal August 1921, p.27, hereafter referred to as BU. 
3 OHBL p.36, British Legion Annual Report 1922, hereafter referred to as BLAR. 
4 See Table 3. 
5 BLAR 1923. 
6 Report on Revolutionary Organisations in the United Kingdom, 21 ,. ~AB24/80. 
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Committee which would co-ordinate and monitor Branch activity within the county 
boundary or city district. 
However, the real strength of the ex-service movement lay at the grass 
roots level. The branch was the basic unit and mainspring of the Legion as 
acknowledged by the first Annual Report in 1922: 
The life of the Legion lies in its Branches, and while Headquarters can 
exercise a controlling influence, the well being and the whole future of the 
Legion is largely in the hands of the Branches themselves.7 
Every member of the Legion was firstly a member of his local branch and it was here 
that ex-service men went to meet their fellow members, to discuss problems and to 
deal with Legion work. It was also the branch that formed the first contact for the 
local ex-service community; much of the basic work of the Legion in employment, 
pensions and relief was carried out by the branches. 
Much of the effort of the Legion hierarchy was devoted to the 
formation, development and control of new branches. The role of the Area 
Organising Secretary (a paid post) was defined as 'Organising Strong Branches on 
Sound lines'. 8 Once a branch was formed, the role of the Area and County became 
one of supervision - by ensuring that the branch adhered to the Legion rules and 
constitution and executed all relief, employment and pension work properly. This 
control sometimes manifested itself with 'an appearance of ruthlessness'.9 Legion 
Headquarters continually stressed the need for control and respectability in branches. 
In 1925, after there had been considerable 'pruning' of 'unsatisfactory' branches, the 
Annual Report explained that: 
Your Council, ever jealous of the good name of the Legion, sets more 
store on the possession of a fair number of branches commanding the 
respect of the entire community among whom they exist, rather than on 
having a vast number incapable of commanding such respect. 10 
7 BLAR 1922. 
8 General Secretary's Circular Letters to the Branches, to Area Organisers, 21 April 1922, hereafter referred to as GSCLB. 
9 BLAR 1925. 
10 ibid. 
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This pruning had been achieved by the mass expulsion of branches which were not 
deemed fit to remain in the Legion. The majority of the branches which were closed 
down during 1924-25 came from the Metropolitan and North Eastern Areas -
previous strongholds of the Federation and Association - which lost eleven and four 
branches respectively.ll Many of the branches expelled had become moribund -
branches in name only with no activity or live membership - while in others it was felt 
that the standard of behavior had brought discredit upon the Legion. Most of the 
branches were wound up due to the actions of disreputable clubs attached to the 
branch which broke licensing laws. 
An exchange of letters between Thomas Jarvis, the secretary of the 
Millwall & Cubitt British Legion club, and General Sir Ian Hamilton in 1929, 
President of the Metropolitan Area, is revealing. Both the Branch and club in 
Millwall were in serious difficulties when Jarvis wrote to Hamilton: 
Thank you very much for your assistance, we are at our lowest ebb ... 
nobody at present is getting any pay ... I myself would not like to see the 
old club finish for the sake of a little assistance ... but now our backs are 
against the wall and we shall fight to keep open as long as the odds are not 
too great. 12 
Although Hamilton was sympathetic and had sent a donation, the Area Organising 
Secretary, H. Cheeseman was not impressed by Jarvis' plea. He wrote to Hamilton 
informing him that: 'I am arranging for my Standing Committee to visit the Branch. 
The best thing to be done in the case of the club is for it to close down. It is an 
absolute death trap'.13 Ultimately, the club was indeed closed down and the branch 
was completely re-organized. This is just one example of the control which Area 
Councils and Headquarters wielded over Legion branches. Legion branches were 
never allowed to be a mere aggregation of branches with no concrete policy; there 
11 See Table 3. 
12 Thomas Jarvis to Ian Hamilton, 23 January 1929, 1H29/8. 
13 H.E. Cheeseman to Ian HamiltM - - -y, IH29/8. 
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could be no argument over the Legion principles or objectives which were set by the 
National Executive Council. 
However, although the rules and principles of the Legion were firmly 
maintained, the branches of the Legion still varied widely in size, membership and 
activity. Membership could vary from 90% of the local ex-service community to less 
than 1 %, while the actual number of members could range from ten or twenty to over 
one thousand. Most Legion branches drew their membership from the ex-service 
men of a village or town, but there were also many branches which reflected a 
distinct group of interests or commemorated a particular unit which served during the 
war. These ranged from the British Serbian Units Branch with 18 members 'who met 
month after month with no other attraction than to meet each other'14 to the House of 
Commons Branch of 100 M.P.s and parliamentary staff, which was intended to 
marshal support for ex-service policies within the seat of government itself. The 
London City and the Birmingham 'Forward' Branches were 'composed of business 
men and the black-coated Brigade Generals'15 who were meant to use their influence 
in economic and employment matters. The Monash Memorial Branch was formed 
from Australians who remained in Britain after the war while the Fleet Street Branch 
contained journalists who often assisted with Legion publicity. These special interest 
branches were exclusive and tended to discriminate between ex-service men. For 
example, while the London City Branch was filled with stockbrokers, other ex-
service men who worked in London joined the suburban branches in the areas where 
they lived. This situation drew protest at the first Legion Conference in 1922 when 
the Sheperd's Bush delegate claimed that the formation of branches in Government 
departments and House of Commons was: 'setting up in the Legion a distinct class 
system. They were creating class distinction, weakening local branches and tending 
to bring about demoralisation'.16 The real complaint was that many 'house' branches 
14 Miss C.M. Marx to Ian Hamilton, II February 1930, IH29/12. 
15 H.E. Cheeseman to fa" Hamilton, 21 July 1926, IH2912. 
16 Annual Coni Res. No. 24, hereafter referred to.1S AC. 
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set their subscription rates at a high level, thus discouraging poorer ex-service men 
from joining them. At the same time, house branches attracted wealthy Legion 
members away from local branches which needed their financial support. The motion 
was defeated and the next twenty years saw the proliferation of Ihousel branches; 
such a situation was perhaps inevitable, but it did create serious distinctions between 
Legion branches. However, the vast majority of Legion branches remained 
connected solely to the communities where they were formed and these branches 
could become the focus for local ex-service activity. A good example of a thriving 
branch comes from a description ofa meeting at Ashford, Kent in May 1927: 
It was just an ordinary combined meeting of the Menls and Womenls 
branches - held every quarter; that is, just ordinary for Ashford.... Some 
500 to 600 present.. .. First, Silent Tribute and Exhortation; Apologies, 
Minutes of the last meetings of Menls and Womenls branches read by the 
respective secretaries, followed by quarterly reports from each. Then the 
appointed delegates reports on the Area Conference. Short Addresses 
were given by the Chairmen of the two sections, each summing up their 
respective branch activities. Then a half-hour address by Mr Wilce-Taylor 
from Headquarters on British Legion and United Services Fund Co-
ordination and Aftercare of War Orphans. Follows quarter-hour interval 
for refreshments supplied by the Refreshment committee at moderate 
charges ... Then a short sketch well played by local actors, and after that 
some community singing! Printed sheets, conductor, piano, and a leading 
singer - everything is done well at Ashford! 17 
This meeting at Ashford might have had more variety and entertainment than a 
typical branch meeting, but it does give a good impression of the type of activities 
which went on at a branch meeting. It is also important to note, that apart from the 
silent tribute and exhortation and the topics being discussed, the format used and the 
type of entertainment provided was exactly the same as might be found at a Church 
meeting, a Womenls Institute, or a Working Manis club. Indeed, there was little to 
distinguish Legion organization and structure from many other voluntary movements 
in Britain. 
17 Dr r Vay 1927, p.228. 
, 
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A branch was run by its members through elected Committees and 
officers which were decided at the Branch Annual General Meeting. This was open 
to aU local members of the Legion as the forum where branch officers were elected, 
the previous year was reviewed and aU members could have their say on the running 
and policy of the branch. The Legion organisation and structure certainly provided a 
democratic pyramid, running from Branch to National level. Every Branch held its 
General Meeting during the autumn, each County held its Conference during 
November and December, with Area Conferences in January to March, aU building 
up to the Annual National Conference at Whitsuntide. All of these Conferences 
could be forums for the Branches and their delegates to air grievances, discuss issues, 
elect officials and attempt to change the policy of the Legion. 
However, there were practical obstacles in the way of Legion 
democracy. The main problem was lack of finance. Democracy can be expensive, 
and many branches simply could not afford to send a delegate to the Area and Annual 
Conferences. This is borne out in the numbers of delegates who attended Conference 
in the period. At no time were there more than 1,206 delegates at any Annual 
Conference. 18 This was not apathy or any direct desire by the leadership to limit the 
representation of the branches but based entirely on financial considerations. The 
Whitley bay delegate put the problem very clearly at the 1923 Conference: 
In the North Eastern Area there were 187 Branches but he believed that of these 
branches only eight had sent delegates. The reason for the absence of the others was 
a question of finance, pure and simple. Out of these eight delegates, three had paid 
their own expenses; one had his expenses paid by the Area. That left four branches 
, 
that could afford to send delegates to the Conference. 19 
Since another Delegate estimated his personal expenses, in coming to and staying in 
London for the Conference, at five pounds, it is not surprising that many Branches 
18 See Table 7. 
19 AC 1913, Selection ofL)catio • Conference. 
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could not afford to send a delegate.2o This could alter the character of the 
Conference and its decisions. The first seven conferences were held in London which 
made it comparatively easy for a London branch to send a delegate; the outlook of 
these early conferences was acknowledged to be mainly Metropolitan. However, the 
same applied when the Conference moved to Scarborough, Cardiff, Weston-super-
Mare and Buxton. Local Branches, notwithstanding the fares pooling system, were 
more likely to attend and so bring a local character and perhaps bias to the 
Conference. Thus the Annual Conference was not representative of the entire Legion, 
in the way that a County or Area Conference could be of its constituency . .I However, 
the geographical spread of Legion delegates at Conference was sufficient to provide a 
representative sample of the whole movement; a rough sort of democratic 
JP 
representation was obtained at the Annual Conference. I However, even with a 
reasonably representative Annual Conference, there were other pitfalls for Legion 
democracy. The Conference was referred to as the 'Parliament of the Legion', the 
supreme authority and decision-making body. In practice, the Conference, meeting 
as it did only once a year, could not exer~ise full control or authority over Legion 
affairs, principles and policy. Ultimately, the day-to-day running of the Legion, and 
implementation of policy fell to the National Executive Council. In fact, the National 
Executive was in a position of almost unassailable strength. As the Rules of the 
Legion detailed, 'All powers of the Legion shall be vested in and 
exercisable by the National Council except ... those ... expressely required to be 
exercised by the Legion in Conference.' Further, the Council appointed all paid staff 
and officials (except those appointed by Area or Branch committees) and all the 
funds of the Legion, both from affiliation fees and the Poppy Appeal, were ultimately 
controlled by the National Executive CounciPI The National Executive Council was 
composed of a higher than normal number of officers, and its personnel did not 
20 ibid, Brighous~ "I~-"te. 
21 Rule 6(1') poir. , .;."tish Legion Royal Chart.:r oflncorporation am. :chedule of Rules, 1925. 
'Unity of Action' -- 36 
change frequently - the Areas continued to nominate the same people every year. 
This meant that even when the Council failed to implement resolutions passed by 
Conference, there was little that Conference, apart from expressing its displeasure, 
could do. 
A good example of this occurred at the 1929 Conference, when a 
Resolution was tabled: 
expressing profound dissatisfaction with the inaction of the Council in 
failing to comply with the provisions of Resolution No.lll of the National 
Conference, 1928, and urges the Council to take such action without 
delay'.22 
Resolution No.lll of the 1928 Conference, had called for a National Demonstration 
on the Seven Years Time Limit and Pensions Policy. The East Midland Area 
Delegate protested: 
against the efforts of the National Executive Council to mould the policy 
of the Legion ... The Assistant General Secretary, speaking at Leicester on 
January 16th, said "The National Executive Council will never agree to a 
National Demonstration". That means that, though we decide on a policy, 
it is to be over-ruled by the men on the National Executive Council ... if 
they are not prepared to carry out the policy dictated by the 
Branches ... they have no right to sit where they are. If they cannot carry 
out our policy, there are others who are willing to come forward to do it.23 
The Chairman of the Legion was able to deflect this criticism by saying 'we felt that it 
was better to "demonstrate" - which means to prove clearly - by deputations and by 
our leaflet policy ... than by tub-thumping in Hyde Park or gesticulating round the 
Lions in Trafalgar Square'.24 With the pressure thus released no more action was 
taken by either side. Clearly, Branch delegates, even when in effect censuring the 
Council, were reluctant to actually suggest that the Council be removed. In the 
event, the National Executive Council was never seriously challenged throughout the 
twenty years. Thus as Graham Wootton has remarked, ex-service men liked 'to talk 
22 AC 1929, Res. No.138. 
23 ibid. 
24·v . 
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radical and act whig'.25 Some Legion delegates did suggest that there should be a 
greater tum-over in the Council. The Home Counties Delegate at the 1931 
Conference, moved that all NEC representatives, after three years service, should 
have to stand down for at least a year. The resolution 'aimed at importing a 
continuous strain of new blood into the Executive, with a view to keeping the older 
ones, who were liable to stagnate, up to their job. If they wanted a young and 
energetic Executive, they must continuously change it'.26 That the problem existed is 
certain; Council members were bound to lack fresh views and ideas after years on the 
Council. However, this problem was never recognised and addressed by the 
Conference; the 1931 Resolution fell. This lack of 'new blood' and the consequent 
stagnation did mean that the Council and National Officers could seriously fail to 
judge the temper of the Legion as a whole. This could and did lead to serious rifts 
between the Leadership and membership over policy; later chapters will detail the 
actual events and consequences of this. Many Branches were often dissatisfied with 
the action taken by the Executive as lacking 'push and shove'. A good example of 
this occurred in 1927 when the Woodgreen and Southgate Branch: 
resolved to pursue a policy of strenuous attack on the National Executive 
and High Administration because:-
(1) Of the negative and ineffectual conduct of general affairs. 
(2) The continued failure to formulate and fight a strong NATIONAL 
PROGRAMME. 
Principally, however, this branch is out to remove the Executive and 
Administration as now constituted, at any rate by the forthcoming 
Conference. It is considered difficult to distinguish those of our leaders 
who are of REAL and HONEST PURPOSE, and that the only real and 
effective remedy to the present comatose conditions is to put NEW 
BLOOD AT HEADQUARTERS. Men who will take office pledged to 
'GET ON OR GET OUT.'27 
The Woodgreen and Southgate Branch was articulating impatience with the lack of 
real progress made by the Executive, but this 'strenuous attack' was easily defeated by 
25 Wootton, The Politics oflnflllence, p.70. 
26 AC 1931, Alteration to the Royal Charter, Clause 14. 
27 Woodgreen and Southgate Branch ~ircular, 14 February 1926, 1H29/3. 
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the Northern District of the Metropolitan Area which did not support it. Many 
similar resolutions were brought into Conference along the lines that more action 
needed to be taken, but as Lister remarked in the 1927 address, such resolutions did 
not of themselves guarantee actual effective action which could only really originate 
at the Branch leveP8 
It was at the Conferences that Legion delegates had the opportunity to 
elect the Honorary officials who ran much of the Legion administration. The officers 
elected followed the same general pattern and fulfilled similar roles at each level, 
although the responsibilities grew with each post. The main Legion officials were 
President, Vice-Presidents, Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and Honorary Treasurer. 
Legion pre-occupation with respectability and prestige continued with the selection 
of branch officers. In the guidelines for branch formation prospective members were 
warned that 'Great care must be taken in the election of branch officers as the success 
of the branch depends entirely upon it's leadership'.29 Not every branch followed 
such advice, but, in general, a branch President was a respected member of the local 
community who could use his influence for the benefit of the branch. Local worthies 
and ex-officers predominated amongst Branch Presidents. This process was 
accentuated at the higher levels of the Legion. The County Patron and President was 
frequently held by a local noble or senior military figure; the post was often held by 
the Lord Lieutenant of the County. In Oxfordshire the first President was the Duke 
of Marlborough while in Somerset Admiral Bethel was followed by the Duke of 
Somerset. 30 Area Presidencies were held by similar people with perhaps more 
glowing records in the Great War or previous conflicts. The South Eastern Area 
Presidency was held by Major-General Rt. Hon. J.E.B. Seely until 1930 and 
subsequently by Brigadier-General EJ. Phipps Hornby, while General Sir Ian 
Hamilton held the Metropolitan Area Presidency from 1921 until 1935 when he 
28 AC 1927, Discussion of Annual Report. 
29 Official Handbooks of the County Organisation 1933. 
30 Somerset Coun' Annual Repor\ and Accounts 1934, IH29120. 
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became Patron. 31 The post of National President was held by Field Marshal Earl 
Haig, Admiral Earl Jellicoe and subsequently by General Sir Frederick Maurice 
'whose vast knowledge of Legion affairs marked him out as a particularly suitable 
successor to those two great figures of the War'.32 This concentration of members of 
the military and social elite amongst the Presidents of the Legion was a striking 
feature of the organization. Although the Legion's practical work was the 
cornerstone of it's activity, much of this was accomplished by an entirely voluntary 
membership. It was the President's role to create interest and enthusiasm for ex-
service issues - both for Legion members and non-members. One of the responses of 
Legion Organisers like H.E. Cheeseman of the Metropolitan Area was to use popular 
and well known figures like General Sir Ian Hamilton to draw attention to the 
Legion's work. He remarked that 'experience has already taught me that it is very 
difficult to arouse enthusiasm unless someone of influence, like yourself, can give us 
a lead'.33 Thus the role of a Legion President at any level of the organization was to 
make key-note speeches, address large meetings, inspect Legion parades and reviews 
and generally help to keep the Legion in the fore-front of the public mind. When Sir 
Ian and Lady Hamilton held a Ball for the Metropolitan Area in 1928, Cheeseman felt 
that he had done 'more in four hours than the Area Council could have done in 
sending representatives to all the Branches'.34 This reinforces the importance of 
social functions to the Legion's work. As a voluntary group the Legion had to keep 
its members happy and interested in the serious side of its work, mainly through 
social functions. Personalities and 'eminent men' like Hamilton were well-suited to 
enhancing this social dimension of the Legion. Cheeseman felt that Hamilton 'should 
be asked to attend functions where your splendid personality and immense popularity 
does a great deal of good by getting outside people to take an interest in the local 
31 South Eastern Area Annual Report and Accounts, 1929-1931. 
32 BLAR 1932. 
33 H.E. Cheeseman to Ian Hamilton, 29 March 1926, IH29/1. 
34 'I.E. Cheesema1 to Ian Hamilton, 11 May 192?, IH29/4. 
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affairs of the Branchl.35 There was a division of work between the President and the 
Chairman which Hamilton recognised: 
I like the Chairmanls idea that he is to take the Iseriousl meetings and 
prefers frivolous people like myself to go to shows such as this garden 
party. I'm sure I donlt mind, but I confess I have sometimes felt that my 
magnificent powers of oratory were somewhat wasted on half a dozen 
little boys and girls and a policeman, which is the usual audience at a 
garden party openingp6 
Many of the eminent men of the Legion, Haig and Hamilton included, did not involve 
themselves directly in Legion administration but played a major role in popularising 
the Legion. However, at every level they added a layer of prestige and social status 
to the Legion which was generally welcomed by Legion members. In Sunbury-on-
Thames, the Branch President was a local prominent figure, Sir George Higgins, who 
was not an ex-service man. At first he refused to accept the post, but las one of the 
oldest residents, who had shown his interest in the Legion,1 the Legion members 
pressed him to accept.37 In fact, this patronage of clubs and branches had a long 
precedent, even within the Working Manis Movement, for the prestige and financial 
assistance which could be gained. Thus, many of the leaders of the Legion were 
essentially figureheads and not intimately involved in the practical work of the 
Legion. In fact, many of the men elected to the position of President did little more 
than lend their names to the organization. When General Sir Ian Hamilton found that 
he was criss-crossing the country attending Legion functions he complained to 
Colonel Heath, the General Secretary, that: 
It seems to me that I am having more and more put on my shoulders, 
though not by you .... I do wish some of the other (national) Vice-
Presidents would take a hand now and then, but, as far as I can see they 
donlt very much help.38 
35 H.E. Cheeseman to Ian Hamilton, 12 July 1927, IH29/4. 
36 Ian Hamilton to H.E. Cheeseman, 8 July 1927, IH29/4. 
37 Sunbury-on-Thames Branch History. 
38 Ian Hamilton to E.C. Heath, 23 April 1926, IH29/1. 
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Men like Haig and Hamilton became extremely popular within the Legion, not only 
because they were well-known public figures, but because they were among the few 
high-ranking officers who took an active and personal interest in the ex-service 
movement. 
While the Presidents were involved in their 'frivolous' role, Legion 
Chairmen and committees were debating and dealing with major issues concerning 
ex-service men. Colonel Crosfield called the Chairmen and Secretaries the 'The 
Platoon Leaders'.39 At the higher levels these were augmented by the paid organizing 
staff. Thus the main influence on Legion policy was exerted by the 'working parties' 
of Chairmen, Secretaries and Committee members. 
Every level of the Legion relied on a General Committee or Council to 
run its general affairs and decide upon important matters. The Branch General 
Committee was formed from the Honorary Officers and seven to fifteen members of 
the branch who were willing to be fully involved in the Branch's activities. Its job was 
to 'hold Branch meetings regularly ... Commence punctually and be businesslike'40 
while ensuring that the sub-committees dealing with Employment, Relief, Finance, 
Entertainment, and Poppy Day functioned correctly without any overlapping of 
responsibility. This pattern of General Committee and sub-committees which 
executed detailed work was repeated throughout the Legion hierarchy. At Branch 
level these committees were more concerned with the practicalities of ex-service 
needs and problems than Legion policy. 
Above Branch level, the structure utilised varied considerably from 
Area to Area. Area Councils could delegate some administration and work to 
County Committees but not every Area Council decided to implement this option 
immediately. Thus the County Committee was not necessarily an integral part of the 
organization and it took a number of years for this system of administration to 
39 AC 1922, Col. Crosfield, Vice-Chainnan's Address. 
40 South Eastern Area Annual Report and Accounl5 1931. 
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spread. By 1933, six of the Areas had implemented County Committees although it 
was never introduced into Ireland. The territory covered by a County Council 
depended on the traditional boundary of the area although some committees were bi-
county as in the case of Leicestershire and Rutland (Rutland, the smallest county in 
England being too small to form a Committee on its own). The number of branches 
in a county could vary greatly depending on the size and population of the County. 
Thus a large prosperous county like Kent in 1937 had 132 branches compared with 
23 in Pembrokeshire. 41 The County Committee was formed from the elected 
Honorary officers and a number of representatives from the branches - generally 
between ten and twenty. Its role was to control and supervise the branches, ensuring 
that each branch operated properly and did not overlap its activities with any other. 
The County Committee also had an important function as an information gatherer, as 
noted in the 1934 Somerset County Report: 
The work undertaken in this County along the lines and conviction 
expressed by the Somerset Branches proves that the only means of the 
Legion becoming strong in development, purpose and service is by a virile 
County department responsible for all Legion work within its borders. By 
collections of data, opinions and experiences of County Committees, 
Headquarters can obtain valuable information to assist them in the carrying 
out of Legionls policy as well as being more directly in touch with the 
convictions of the Branches which are the primary units of this democratic 
organisation. 42 
Since an Area might contain between 100 and 600 branches it was impossible for 
Area officers to maintain a close personal watch on every branch. Even before the 
general adoption of the County system, and in the initial stages of growth when there 
were fewer branches in each Area, it was recognised that lit is quite impossible and 
much too expensive for anyone man (the Area Organiser) to visit every village and 
every Parish throughout the length and breadth of the Areal.43 A County Committee 
could assist with these tasks and County officials were expected to visit the branches 
41 See County Handbooks 1937. 
42 Somerset County Annual Report and Accounts 1934,IH29/20. 
43 GSCLB, to the Area Organisers, 21 April 1922. 
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in their district regularly and inform and inspire the members and officers. This 
ensured a common standard and co-ordination between branches but also provided 
encouragement and assistance to the branches in their work. However, Legion 
members did not favour the County system because it made administrative 
tasks easier, but because it harnessed the 'County spirit'. At the 1922 Annual 
Conference, a resolution called for the abolition of Area Councils and their 
replacement with County Committees. The Great Malvern delegate explained that 
Area work was too remote. There was not enough humanity in it.... he 
contended that sentiment was stronger than business. It took them to the 
front - it took them through the war and one of the things which the War 
Office did not dare touch in recasting the Army, or attempt to tamper with, 
was the pride which was taken in the County name. 44 
Although this resolution was not passed, the arguments were rehearsed constantly in 
many other similar resolutions. Use of the 'county name' clearly meant more to ex-
service men than the system of Area administration and was an important way of 
harnessing loyalty, enthusiasm - and members. Legion membership and numbers of 
branches grew much faster in those Areas which had first established the County 
system. By 1933 Somerset, which had established a County committee in 1921, 
contained 128 branches while Nottinghamshire, which organized its county 
committee in 1930, could claim only 64 branches.45 Although Leicestershire and 
Rutland had established a County Committee comparatively late, membership had 
doubled by 1933 since the formation of the County in 1931. 46 
Although the Area Council did not inspire the same loyalty or 
enthusiasm amongst Legion members, it fulfilled many other important administrative 
functions. The 1933 Annual Report, while marking the progress of the County 
system, argued that it was essential to 'realise that the whole of the executive 
functions in an area ... are in the hands of the Area Councils and cannot be delegated 
44 AC 1922, Discussion of Annual Report. 
45 See County Handbooks 1933. 
46 Leicester and l~utland County Handbook 1933. 
'Unity of Action' -- 44 
to County Committees'.47 The Area retained full responsibility for all Legion 
activities within the Area and so monitored both the branches and the County 
Committees. The Area Council translated National policy into action through 
directives for use within the Area and the paid Area staff did much of the organising 
and administrative work in co-operation with the Counties and the Branches. In 
practice this meant informing the branches of new initiatives and helping them to 
implement them as well as gathering information from the branches and the Counties 
to pass on to Headquarters. Much of the important work on pensions, employment 
and relief was carried out by the Area, which was reflected in the larger paid staff at 
the Area level. 
However, it was at the National Headquarters in London that the 
detailed formulation of Legion policy was undertaken by the 26 members of the 
National Executive Council under the guidance of the National Chairman. The 
Council met every three months to discuss Legion affairs and was the final arbiter of 
Legion policy between Annual Conferences. 48 Topics of national importance, such as 
foreign policy, were completely in the hands of the National Executive Council which 
also had the power to expel branches and to confirm, modify or reject the actions of a 
branch County or Area. Much of the work of the Council actually took place in a 
we.re.-
wide ranging number of sub-committees which1'appointed to overlook one particular 
area of policy. The members of the sub-committees were drawn from the National 
Executive Council and thus their outlook tended to be accepted by the full council. 
The most important and permanent sub-committees were the General Purposes 
Committee, the Employment Committee, the Central Relief Committee, the Standing 
Orders Committee, the Finance Committee, the Appeals Committee and the Pensions 
and Disablement Committee.49 However, other sub-committees covered the full 
range of Legion work, being created or disbanded on an ad-hoc basis. 
47 BLAR 1933. 
48 Rule 6(F) Royal Charter. 
49 NEe Minutes 1921.1939. 
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Although the policy, and most of the practical work of the Legion was 
undertaken by voluntary members, there was also a substantial number of paid 
employees working for the British Legion who could not hold an elected position or 
vote on Legion policy. Paid officials dealt with the administration and 
correspondence at National and Area level, while a wealthy branch or County 
Committee might employ a secretary and most clubs employed a steward to manage 
its business. These paid employees co-operated with the National, Area, County and 
Branch sub-committees and thus formed a pyramid structure from the National 
Employment, Relief, Appeals and Pensions Departments through the Area 
administration down to Branch sub-committees of ordinary branch members. The 
most important paid post in the Legion was General Secretary held by Colonel E.C. 
Heath from 1921 until 1940. It was his duty to correspond with the branches, deal 
with the administration at Headquarters and review and report on every aspect of 
Legion work to the National Executive Council. He was helped in this task by the 
Assisting and Organising Secretary, J.R. Griffin, who held the post until 1940 and 
then took over from Heath. The General Secretary's Department, the Secretariat, 
worked on all the correspondence and paperwork necessary at Headquarters. The 
other Headquarters Departments of Employment, Pensions and Appeals work, were 
run by specialist professionals like A. G. Webb who worked at the Pensions 
Department throughout the inter-war years and developed considerable expertise on 
Pensions matters. 50 At Area level, the Legion initially employed a rather large and 
unwieldy system of separate posts, consisting of an Area Secretary, an Area 
Organiser, an Area Appeals Organiser, and in four Areas an Employment Officer, 
each with their own office staff. This large staff was probably helpful, if expensive, 
during the initial stages of Legion growth but in 1923 this was investigated and 
revised. 51 The reform combined all the separate posts and responsibilities into one; 
500HBLp.282. 
51 BLAR 1923. 
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that of Area Organising Secretary. This was a Headquarters appointment which gave 
the National Executive Council greater control over the Area administration, by 
ensuring the quality of Area staff. This was a very responsible post which demanded 
a great deal of work and commitment, as a letter by H.E. Cheeseman, the 
Metropolitan Area Secretary in 1929, shows: 
Five nights out of seven nearly every week since I became the Organising 
Secretary, I have not reached home until late at night. It has just been 
work. It has been expensive in meals, in being sociable with Branch 
Secretaries and Members and meeting people, helpful directly or indirectly 
to the Legion. 52 
The Area Secretary was the linchpin of the Area organisation and administration 
who had to look after all aspects of Legion work, and conduct the correspondence 
for the Area. There were also a number of people who worked at Area level, but 
who were not necessarily attached directly to the Area. These included the Pensions 
Appellant Representatives who worked at the Pensions Appeal Courts, and the 
inspectors who monitored the conduct and business of British Legion clubs. 53 
Paid officials required salaries and administration cost money. Finance 
was crucial to the operation of the Legion, and determined the growth of the 
organization throughout the twenties and thirties. The basis of the Legion's 
administrative finance was the affiliation fee, paid by every member on a yearly basis. 
This amounted to one shilling sixpence and was collected by the branches and then 
sent to Headquarters. 54 The money was then expended in national administration 
costs and one third was returned to the Areas for regional work. Branch Funds were 
dependent on club subscriptions and each person who joined a branch paid an 
entrance fee of one shilling as well as a yearly subscription which had to be at least 
2/6 a year. 55 The amount of subscription was set by the branch as was the number of 
payments; it might be paid in weekly, monthly or yearly installments. 
52 H.E. Cheeseman to Ian Hamilton, 19 November 1929, IH29/10. 
53 British Legion Handbook for the Branches 1932. 
54 BLAR 1922-39. 
55 Rule 2(E) Ro. 
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County finances were a subject of much controversy. Since the 
establishment of these committees was in the hands of the Area Councils the counties 
were not assured of finance and certainly did not receive top priority for any available 
funds. Prior to 1933 the Counties had to depend largely on fundraising events, 
occasional grants from the Area and donations from the branches. Thus there were 
no regular and definite arrangements for County administration finance, and the 
extent of County activity really depended on the willingness of the Area and its 
branches to support it. In 1933, after a review of County and Area administration, 
the Counties were allowed to retain one third of the affiliation fees from its 
branches. 56 
Initially, the Areas were dependent on a proportion of the affiliation 
fees collected in the Area, but combined with the other reforms in Area 
administration, this was supplemented, after 1923, by a system of block grants from 
HQ which regularized Area finance and administration. 57 Area fund raising events 
also raised much cash for projects and relief work within the Area. These fund 
raising events were essential for all levels of the Legion as a letter from General 
Edward Bethune, the Metropolitan Area Chairman, to Hamilton in 1928 reveals: 
I must have some money somehow to carry on as we are doing at present and I am 
writing to ask you whether your fertile brain can suggest any means whereby we 
could get £300 or £400 for our own domestic use. 
I have thought of many things but they do not seem to be quite feasible 
and a direct appeal to individuals is rather against our agreement with the 
National Executive Council, so we are rather in a cleft stick. To pay the 
wages this week, we shall have to draw on our Reserve which is not very 
great, so if you can help us with any ideas I should be most grateful,58 
This illustrates the problem of Legion finance at every level. The affiliation fees paid 
for much basic administration and expenses, but Legion commitments and 
56 BLAR 1933. 
57 NEe Minutes, 9 June 1923. 
58 ~ . .' ~ethune to Ian Hamilton, 20 March 192t1 •• ,~,-
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expenditure often exceeded income. The Poppy Day Appeal was the only direct 
approach the Legion could make to the public and the income from that was 
exclusively earmarked for relief, not Legion administration. Thus, the Legion's 
general needs could only be met through fund raising events. With most branches, 
Counties and Areas holding fetes, garden parties, raffles and dinners, it is not 
surprising that Robert Graves observed that the British Legion fete had become a 
permanent feature of British life. S9 If, as in Bethune's case the planned fair, fete and 
ball did not materialise, the cash left for everyday expenses could be very small. This 
cash flow problem could affect every level of the Legion and often hampered the 
administrative work of the Legion. 
fA letter concerning the early history of the Metropolitan Area Council (1921-1925) is 
revealing in this respect. In February 1935 Arthur Francks, a former Metropolitan 
Area Chairman wrote to Hamilton: 
In these early days the Area was dependent solely on its proportion of 
affiliation fees, and funds were none too plentiful, and in order to make 
both ends meet I had to take the dual position of Chairman of the Area and 
of the Finance Committee, and managed the Area on a total income rather 
less than is now paid in salary to Captain Birrell.60 
In these circumstances, the Legion organization could not deal with all the work that 
was expected of it. The financial position of the Legion improved throughout the 
period which allowed it to engage in projects of greater scope and value. For 
example, by 1935, the Metropolitan Area was spending £2,500 a year on 
Employment bureaux whereas in 1921 a grant of £150 had established the first 
bureaux in London. 61 
Lack of finance was not the only weakness within the Legion's 
structure. Like most organizations dealing with considerable sums of money, the 
Legion swam in a vast amount of paperwork. The amount of administration required 
S9 Robert Graves and Alan Hodge, The Long Weekend: A Social History of Great Britain 1918-1939, London: Faber and Faber, 
1940, p.37l. 
60 Arthur Francks to Ian Hamilton, 18 February 1935, IH29/20. 
61 Ibid. 
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by the various levels in the Legion often discouraged men from taking on the 
voluntary post of Branch secretary62 while the number of entries for the Annual Haig 
Cup for the best branch was generally very small - perhaps due to the large and 
detailed form which had to be completed. 63 Voluminous paperwork was an 
inevitable result of the extensive activities of the Legion, but during its early 
development the organization also suffered from a clumsy administrative system at 
Area level, and from complicated procedures for the payment of affiliation fees. As 
Major Jellicorse observed, 'the Branch has to write to Headquarters to purchase the 
affiliation stamps. If the Branch fails to do this, the Area is notified and it notifies the 
County which then notifies the Branch'.64 This system hampered Legion growth, as 
the complications not only confused branch secretaries who were unsure where to 
send affiliation fee monies and did not ensure prompt payment of affiliation fees. 
Although this problem was largely surmounted in 1927, with the introduction of a 
simplified system, it is clear that the three levels of Legion organization may have 
been well suited to the control and supervision of Branches but was less suitable for 
efficient administration. 
This was most obvious in the difficulties which the Legion encountered 
in the large urban areas of England. While the Branch, County and Area system 
suited rural areas, by acting as a cement between distant branches, it did not work 
well in an urban environment. Branches were found to be more difficult to establish 
while the County unit was replaced by District committees which could not harness 
the essentially rural and traditional 'county spirit'. In Birmingham, Manchester, 
Liverpool and London, the Legion had numerous problems in establishing a strong 
and efficient organization. Haig wrote to Colonel Crosfield in 1921: 
You know of the troubles at Manchester and Birmingham. We must 
expect that sort of thing at the start - after a year or two there will be 
62 Major Jellicorse, Notes on the British Legion, n.d., 1H29/37/4. 63 ibid. 
64 ibid. 
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ample money to go round. In the meantime the branches must be helped 
and encouraged.65 
Haig may have been optimistic but the problems did not disappear so readily. In 
1925, the Metropolitan Area Council was dismissed and the Area was run by 
Headquarters for a year in order to build 'an improved and strengthened organisation 
capable, it is hoped, of maintaining the best traditions of the Legion in the 
Metropolis'.66 In Liverpool, due to the lack of success in Appeals and severe 
financial problems, after 1926 special arrangements had to be made concerning 
Poppy Day, whereby the collection was organised by the Lord Mayor and 2% of the 
gross sum collected was retained for administrative purposes.67 The situation was 
similar in Manchester during 1929 when an "Organisation Office" had to be set up 
and £1000 loaned to Mr Wilce-Taylor for Ire-organising the Legion in Manchester'.68 
These are all symptoms of the difficulties the Legion had in Britain's larger cities. 
This was a serious weakness given the importance of these cities and the Legion's 
inability to develop an adequate organization in urban areas definitely affected the 
extent and character of the movement. 
One other direct consequence of Legion organization was the growth 
of rivalry between competing Areas, Counties and branches. Although the rivalries 
between the old organizations disappeared rapidly in 1921, these were quickly 
replaced by other forms of competition which were tacitly encouraged. It was 
argued that County Councils produced a 'friendly rivalry' for the 'benefit of the 
organisation'69 which was a throwback to the system of Regimental loyalty and 
rivalry which formed an integral part of the British Army. The constant paper battle 
over the boundary between the South Eastern and the Metropolitan Areas is a good 
example of the time and effort which could be wasted on competition between 
Legion units. The Metropolitan Area covered all the territory in a fifteen mile radius 
65 Haig to Crosfield, 9 October 1921, Acc.3155, No.H1227.e. 
66 BLAR 1925. 
67 NEC Minutes, 13 March 1926. 
68 NEC Minutes, 22 June 1929. 
r~ Eastern Area Annual R 1port 1931. 
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from Charing Cross. The South Eastern Area covered Sussex, Hampshire, Surrey, 
Berkshire, the Isle of Wight and Kent but the boundaries meant that large areas of 
Surrey, Middlesex and Kent were contained in the Metropolitan Area.70 In 1923 it 
was settled by the National Executive Council that the Areas would remain as defined 
in the Royal Charter, although branches in certain buffer districts on the hinterland of 
London could choose which Area they wished to join. Once they had decided, the 
decision was final and branches which were formed subsequently had to join the 
appropriate Area Council.71 Under the Chairmanship of Colonel Grantham, who 
retained the post from 1921 until 1937, the South Eastern Area continually pressed 
for a revision of the boundary between the two Areas. The matter came to a head in 
1934 when the Surbiton Branch, with Grantham's involvement and approval, 
attempted to change the terms of the Legion's Charter at the Annual Conference by 
resolutions which would limit the Metropolitan Area to the County and City of 
London and pass control of almost 80 branches over to the South Eastern and Home 
Counties Areas.72 Admiral Sir Henry Bruce, the Chairman of the Metropolitan Area, 
wrote to Col. John Brown, the National Chairman in February 1934: 
There is no doubt that this is a concerted attack on my Area and as such 
we must be prepared to counter it, as the South Eastern Area has 
challenged us on the floor of the National Conference at Whitsuntide. 73 
During the time between the Area Conferences in February and the Annual 
Conference in May much of the Metropolitan Area Council's efforts were directed at 
mobilizing Fleet Street in their defence and organizing a large contingent of delegates 
for the Annual Conference. The tension between the leaders of the two Areas grew 
to the extent that Bruce referred to the South Eastern Area as 'the enemy'.74 
70 NEC Minutes, 15 July 1923. 
71 ibid. 
;; AC 1934, Amendments to Royal Charter, Clauses 19 and 32. 
7 Sir Henry Bruce to John Brown, 28 February 1934, 1H29/19. 
4 Sir Henry Bruce to Ian Hamilton, March 1934.1H29/19. 
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The South Eastern Area leadership wished to redraw the boundaries of 
the Areas to take account of 'County spirit'. The Surbiton delegate at the Annual 
Conference in Weston-Super-Mare explained that the: 
resolution had been drawn up for the benefit of men in the Regiment under 
his command during the War, who, although members of a Surrey 
Regiment, found that their Branches - actually located in Surrey - were not 
in that County for Legion purposes.7S 
This situation had occurred due to the large expansion of the London suburbs during 
the inter-war period. But the resolution was not merely a reflection of county 
sentiment, because the acquisition of 80 branches represented a considerable 
aggrandisement of administrative power. The Organising Secretary of the 
Metropolitan Area, W. Birrell) wrote to General Sir Ian Hamilton in March 1934: 
They (the buffer state Branches) have expressed .... the opinion that their 
interests undoubtedly lie in the Metropolis, although living in suburban 
districts - in some cases created by the London County Council. Their 
members although living outside the confines of the L.C.C. boundary, in 
most cases make their living in London, and as such cannot be compared 
to members of rural Branches coming under County jurisdiction. 76 
The outer suburbs like Croydon, Wimbledon, East Ham and Walthamstow, were new 
settlements filled with commuters who worked in London. Thus, the Legion 
branches in these places were comparatively wealthy and would be a valuable asset to 
the South Eastern Area. Surprisingly, Legion Headquarters did not intervene in the 
dispute between the two Areas. Just before the National Conference in 1934, 
General Sir Ian Hamilton mentioned to Mr Turner of the Somerset County 
Committee that: 
I was confident that those who drive our destinies from 26 Eccleston 
Square would, in their own good time, take me into their confidence and 
inform me at least whether they themselves had been taking any hand in 
this affair; or if not that, at least what sort of a line they are about to take 
at the Conference. The oracles, however, have been dumb. Not a word or 
hint has been dropped to me as President of the Metro. Area which has 
75 AC 1934, Amendments to Royal Charter. Clauses 19 and 32. 
76 ibid. 
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been publicly criticised, dismembered in anticipation and large pieces of its 
flesh and blood handed out to other Areas. 77 
It is likely that it was too divisive an issue to take any declared line and one which 
was best left to the decision of the Annual Conference, although Hamilton was 
convinced that 'Maurice, Brown, Heath and the rest of them were behind this stunt of 
Grantham's'.78 It is possible that Headquarters thought that the Metropolitan Area 
was 'something of a nuisance to the Legion, and always up against Haig House on 
every occasion, should therefore be "downed"'.79 Certainly, the National Executive 
Council and the National Officers did not hesitate to become involved in most 
disputes within the Legion, which was the proper role of the Council and the 
National Officers, and the failure to do so in this instance does suggest a tacit 
agreement with the resolutions of the South Eastern Area, while not publicly 
involving the National controlling body in the controversy. 
Ultimately, as with any important Legion controversy, the decision lay 
with the Branch delegates at the Annual Conference. The Metropolitan delegate from 
Shoreditch, who spoke against the motion, 'shattered the arguments entirely' and 
upon the call for "those against", up went a thousand hands, amidst 
tremendous enthusiasm. Cries of "Up the Met", cheers and laughter held 
the Conference for a nearly a minute, and the Chairman formally declared 
the motion lost" .80 
After this excitement at the Conference, Bruce was able to say that the Legion and 
the two Areas were 'back to normal'.81 However, the 'Area stir' does demonstrate 
that rivalry and competition remained an important feature of the ex-service 
movement even after amalgamation. Legion members could display a localism and 
respect for historic boundaries quite at odds with the notions of unity and universal 
comradeship. The Legion was a national organization, but with a stubbornly local 
outlook. 
77 Ian Hamilton to Mr Turner, 20 April 1934, 1H29/20. 
78 Ian Hamilton to Sir Henry Bruce, 12 February 1934, 1H29/20. 
79 Sir Henry Bruce to Capt. Ian Fraser, 17 February 1934, IH29120. 
80 BU June 1934, Metropolitan Area Supplement, found in IH29/20. 
8' :ir Henry Bruc~ to Ian Hamilton, 8 June 1934, IH29/20. 
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However, there were also serious national divisions which belied the 
outward image of unity. The most unfortunate division was the continued existence 
of the Officer's Association. In July 1921, just after the Legion had been formally 
established, General Sir Frederick Maurice considered that 'in amalgamations of this 
kind each of the bodies has to give up something, often a great deal, for the general 
good'.82 Although the Comrades, Federation and Association did subsume their 
identities, membership and structure within the new organization, the Officers' 
Association applied for, and gained, a Royal Charter which guaranteed its separate 
existence. The need for a Royal Charter to safeguard the funds subscribed 
specifically for officers, had been discussed soon after the Association had been 
founded. 83 But it was not until November 1920 that the draft of the Petition and 
proposed Charter were discussed by the Association's Grand Council. At this stage 
the amalgamation negotiations were well advanced, but the Officers' Association did 
not inform the other societies of their proposed Charter.84 Ultimately, the Royal 
Charter was granted to the Officers' Association on 30 June 1921 - one day before 
the official formation of the British Legion. 85 Thus, other than surrendering its 
Appeals Department, which became the nucleus for the British Legion Appeals 
Department, the Officers' Association did not sacrifice anything in the amalgamation 
process. Instead, the Officers' Association simply became known as the Officers' 
Benevolent Department of the British Legion, although the old title was still used 
frequently. With its guaranteed existence, the Officers' Association could enjoy the 
benefits of being under the umbrella of the British Legion without actually altering its 
structure, its governing councilor its work. 
Not surprisingly, the manner in which the Officers' Association had 
dealt with the amalgamation negotiations aroused suspicion amongst many rank-and-
file Legion members and relations between the Legion proper and the Officers' 
82 BU July 1921, p.l0. 
83 OHBL p.22. 
84 ibid. 
85 ibid, p.23. 
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Benevolent Department were not always cordial. The Officer's Benevolent 
Department perpetuated the class and rank distinctions of the O.A. in the British 
Legion, and maintained assumptions about the position of ex-officers. Since these 
men and their families were expected to be middle class with higher aspirations than 
ordinary ex-service men, the aims of the Officers Benevolent Department were 
notably wider and the assistance more generous than Legion relief. The general 
policy ofthe Officers' Benevolent Department was to : 
promote the well-being of all who have held His Majesty's Commission, 
and their dependants, and especially of those who were disabled during the 
late War; to relieve distress from causes arising out of the war so far as 
funds permit, and, wherever possible, to make the recipient of relief 
independent by giving him or her a fresh start in life. 86 
In attempting to achieve these broad, generous aims the Officer's Benevolent 
Department used a centralised structure of paid officials based in London, which was 
quite different from the decentralised voluntary system adopted by the Legion. The 
first 'Branch' of the Department dealt with all applications for business grants, loans 
and training, while Branch Number Two operated as an Employment Bureaux and 
processed applications for relief from Officers. The 'Families Branch' was concerned 
with distress arising out of family circumstances for wives, widows, orphans and 
dependents.87 These three functions duplicated the Legion's work for other ranks, 
but an ex-officer could also obtain other benefits through three other branches of the 
Department. A disabled officer or an officer's widow could obtain assistance to buy 
or maintain a home. Advice was given on pensions and gratuities as well as free legal 
and financial advice. Further, through the Families Branch and the Avenel St. 
George Scholarships, over 1,000 officers' children received assistance with school 
fees. 88 The Department paid school fees to ensure 'that the war children themselves 
do not suffer because of their father's service, and to bring them up as good 
86 BLAR 1922. 
87 ibid. 
88 BLAR 1922-1939. 
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citizens'. 89 But, unlike the U.S.F. which selected candidates through merit, the 
assumption was that an officer's children should receive a high-quality, private 
education simply for reasons of status. Through all of the Branches of the 
Department, ex-officers could receive considerable financial assistance far beyond 
that provided through the normal channels of Legion relief. In 1933, General Sir Ian 
Hamilton interested himself in the case of one man, but was informed that: 
this ex-officer during the past two years has been assisted by the Officer's 
Association in Scotland to the extent of £323.2.8 which sum does not 
include £145 gained by London Headquarters; a total of £468.2.8.90 
Given that the most a rank-and-file member of the Legion could expect to receive 
from a Local Benevolent Committee was a grant of £5,(and only in special 
circumstances) there was a great gulf in the assistance which officers and the rank-
and-file could expect to receive. In Business Loans, an officer could receive up to 
£250 while the ranker could receive a maximum of £25.91 The Grimsby Delegate at 
the 1933 Annual Conference pointed out the absurdity of such distinctions: 
two Skippers (of the Grimsby fishing fleet) held exactly the same position 
but were differently classed because one held a commission. The Officers' 
Fund was in such a position that they could hand out to one Skipper £10, 
£15 or £20 without opposition ... but the other Skipper ... had to apply to the 
Relief Fund. 92 
The decisions made by the Officers' Benevolent Department were often completely 
arbitrary; the rank held by a soldier during the Great War was no guide to the amount 
of assistance he required - or deserved. 
While the Legion Relief regulations were made consciously tight due 
to the large calls made upon its funds, there was no corresponding attempt by the 
Officers' Benevolent Department to restrict its expenditure to fit its income. At the 
inception of the Legion, the Officers' Benevolent Department had been the wealthier 
89 BLAR 1932. 
90 S.D. Crookshank to Ian Hamilton, 20 December 1933, IH29/19. 
91 BLAR 1922. 
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of the partners,93 and the Officer's Association had dispensed with its Appeals Branch 
when it merged with the Legion. In return, the Officer's Benevolent Department 
received 5% of the Poppy Day receipts or £50,000, whichever was less.94 Even with 
large capital reserves which brought in substantial income, by the late twenties the 
Officers' Benevolent Department was spending that capital to maintain the type of 
assistance it could offer.9S 
As might be expected, the privileged position of officers within a 
theoretically equal organisation did provoke anger amongst ordinary ex-service men. 
The Lambeth Delegate at the 1922 Conference complained that: 
the officers although in the minority, got a lot more than did the Tommies. 
He was sure the Field Marshal did not want that sort of thing to come 
about, and he asked them to consider seriously whether this fund should 
not now come under the National Executive of the Legion. Either the 
officers were in the British Legion or they were not. They wanted to 
know where they stood.96 
The ambiguous situation created a great deal of friction between the Officers' 
Benevolent Department and Legion members. Branches were particularly annoyed 
by the tendency of officers to join the St George's Hanover Square Branch (which 
was the O.B.D. branch) in London, which starved local branches of valuable funds 
and members. 
In May 1925, the National Executive Council passed a resolution that: 
'the time has arrived that steps should be taken to abolish all means indicating that the 
Officers' Benevolent Department of the British Legion is a distinct organisation~97 
The action arose because since the Legion was about to receive its own Royal 
Charter, it appeared logical to demand the surrender of the separate O.A. Charter. 98 
Due to its separate charter, the O.B.D. was governed by its own Council and did not 
have any members elected by the Legion. This resolution was an attempt to end the 
93 OHBL p.22. 
94 OHBL p.33. 
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divisions in the movement and place the Department under the control of the 
National Executive Council. However, the committee appointed to investigate the 
question discovered that the 'whole matter bristled with difficulties when they came 
down to details'.99 Since the original O.A. Charter did not contain a clause allowing 
for the surrender of the Charter, there was no legal way, short of an Act of 
Parliament, that the O.A. could surrender its charter. loo At the same time, the sub-
committee of the National Executive Council had worked out a scheme whereby the 
Legion and O.A. could operate under one Charter. Unfortunately, the leaders of the 
O.A., excepting Maurice, were not prepared to compromise on the issue because 
they believed the negotiations were really an attempt to 'collar' their funds for Legion 
use. WI 
This left the Legion with little option but to break completely with the 
O.B.D. or accept its version of compromise. Ultimately, only cosmetic changes were 
made to the arrangements between the Legion and the O.B.D. The title 'Officers' 
Association' was only to be used on legal and financial documents, and further 
National Executive Council representatives were to be appointed onto the Officers' 
Executive Committee. 102 At the same time, 'the actual disbursement of money' was 
to remain firmly in 'the hands of the Officers' Department' .103 
At the 1926 Annual Conference the East Anglian Area framed a 
resolution which called for the Officers' Association, United Services Fund and 
British Legion to be formed into 'one body, thereby reducing the expense of 
maintaining three separate Headquarters'. 104 The Swansea delegate argued that 
99 
the administration of all Funds, including the Officers' Association, should 
be direct through the Branches of the Legion, in order that Branches might 
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100 OHBL p.96. 
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feel they were doing the right thing and that the granting of assistance was 
not left to any individual concern. 105 
This would have been a logical and sensible development of the principle of unity 
which the Legion espoused. More importantly, it would have erased the unfair and 
arbitrary divisions between Legion and O.B.D. relief. Eventually, the Legion and 
United Services Funds were amalgamated in 1934, but the Officers' Benevolent 
Department remained a separate and divisive element in the Legion's organization. 
The existence of a separate Women's Section also divided the Legion, but along 
gender rather than class lines. The Women's Section was firmly under the control of 
the National Executive Council but maintained its own parallel structure of National 
Council, Areas and branches. It was decided at the Unity Conference in 1921 not to 
allow ex-service women to join the Legion and to form a Women's' Auxiliary Section 
instead, but at the 1922 Conference this decision was revoked. Colonel Crosfield 
argued at the 1922 Conference that: 
they had no right logically to exclude ex-service women from full 
membership. Last year he was against it because he thought it would 
mean admitting them into their clubs and he did not think that would be 
good for the movement. He understood now they did not wish to enter 
into their club-life but merely wished to have the privilege of full 
membership at the branches. 106 
Crosfield was airing a common view; there was still strong prejudice against women 
being present in pubs or clubs where alcoholic drink was consumed. Thus, ex-service 
women could become full members and involve themselves in all aspects of Legion 
work - but they could not take part fully in the social side of Legion membership 
which was still reserved exclusively for men. The ambivalent position of ex-service 
women in the Legion could lead to awkward conflicts; in 1925 the Oxford Branch 
refused to admit an ex-service woman on the grounds that the Branch and Club, 
105 ibid. 
106 AC 1922, Res. No. 43. 
'Unity of Action' -- 60 
being on the same premises, were inseparable. The National Executive Council had to 
reprimand the Branch for directly violating the Constitution. 107 
Although ex-service women could join the Legion as full members, the 
Women's Section continued to develop albeit with a much broader membership than 
the Legion branches themselves. Since there had been relatively few women in the 
Armed Forces during the Great War,108 membership of the Women's Section was 
open not only to ex-service women, but to the wives, widows, daughters and female 
dependents of past or present members of the F orces. 109 This allowed the Section a 
viable membership, but also meant that it was not an exclusively ex-service 
organization. The aims of the Section were also wide and expansive as described in 
the 1933 County Handbooks: 
The Women's Section of the British Legion is the "other half' of the 
British Legion. It is an energetic body of women, banded together to 
secure in all directions the welfare of the women and children whose men-
folk served their country, and more especially of those who have been 
disabled or died, and also to further in every possible way the interests of 
ex-service men. 
Every endeavour is made by the Women's Section to assist the Legion 
branches in the social side of their work by money-raising activities, 
managing refreshment booths at social functions, organizing bazaars, treats 
for the widows and orphans etc. Poppy Day collections can be increased 
by using all members available for this work. On questions of Relief, 
Pensions and Welfare, the Women's Section can take an active part by 
making widows and orphans their special care. 110 
The Section's work fitted within the charitable and voluntary role which women had 
fulfilled since Victorian times. Hospital visiting, caring for orphans and raising funds 
through bazaars and refreshments were all socially acceptable roles for women to 
undertake. The volunteers who collected for Poppy Day were almost exclusively 
women, if not necessarily members of the Section. There were a number of other 
important and valuable schemes which the Section were involved in, such as the 
107 NEC Minutes, 30 May 1925. 
108 Roughly 100,000 women had served in the anned forces. See AlP. Taylor, English History 1914-1945, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p.38. 
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National Wardrobe Scheme, the Children's Holiday Scheme and the Central Sales 
Agency which made valuable contributions to the relief work of the Legion.l1l 
Within the Legion there were clearly defined areas which were considered legitimate 
activities for males and others for females - which corresponded to gender roles in 
the rest of society. 
At the outset, the Women's Section did not grow as rapidly as the 
British Legion itself mainly due to a lack of established branches and a paucity of 
funds. Unlike the Legion proper, the Women's Section could not rely on Poppy Day 
commission or grants from Headquarters and this hampered the growth of the 
Section.ll2 Additionally, there was a great deal of confusion amongst Legion 
branches as to the Section's position in the movement. In February 1925, the General 
Secretary of the Legion acknowledged that: 
misapprehension as to eligibility for membership of the Section and the 
scope of its activities, has in the past been a cause of reluctance on the part 
of some Legion branches to assist in the formation of the new units. 113 
Many branches hesitated to establish a Section because they believed that only ex-
service women could join, or that, once formed, 'the women would dictate to the 
men'. In Oxfordshire, all appeals and letters from Headquarters on the subject of 
establishing Women's Section branches were ignored until 1928, when Viscount 
Hampden (the Area President) asked all delegates at the Area Conference to 'break 
down existing prejudices' and get the Women's Section underway in the County.l14 
However, it was emphasised that Section branches should be opened in towns and 
not in villages where the W.1. was firmly established.l15 The Women's Section 
duplicated the work of the W.1. and in these circumstances it was difficult to run a 
new organization in competition with firmly established women's societies. 
111 BLAR 1922-1939 
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There was also a highly developed sense of prejudice against women in 
the early ex-service movement which continued into the British Legion. The 
Federation and Association had both been angered by the Government and Municipal 
authorities employing female clerks rather than returned ex-service men and they 
mounted numerous demonstrations and framed resolutions protesting at the situation. 
At a Federation demonstration in Hyde Park in June 1919, 'any woman driver who 
passed was greeted with shouts of "pull her off" by angry unemployed ex-service 
men. 116 At the 1922 Legion Conference a resolution was passed which demanded 
that the Government should 'discharge forthwith... temporary female staff ... and 
replace them by ex-service men'.117 The Birmingham delegate claimed that young 
women were working in the civil service who 'had no earthly need whatever to take 
the bread out of the mouths of ... poor unfortunate comrades who ... could not get 
enough to live on'.118 Such attitudes died hard amongst ex-service men and there 
was strong prejudice in favour of maintaining the Legion as an exclusively ex-service 
and male preserve. At the same time, many branches welcomed the involvement of 
the Women's Section and developed a harmonious and successful relationship. The 
Swansea delegate at the 1925 Annual Conference said that the Section was: 
one of the Legion's greatest assets, and he deplored the fact that many 
Branches would not co-operate with the women. The women raised far 
more money on Poppy Day than the men, and they were willing to 
undertake all investigations in connection with the Relief Committees. 119 
The Section appeared able to harness the enthusiasm of its members and was 
involved in a great deal of useful practical work. Even so, its growth was slow but 
steady; from small beginnings in 1922 with 6,560 members in 126 branches, by 1930 
the Section had 107,580 members in 1,147 branches. Although the Section's work 
expanded greatly during the 1930s, with much greater efforts being made for 
116 Report on Revolutionary Organisations in the United Kingdom, 4 June 1919, CAB24f81. 
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Children's Holidays and projects assisting depressed areas,120 membership reached a 
peak in 1930 and did not grow considerably subsequently so that by 1939 there were 
127,120 members in 1,790 branches.l21 This lack of growth may be explained by a 
number of conflicts which appeared on the floor of the Legion Conference. 
Many of these arguments developed over the role of the Section within 
the ex-service movement and some of the views of the Section rankled with Legion 
members. In 1926, Lady Edward Spencer Churchill, the Section Chairman, said that: 
In the manner of giving a helping hand to the Legion there is no end to the 
useful activities which are constantly going on. It was said in 1914 that 
women were the finest recruiting sergeants in the country. It is still as true 
where recruiting for the Legion is concerned. 122 
In fact, ex-service men preferred a clearly defined boundary between their activities 
and the Section's. The growing involvement of the Section in Relief work through 
consultative committees with Legion branches drew a protest resolution at the 1928 
Annual Conference. Resolution 70, while recognising the valuable work of the 
Women's Section protested against the introduction of the Section to the 'higher 
councils of the Legion', reasoning that the 'Women's Section cannot possibly have the 
same ties of comradeship which made the Legion possible'. 123 The Calverley delegate 
argued that: 
The Conference should realise what the position would be if members of 
the Women's Section gained a position on Area Executive Councils. It 
would result in people sitting in their higher councils who were not elected 
by ex-service men. A girl born in 1917 ... could vote in the election of a 
delegate, whereas a vote was refused to the son of an ex-service man. 124 
Ultimately, although Legion members appreciated the practical work of the Section, 
they were not prepared to allow non-service people any say in the running of the 
movement. Although the Chairman assured the delegates that there were no plans 
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for Women's Section delegates to sit on Area Councils or the National Executive 
Council, the resolution was passed by the Conference. Similar resolutions were 
passed at a number ofthe Conferences (notably in 1931) and it would appear that ex-
service men agreed generally with a delegate at the 1928 Conference who remarked 
that 'So long as they kept to themselves and left the men to themselves, the Yorkshire 
Area had no objection' (to the Women's Section).125 Clearly defined boundaries were 
erected between the Legion branches and the Section which maintained the Section in 
the subordinate position, and this probably dampened the enthusiasm of many female 
volunteers. 
The divisions between the Legion proper and the Women's Section, 
were, as we have seen, only some of the distinctions found in the British Legion. The 
Officers' Benevolent Department maintained arbitrary and explicit boundaries of class 
and status within the Legion, while the Women's Section divided the movement 
between male and female, service and non-service. Even within the main membership 
of the Legion there were the 'house' branches which distinguished between members 
on the basis of occupation and past experience. Arid the rivalry between different 
branches, Counties and Areas was not always friendly and beneficial to the movement 
but could cause great tension between different units. Nevertheless, compared to ex-
service movements on the continent, the British Legion did form a broad church 
which could encompass the activities and interests of all ex-service men. Both the 
French and German ex-service societies were fragmented into many different 
organizations with no common co-ordination. In France, the societies tended to 
represent particular groups of ex-service men; from groups which represented 
disabled veterans like the Association Generale des Mutiles de la guerre or the Union 
Federale, to those representing discharged ex-service men such as the Federation 
Maginot, or the more politically orientated Union Nationale des Combattants. 126 In 
125,\.:..1 
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Germany, the movement was sharply divided by political rivalries into the Stahlhelm 
on the right and the Reichsbanner on the left. 127 
In contrast, there was never any dissent or protest which threatened to 
destroy the consensus and framework of the Legion established in 1921. Much of the 
explanation for this lies in the control and vigilance exercised by the National 
Executive Council which was powerful enough to discipline or expel any member of 
a branch foolish enough to challenge its authority. The Legion can thus be 
characterized as a body with a powerful national organization which imposed a 
national policy on branches which maintained a strongly parochial outlook. The unity 
of purpose which amalgamation and a single organization gave the British ex-service 
movement was certainly beneficial. It prevented a number of ex-service associations 
continually competing and wasting effort through disunity. However, the British 
Legion could not be described as a wholly unified movement, nor could it ever foster 
unity throughout the whole nation in the way which Haig had dreamed. Instead the 
British Legion was a reflection of the divisions of class, status, gender and geography 
which existed throughout British society. 
127 James M. Diehl, Paramilitary Pc ics in Weimar Germany, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977, pp.293-295. 
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'The Most Happy And Cordial Relations Continue to Exist': 
The British Legion (Scotland). 
In 1927 The Scotsman described the new Scottish National War Memorial at 
Edinburgh Castle as: 
Small, but of dignified proportions, embellished both inside and out by the 
work of distinguished artists, harmonious in conception and detail, the 
Memorial is an expression of a sincere and reverential spirit, earnestly 
striving to reflect in stone and in glass the emotions of pity and fear, of 
devotion and sacrifice, of courage and pride evoked by the experience of 
the Great War.1 
The Memorial had long been the subject of controversy, but The Scotsman argued 
that it 'encloses the soul of the nation as it lived through those terrible years'2 of the 
Great War. The Scotsman clearly believed that the time, effort and money spent had 
been worth it, and indeed the memorial still has the power to impress and move the 
visitor. The opening ceremony on 14 July 1927 was equally emotive: 
Deeply impressive, and conducted with the solemn dignity befitting the 
occasion, the ceremony in Crown Court will live long in the memory of 
those who were privileged to take part or to be spectators '" Seldom can a 
more distinguished company have trodden this historic ground, flanked by 
the Banqueting Hall and other buildings with imperishable memories of 
Scotland's Kings and Queens ... This remarkable mingling of Royalty, 
nobility, and distinguished naval, military and air force chiefs emphasised 
the historic aspects of the occasion. 3 
The King, Queen, and Prince of Wales were present, along with the Lord Lyon of 
Arms, Heralds, much of the Scottish nobility, Lord Provosts from every major town 
and city, commanders of the Navy, Army and Air Force and colour parties from 
every Scottish regiment. If the memorial itself was meant to encapsulate the soul of 
the Scottish nation during the war, then the use of traditional symbolism, the 
1 The Scotsman, 14 July 1927, p.8. 
2 ibid. 
3 The Scotsman, 15 T'lIy 1927, p.9. 
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dignitaries and the presence of many military standards and colours, emphasised the 
fact that the whole Scottish nation was represented at the simple, but impressive 
opening ceremony. However, there was one element missing from the proceedings. 
Every Scottish regiment was represented by its colour party and by a senior officer 
who deposited that Regiment's Roll of Honour in an elaborate casket at the centre of 
the Memorial. But as a monument to Scotland's most recent conflict, the 
representatives of those who had fought and returned home were conspicuous by 
their absence. The Scotsmall mentioned that: 
not the least interesting part of the visit was the tour with Their Majesties, 
accompanied by the Prince of Wales and the Princess Mary, made on foot 
round the northern side of the Memorial, where various companies of ex-
Service men and others stood in position. 4 
Situated north of the Memorial building, the ex-service men were unable to see the 
ceremonies, and were denied an active part in the proceedings. This may have been 
due to the cramped nature of the site in front of the War Memorial, but was also 
indicative of the attitudes adopted by the Scottish Legion towards the Memorial. For 
while the British Legion in England was an avid supporter of all such ceremonies, and 
formed an integral part of the Remembrance ritual each year at the Cenotaph, the 
same was not true of the British Legion (Scotland). In 1923, the National Executive 
of the British Legion (Scotland) complained: 
that the expenditure at a time like this of so large a sum (£150,000) in 
mere "dead stone and lime", which can confer no benefit on the living or 
on the dependents of the Dead service man savours of ingratitude. 5 
This expressed a common ex-service sentiment - 'honour the dead, but serve the 
living'. However beautiful the monument might be, it could not put food into the 
stomachs of unemployed ex-service men or their families. This more radical 
appreciation of the worth of memorials is a good example of the differences between 
the two Legions of British ex-service men. 
4 ibid. 
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The existence of an independent, and distinctive British Legion in Scotland 
has received little or no attention. The use of the same name suggests that the two 
organisations ran in parallel with the same aims, objects, principles and structure. 
However, this can be misleading as there were distinct differences between the British 
Legion and the British Legion (Scotland). Although the official line of the London 
Headquarters was always that 'the most happy and cordial relations continue to exist'6 
between the two organisations, there were periods when relations were characterised 
more by suspicion and frustration than cordiality. These negative feelings were 
generally produced during the intense attempts to amalgamate the two organisations 
during the inter-war years. By examining these separate, but similar organisations, 
we can hope to assess the differences between the two associations, and attempt to 
understand why one of the major aims of the Legion, that of unity, was never 
completely achieved. 
The identical use of the term 'British Legion' by the two organisations, the 
British Legion and the British Legion (Scotland), represents more than a simple 
confusion. It is an indication of the duality which formed, and forms, part of the 
Scottish identity since the Union of Parliaments in 1707. An obvious and, for our 
purposes, important example can be found within the British Army. Scottish 
regiments have jealously maintained their distinctive uniforms, character and 
traditions, many of which date from before the Union. However, this has not 
precluded a pride and loyalty in the wider traditions of the British Army. John 
Buchan's foreword to the Scottish section in the British Legion Pilgrimage to the 
Battlefields of 1928 gives a good example of this attitude: 
Scotland is today passing through a difficult time. There is a danger of our 
losing through apathy much of that tradition which has given us in the past 
our character and our power. The motto of a famous Scottish regiment, 
'Scotland for ever!' might well be the watchword which we should bring 
back with us from the Battlefields; for it is on a sturdy local patriotism 
924. 
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alone that there can be built up the wider patriotism of Britain, the British 
Empire, and Western civilization. 7 
Buchan was not only arguing for the necessity of an organisation like the British 
Legion (Scotland), which through its belief in service, loyalty and tradition could help 
Scotland through its difficulties, but the reference to a famous Scottish military 
exploit had strong resonances, particularly to those men who had fought in the latest 
of Britain's wars. This ability to adopt a dual identity and purpose informed much of 
the character of the British Legion (Scotland). It also formed the stumbling block for 
many of the basic misunderstandings over the amalgamation negotiations between the 
two Legions. 
Although it is now unclear exactly when Scottish ex-service organisations 
were first established, by November 1918 the Federation, Comrades and Association 
all had branches in Scotland. At the meeting of the Scottish National Committee of 
the Comrades, Captain E.B.B. Towse V.c., Chairman of the Headquarters 
Committee in London, announced that 'from now onwards Scotland would have 
complete control of its own affairs'. 8 This was laid down in the Comrades 
constitution as, once formed, each National Headquarters 'shall ... deal as may be 
necessary or expedient with all matters affecting the welfare of Comrades in its own 
Country'.9 Thus, very early in the history of the ex-service movement, Scotland 
gained autonomy. 
While the Welsh organisations participated in the English Unity Conferences, 
Scotland maintained an independent stance which resulted in two British Legions; 
one covering England and Wales (and after 1925 both Northern and Southern 
Ireland) and one covering Scotland. Both Legions had almost a parallel history for at 
roughly the same time as amalgamation negotiations were gathering pace in England, 
the two Scottish organisations also began to consider unity. Although the 
negotiations began as early as 28 August 1919, little was achieved until after an 
7 A Souvenir of the Battlefields Pilgrimage, 1928, p.106. 
8 Executive Committee of the C,,",·~rlp., (Scotland), 26 November 1918. 
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amalgamation Conference on 31 August 1920 between the Comrades and Scottish 
Federation, when it was agreed that 'the principle of amalgamation was agreed to as 
being in the best interests of all ex-service men'.lo The same ideas motivated the 
Scottish Conference as the English one, as it was decided that the 'new body should 
be strictly non-party political, should embrace all ranks ... and membership to be 
confined strictly to ex-service men'.ll In common with the organisational 
arrangements which had obtained previously, Scotland was to have 'full control of its 
own local affairs'. 12 
But even though both Legions operated under similar rules and constitutions 
and held to the same beliefs and ideals, there were major differences between the two 
organisations. Many of the distinctions were superficial, but others were deep 
differences in approach, attitude and practice. The greatest difference lay in scale. 
The Legion with its Headquarters in London controlled the movement throughout 
England and Wales, and, after 1925, in Ireland as well. In terms of size, as well as 
finance, it was by far the greater of the two Legions. In fact, the size of the British 
Legion (Scotland) compared unfavourably with that of the smallest English Area. In 
1926 the Scottish Legion could muster 181 branches,13 which was roughly similar to 
the number in the North Eastern Area in England. Its membership was also very 
much smaller; in 1935 there were 15,800 Scottish Legionaries in 303 branches,14 but 
the North Eastern Area in England could claim 18,105 members in 214 branches. 15 
While the British Legion in England and Wales in 1938 represented (at the very 
lowest estimate) 6.7% of the total ex-service community, the Scottish Legion 
comprised only 2.2% of the total Scottish ex-service community.16 At the 1935 
10 Executive Committee of the Comrades, (Scotland), 8 September 1920. 
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Conference, the Scottish President General Sir Ian Hamilton remarked that 'We must 
double our strength before we can talk eloquently'.17 This very low membership 
strength was certainly influenced by many of the same factors which are discussed in 
Chapter Three but there were further reasons. Hamilton went on: 
Here, the Earl Haig Fund goes on its old way, ie. entirely independent of 
the British Legion. Here too, we have the United Services Fund Trustees 
going on the same as ever. Where do we come in except for show 
purposes? We have no real power because we have no money.18 
The financial position of the Scottish Legion was much more precarious than that of 
the English one. This was because the structure of benevolent work in England and 
Scotland was very different. On the formation of the British Legion in England, the 
Officers' Association relinquished its independence and became the semi-autonomous 
Officers' Benevolent Department. The Officer's Association also handed over the 
administration and organisation of the Earl Haig Fund to the Legion's National 
Executive Council, in return for five per cent of the proceeds from the Earl Haig 
Fund Appeal, namely Poppy Day, and one third of all bequests and donations given 
to the British Legion. 19 In Scotland, the Officers' Association maintained its separate 
identity and continued to organise the Earl Haig Fund Appeal. The Officers' 
Association was also responsible for the collection and distribution of the Poppy Day 
money, of which one third was retained for officers, and two thirds was allocated for 
other ranks. Thus, the British Legion (Scotland) decided early in January 1921 that it 
'had no use ... for a relief committee, having no relief Fund to administer'.2o Unlike the 
English Legion, the Scottish Legion had no part to play in Poppy Day other than 
providing voluntary help - it received no commission from the proceeds, and made no 
decisions concerning the Fund. 
While the English National Executive Council had a great deal of power and 
influence because it held the purse strings of the Poppy Appeal through the Central 
17 AC BLS 1935, Hamilton's Presidential Address. 18 ibid. 
19 See Chapter Four. 
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Relief Committee, the Scottish Legion was always hampered by severe financial 
difficulties. In 1924 the Scottish Legion offered to pay £5 5s as an affiliation fee to 
the British Empire Services League in place of £30 which was demanded. Since the 
secretary of B.E.S.L. refused this, the treasurer stated 'that the present financial 
position of the Legion could not allow of this fee being paid'.21 Eventually a 
compromise of £ 10 was agreed on, but this episode highlights the financial weakness 
of the Scottish Legion, dependent as it was only on membership fees and without any 
commission from Poppy Day to bolster its bank account. This also hampered all 
negotiations for a Scottish Journal which eventually did run, but never very 
successfully. With such a small membership, and few capital reserves, it was difficult 
to make the magazine a financial success. In contrast, the British Legion in England 
was able to publish the Legion Journal at a considerable loss every year during the 
twenties, and the Journal only began to make a profit in the thirties.22 Such 
extravagance was not open to the British Legion (Scotland) which certainly affected 
the strength of the movement in Scotland. The Scottish Legion could not afford to 
appoint paid Area Organisers to 'establish new branches on sound lines',23 nor could 
it afford to spend money on large recruitment campaigns like the 'Big Push' of 1922 
which raised public consciousness and the membership of the Legion in England. 
Without the benefit of strong finances, the growth of the Legion in Scotland was 
always hesitant and patchy, dependent as it was on local interest and involvement at 
branch level. 
The organisation of the Legion in Scotland appeared to be very similar to that 
of England, but the ways in which the structure operated were different. At the head 
of the movement was the National Executive Council, followed by regional areas, 
and then the local branches. The National Executive Council did not have the same 
character or influence as the English Council. While the British Legion elected solid 
21 NEC BLS 16 February 1924. 
22 See Chapter l1lfee. 
23 GSCLB ,\prill922. 
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middle class ex-officers to the national post of Chairman, the Scottish Legion 
consistently elected nobility. During the inter-war years, the post of chairman of the 
British Legion (Scotland) was filled by Sir William Dick-Cunningham, Lord 
Glentanar, the Earl of Haddington, and Lt.Col the Earl of Airlie.24 Paradoxically, 
these 'noblemen and gentlemen of position in the land'25 were supported by a more 
egalitarian National Executive Council. Unlike the English National Executive 
Council, which over the period contained roughly 40%-50% ex-officer 
membership,26 the Scottish Council had, on average 27% ex-officer representation -
and in one year contained no ex-officers at alp7 Thus a patrician leadership was 
balanced by a populist Council. 
While the National Executive in England operated as the sole decision making 
body in the Legion, with the Annual Conference subordinate to its views, the 
situation was different in Scotland. The National Executive Council did not view 
itself as the final decision making body, but instead referred major decisions to the 
Annual Conference. This difference in practice had a number of roots. There may 
well have been a genuine desire to make the Scottish Legion as democratic as 
possible, but another, equally important factor lay in the power of the Scottish 
Branches. The Scottish Executive did not have the power of the Poppy Day 
commission with which to persuade or coerce branches. The Legion in Scotland 
depended almost entirely on the goodwill and enthusiasm of the branches for its 
success. If the Scottish Executive had attempted to ignore the wishes of the 
branches, which the English Executive was able to do on a number of occasions, the 
Scottish leadership might well have found itself without any members to lead. 
Thus, the leadership of the Scottish Executive was based more on persuasion 
and consensus than the English council. There were many questions which the 
24 BLS, AC Reports 1921-1939. 
25 Report by the Co-operation Committee for Submission to the National Executive Council of the British Legion (Scotland), 29 
March 1930, p.29. 
26 See Chapter Three. 
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leadership felt were 'most important' and 'required full consideration by the National 
Executive Council and the members of the organisation'.28 Special Conferences on 
specific issues were held on many important subjects; Groups in 1924, the Means 
Test in 1934, International Co-operation in 1937.29 The referendum was also a 
frequently used tool to divine membership views on any subject. What is more, the 
views expressed at these Conferences and through the referenda were taken 
seriously. In general, the Scottish National Executive did not act against the views 
expressed by the majority of the membership. In Scotland, such methods were taken 
seriously, while in England, special conferences, and referenda were never even 
suggested as viable means of divining the views of the membership. It might be 
argued that this type of democratic participation was only feasible in a small unit like 
the British Legion (Scotland) but it does demonstrate a difference in attitude between 
the Scottish and English leaderships. 
Thus, there were great differences between the two Legions in the matters of 
finance, membership and the power of leadership. These differences in attitude and 
practice had a major effect on the protracted negotiations for unity which took place 
in the twenties and early thirties. Since the main motivation for the formation of the 
British Legion had been unity of purpose so that all organised ex-service men could 
speak with one voice, the London National Executive Council believed that the 
logical extension of this policy should result in one British Legion covering the whole 
of the British Isles. This found expression in the National Constructive Programme 
of 1921 which desired: 
To make the British Legion truly National by drawing into or affiliating 
with it all existing ex-service men's and women's associations, benevolent 
funds, clubs etc.30 
This did not contain a specific reference to the separate organisations in Ireland and 
Scotland, but this 'domestic object' informed all future relations between the British 
28 NEC BLS, Emergency Committee, 26 April 1927. 
:9 BLS AC Reports 1921-1939. 
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Legion and the British Legion (Scotland). From June 1921, the National Executive 
Council in London pressed for unity between the two Legions. An offer from 
London, made in November 1921, suggesting that Scotland should constitute herself 
as two Areas of the British Legion was refused politely since the Scottish Unity 
Conference had already been held that year, and any change would require alterations 
in the newly adopted Constitution of the British Legion (Scotland).31 These excuses 
were obviously made quickly because no one in Scotland wished to contemplate such 
complicated negotiations so soon after the formation of the Scottish Legion. 
At the 1922 Annual Conference the question of amalgamation was again 
discussed by the British Legion Scotland. It was decided by 62 votes to 5 'not to lose 
the status and individuality of the British Legion (Scotland)" and argued that 'co-
operation of the British Legion of all Countries was already secured in the Empire 
Services League'.32 This point caused a great deal of misunderstanding between the 
London and Edinburgh Headquarters of the two Legions. Although the British 
Legion (Scotland) recognised the Legion in England as the 'parent body' and often 
asked for help and advice from London, Scottish Legionaries were content enough 
with co-operation, and did not see the necessity for amalgamation. At the same time, 
the leaders in London believed that amalgamation was essential for the future 
strength of the Legion. A united body of all ex-service men within the British Isles 
was envisaged - one which paid all of its affiliation fees to London. It was argued 
that: 
if the Legion is to obtain the necessary reforms from government and from 
public and other bodies for the benefit of ex-service men .. .it is essential 
that...the Legion must speak with the voice of the united ex-service men of 
the Kingdom.33 
Not only would this give a united Legion greater financial strength but greater 
membership from all the nations of the United Kingdom. Since Legion leaders 
31 NEC BLS 18 November 1921. 
32 AC BLS 3 June 1922. 
33 BLAR 1923. 
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equated political influence with membership figures, it was seen as vital to bring all 
ex-service groups together under one head. The 1925 British Legion (Scotland) 
Conference in Kirkcaldy produced a typical example of the misunderstanding which 
frequently occurred between the two Legions. The British Legion (Scotland) Journal 
mentioned that: 
It is some years since we had the pleasure of having a representative at our 
conference from the British Legion parent body and Colonel Heath, the 
General Secretary received a most hearty welcome.34 
This acknowledged the British Legion as the parent body, and was appreciative of 
Heath's uplifting speech on the growth of the Legion and the spread of branches 
throughout the world, but no mention was made in the Journal or the Conference 
minutes of Heath's offer which was: 
conveyed to the ex-service men of Scotland on behalf of your Council an 
intimation that, should they at any time determine to apply to become an 
Area of the Legion, their request would receive the most sympathetic 
consideration. 35 
Heath's purpose, in line with the National Executive's views, was to stimulate 
discussion on the amalgamation question. In mentioning the growth and strength of 
the Legion, Heath hoped to encourage Scotland to become an integral part of the 
organisation based in London. In this he signally failed, and while he believed that his 
intimation had reached 'the ex-service men of Scotland'36 it is clear that his offer was 
not even heard in the Conference Hall. Scottish Legionaries believed that they were 
already included in the Legion's wider work through the British Empire Services 
League. On many occasions, the leaders of the two Legions were talking at cross 
purposes. 
Even Earl Haig, who had consistently preached for the unity of all ex-service 
men since 1920, was unable to bring understanding between the two organisations. 
34 BLS Journal July 1925, p.5. 
35 BLAR 1925. 
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As President of both organisations, he was uniquely placed to influence the situation. 
In 1921, Haig thought that 'the trouble has been due to a lack of a definite policy at 
London Headquarters. Scotland are ready to follow a definite policy expressed by 
the Executives in London'.37 The events of the next few years proved that the 
Scottish Legion did not understand the motives or necessity for amalgamation, and 
were not willing to follow the London Executive on this issue. By 1926 Haig had 
altered his views due to these disappointments. Although he still felt that 
amalgamation would be an 'excellent thing' he felt that: 
London Headquarters has not been able to show any solid advantage 
which would be gained by Scotland if they did amalgamate with England. 
Indeed there are disadvantages, so I don't blame Scotland for running her 
own show.38 
Haig understood that Scotland would not respond favourably to vague offers of 
amalgamation which gave her no real benefit, but he was unable to develop any ideas 
of his own. He simply reiterated that any new proposal for amalgamation 'must have 
some definite proposals to put forward'.39 This was exactly what the London 
Executive then endeavoured to do, and concrete ideas were formulated which J.R. 
Griffin, the Assistant Secretary, placed before the Scottish Executive at a meeting on 
2nd April 1927.40 He detailed eleven points which amounted to the incorporation of 
British Legion (Scotland) as an Area of the British Legion. Thus, the affiliation fees 
would be altered in line with English practice, and Scottish representatives would be 
sent to the London National Executive Council and Annual Conference. In addition, 
a grant of £800 would be made to cover administration costs. However, the most 
important provision in the proposals was the undertaking that 'Benevolent work in 
Scotland' was 'to remain as at present'.41 This was because the British Legion 
(Scotland) could not undertake to unify the benevolent funds in Scotland and 
37 Haig to Crosfield, 9 October 1921, Acc.3155, No.227.e. 
38 Haig to Crosfield, 28 June 1926, Acc.3155, No.227.d. 39 ibid. 
40 See Appendix H. 
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England, as it had no control over them. However, the ambivalent position of the 
Officers' Association in England, as a semi-independent branch of the British Legion, 
conflicted with the completely separate existence of the Officers' Association in 
Scotland. These legal and financial difficulties proved a major stumbling block for 
unity, but the real reasons lay deeper. 
On 26 April 1927, the Emergency Committee of the British Legion Scotland 
decided that it was 'not favourably impressed with the proposals submitted by Mr 
Griffin',42 and the matter would no doubt have been shelved by the British Legion 
(Scotland) but for the intervention of Earl Haig at the 1927 Annual Conference held 
in Dundee. Although Haig attended the British Legion Conference every year in his 
capacity as President, he only attended the Scottish Conference twice, in 1926 and 
1927.43 Haig had much more contact with London Headquarters than with 
Edinburgh, and this might explain his inability to persuade the Scottish Legion to 
amalgamate. At the same time, Scottish Legionaries held Haig in as much, possibly 
more, awe than the English members and this heightened the impact of his long 
speech in 1927 which argued for unity: 
No man can be more jealous than I for the rights and liberties of Scotland 
and of Scottish institutions, or more proud of that lofty spirit of 
independence which has kept Scotland in the forefront of the nations in 
every field of human endeavour; but I am also a strong believer in 
combining the efforts of all who are seeking to advance the same ideal and 
working for a common cause ..... .I still hope that the time will come when 
there will be in these islands one truly representative body able to speak in 
the name of all the ex-service men of Great Britain, and with the weight 
and influence of all British Ex-service men to back its word. 44 
In effect, Haig was asking the British Legion (Scotland) to subordinate its 'lofty spirit 
of independence' for the greater good of all British ex-service men. This did have a 
major impact on the Scottish delegates but not entirely the effect that Haig desired. 
It is clear that Haig's speech came as something of a surprise for Lord Glentanar, the 
42 NEC BLS, Emergency Committee, 26 April 1927. 
43 BL AC Reports 1921·1927, BLS AC Reports, 1921.1927. 
44 AC BLS H~ig's Presidential Address, 1927. 
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Scottish Chairman, because it had been decided at the National Executive Council 
meeting held just prior to the Conference, that the question of amalgamation should 
be fully discussed by the Council and Branches after the Conference. Thus, 
Glentanar could only prevaricate while mentioning that 'It is my hope, and I am sure 
the hope of every delegate present here to-day, that we may be in the closest possible 
co-operation with the Legion as a parent body'.45 He went on to say that he hoped to 
call a special Conference to deal with the matter once it had been fully discussed by 
the Council. However, Glentanar had not used the words unity or amalgamation, but 
co-operation. Once again, misunderstanding had taken place over the message of the 
speaker. Acknowledgement of the British Legion as parent body and the necessity 
for co-operation was clearly not all that Haig wanted. 
However, Haig's speech did make the British Legion (Scotland) reconsider its 
position. In November 1927 the amalgamation sub-committee's report stated that: 
The sense of loyalty and gratitude, which we have for our President, makes 
it imperative that the Legion in Scotland should give immediate and 
sympathetic consideration to Lord Haig's wishes.46 
Although the Scottish Legion had already considered and rejected the option of 
amalgamation, Haig's wishes could not be ignored by the Scottish Legion leaders. 
Thus, Griffin's proposals were considered again and different conclusions agreed 
upon. It was decided by the sub-committee for amalgamation that the British Legion 
would have to agree to certain additions to its Royal Charter before the Scottish 
Legion could refer the matter to the branches. These additions were mainly to define 
more exactly the position of the British Legion (Scotland), but the most important 
provision was for an addition to Clause 43: 
That all benevolent funds in Scotland remain apart from the British Legion 
and continue to be administered as at present by their Trustees, and 
45 AC BLS 1927. 
46 NEC BLS 1 November 1927. 
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excluded from the powers covered by Clauses 33 and 39 of this Royal 
Charter. 47 
This was to ensure the legal independence of all benevolent funds in Scotland from 
any terms of amalgamation. And although all of the other provisions were easily 
accepted by the British Legion, the addition to Clause 43 became problematic. When 
Glentanar informed the British Legion of the Scottish Legion's terms, Colonel Heath 
replied: 
With regard to the ... addition to Clause 43, the Chairman feels that while it 
may be possible to get this through the National Executive Council, it is 
not going to be easy to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority for the 
amendment to the Charter when the matter comes before the Annual 
Conference at Whitsuntide. He wonders whether it would not be possible 
to meet your Executive's view by placing this particular item in your Bye-
Laws. 48 
While the Scottish Legion saw the protection of Scottish benevolent funds as vital to 
any amalgamation, the British Legion leaders were unwilling to test the matter 
through a vote at the Annual Conference. The Scottish leaders then broke off the 
negotiations due to the 'reluctance of the English Legion Headquarters to alter their 
Charter or even to consult the whole members of the English Legion in conference'.49 
It was at this frosty point in the negotiations that Haig died, leaving an 
important letter concerning the issue unsigned. Colonel Crosfield, the British Legion 
Chairman, had given Haig a draft letter to sign which recommended amalgamation 
without additions to the Charter. Crosfield justified this to Haig because the 
National Executive Council are prepared to give the necessary undertaking that these 
arrangements shall continue and shall not be interfered with', 50 and further, that: 
it might create quite a wrong impression if the British Legion in Scotland, 
in order to become more closely allied and identified with the British 
Legion, insisted on amendments to the British Legion Charter. 51 
47 NEC BLS, Sub.Committee, 30 September 1927. 
48 E.C. Heath to Lord Glentanar, 9 December 1927. 
49 Report by the Co·operation Committee, p.l0. 50 p.12. 
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Crosfield was reluctant to test the oplmon of the membership at the Annual 
Conference because he thought that the addition to the Charter might be resisted by 
English representatives who felt that Scotland was being given special treatment. He 
was not prepared to risk failure for such important proposals. More importantly, 
while the Scottish Legion would not act without the approval of their branches, 
Crosfield, who had been given complete freedom of action on the matter by the 
National Executive Council,52 felt such a vote was unnecessary when the National 
Executive Council were prepared to give their word on the matter. This difference in 
procedure between the two Legions could only heighten the misunderstanding 
between them. 
The Scottish Legion leaders were concerned by the draft letter which had 
been left unsigned by Haig. Since there was no way of knowing whether Haig would 
have signed the draft letter in its original form the leaders sought legal advice on the 
matter. Legal Counsel advised them not to amalgamate without the additions to the 
Charter to safeguard the position of the Scottish benevolent funds. In reprising the 
situation for counsel, the Scottish leaders also revealed their real doubts concerning 
o.M~o.Ma.tion. 
They feared that: 
if amalgamation does take place, the English Legion may ultimately claim 
the right in future to issue the Earl Haig Appeal throughout the whole of 
the United Kingdom, to administer from London the whole of the Poppy 
Day money collected in Scotland, and to receive from that Fund 
commission on the total collection for their own purposes. 53 
There had already been a number of minor quarrels over benevolent funds which had 
caused a certain amount of suspicion between the two Legions. The Earl Haig Fund 
in London collected large sums throughout the colonies for the Poppy Appeal, but 
none of the money ever found its way to Scotland. 54 If the British Legion (Scotland) 
amalgamated with the British Legion, it left the Scottish Officers' Association and the 
52 NEC 1928. 
53 Report by the Cn-oo~ration Conunittee, p.18. 
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Scottish Earl Haig Fund in a precarious legal position. The only way of guaranteeing 
their separate existence seemed to be through a legal addition to the Charter. 
Further, the Scottish leaders feared that, although the National Executive Council in 
London might pledge sincerely to maintain the separate Scottish benevolent funds: 
the English Legion, at their Annual Conference, can always, it is thought, 
overturn any agreement made by their Executive Council and might quite 
likely do so whenever they thought it would benefit their funds. 55 
These fears were based on an imperfect knowledge of the British Legion; it was 
highly unlikely that the membership of the British Legion would overturn such an 
agreement without the express approval of the National Executive Council. 
However, the National Executive Council in London did nothing to educate the 
Scottish leaders or properly reassure them. 
It is also clear that many members of the Scottish National Executive were 
against amalgamation for reasons other than legal impediments. In the very long and 
comprehensive report on amalgamation prepared for the Executive Council in 1928, 
Colonel Blair, one of the committee members, mentioned that: 
there were many other reasons against amalgamation which the Committee 
had agreed upon, but which they purposely did not include in the report so 
as to avoid all controversy. 56 
It is unknown whether any members of the National Executive Council were also 
members of the fledgling Scottish National Party, but clearly, matters of 'sentiment' 
and national pride played a large part in their deliberations. If amalgamation took 
place, the British Legion (Scotland), an independent organisation, would surrender 
that right and be reduced: 
to the level of an ordinary area to be called the 'Scottish Area', putting the 
whole of Scotland which is a nation by itself, on the same basis as an 
English County or English Area with only two representatives on the 
55 ;h;~ ".18. 
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National Executive Council. This proposal alone is contrary to Scottish 
sentiment or, if preferred, Scottish pride. 57 
Thus, they could not surmount the difficulties of national pride and Scottish desire for 
independence and distinctiveness, no matter what benefits amalgamation might have 
provided. The Scottish leaders' fears that Scottish representation on the National 
Executive Council could be reduced still further were phantoms, but it shows that 
they were not prepared to take the risk of amalgamation. The report warned that 
similar amalgamations 'have not proved successful, but on the contrary a source of 
friction, involving in some cases a secession from the main body and the institution of 
a separate body for Scotland'. 58 Finally, the report suggested that the happiest, and 
safest solution was for the two Legions 'to retain their separate entities', and continue 
to work in 'loyal co-operation'. 59 
Eventually, after all these avenues had been explored without success, the 
Scottish leaders decided to consult the branches through a referendum in September 
1928. This gave an unequivocal result - 26 branches were in favour of 
amalgamation, but 132 voted against.60 In view of the result, the Scottish Council 
agreed to drop the question of amalgamation while continuing to explore means of 
greater co-operation with London Headquarters. This information was forwarded to 
London, and it is clear that the English National Executive lost patience with the 
problem. In March 1929 the Chairman was asked to inform the Scottish Legion that: 
since the organisation in Scotland had no right to use the name of the 
British Legion, this Council requested that steps be taken to cease using 
the title "British Legion". 61 
Instead of finding ways to work together, the London Executive was attempting to 
coerce the Scottish Legion into amalgamation. Much to the chagrin of the London 
Executive, the Scottish Legion had also secured the right to use the term 'British 
57 Report by the Co-operation Committee, p.29. 
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Legion' and the letter had little effect other than to sour relations between the two 
Legions. At the 1930 Annual Conference of the British Legion (Scotland), Lord 
Haddington, the Chairman, remarked that: 
the English Executive were apparently prepared to make amendments to 
their Charter to give effect to certain recommendations made by Lord 
Bridgeman's Committee, though not prepared to do the same in connection 
with the amalgamation question. 62 
It appeared to the Scottish leaders that, when an issue was important enough, the 
English Executive were prepared to alter their Charter; the fact that they had not 
done so over amalgamation could only be taken as proof that the English Executive 
had not explored every avenue. As might be imagined, relations between the two 
Legions at this time were far from cordial. By 1932, frustration amongst the English 
membership at the lack of progress became apparent when Liverpool moved three 
motions at the Annual Conference which would, in General Sir Ian Hamilton's words, 
'have broken up the movement in Scotland in three minutes'.63 The resolution 
recorded the keenest disappointment with the British Legion (Scotland) and its 
'failure to respond to the leadership ... of the Prince of Wales ... and ... Earl Haig'. 
Further, the National Executive Council was urged: 
to secure either the same measure of control of the Branches and 
Institutions in Scotland as exists in England, Ireland and Wales, and 
throughout the remainder of the Empire, or take steps to point out to each 
individual unit in Scotland that their use of the title of the British Legion is 
illegal. 64 
This resolution had the same motive as the abortive letter in 1929, but this time was 
to be debated on the open floor of the Annual Conference. The resolution also 
reflected the attitudes of many of the Legion leaders concerning the position of the 
British Legion (Scotland) because it had been discussed 'at great length with various 
members of the National Executive Council: 65 including Mr Lister and Colonel 
62 AC BLS 1930. 
63 AC BL 1932, Res. No. 132. 
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Crosfield. The Prestwich delegate in moving the resolution remarked that 'it was up 
to the Legion to tell Scotland they should come in, that the Legion wanted them in, 
and that if they did not come in they should get out'.66 This was an expression of the 
frustration felt at the ambivalent position of the British Legion (Scotland), as an 
organisation claiming the same beliefs, objects and ideals, but resolutely refusing to 
join with the larger 'parent' body. 
However, frustration was not enough to pass the resolution, and instead a 
conciliatory motion which expressed: 
the earnest hope that the work initiated by Lord Haig shall be brought to 
fruition by the unity of the Legion in Scotland with the British Legion and 
further, trusts that in the meantime the closest possible relationship will be 
fostered between the two bodies. 67 
was passed. This was nothing more, or less, than the type of platitude which had 
caused misunderstandings between the Legions since 1921. The Scottish Legion 
could maintain its position by claiming that a cordial relationship with the parent body 
was sufficient, while the resolution did not really forward matters for the English 
Legion. This resolution marked the end of any serious attempts to amalgamate the 
two Legions, and in truth the negotiations had run out of steam by 1929. 
One of the major criticisms of both Legion leaderships must be that one of 
their basic aims - that of unity amongst all British ex-service men - was never 
achieved. In 1929 the British Legion Annual Report stated that: 
The Council considers it urgently necessary in the interests of the ex-
Service community as a whole that the ex-service men throughout 
England, Northern Ireland, Wales, Scotland the Irish Free State, should 
speak with one voice. 68 
The greatest barrier to full unity proved to be the addition of a paragraph to Clause 
43 of the Legion's Royal Charter. If complete unity was so urgently required, the 
London Executive's refusal to even attempt a Conference vote reveals a stunning lack 
66 AC BL 1932, Res. No. 132. 67.hid. 
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of vision. Poor negotiation skills and an inability to understand the other Legion's 
point of view also characterised the negotiations. At the same time, the Scottish 
Legion did not concede that unity of purpose and action on political issues, 
benevolent work, foreign policy and myriad other ex-service issues would be of 
major benefit to all British ex-service men. 
Closer co-operation between the two Legions only developed in 1938 and 
1939. This time, the impetus came from the British Legion (Scotland) which realised 
that it was losing out from some of the important decisions being made in London. 
The real costs of disunity were made apparent by the failed campaign over 
prematurely aged ex-service men. By 1936, both Legions were aware of the problem 
of 'burnt-out' veterans who were suffering from the effects of their service, but did 
not have war pensions. Both Legions passed resolutions on the issue at their 1936 
Annual Conferences, but while in England the matter was entrusted to the personal 
attention of the Chairman, the scope of the Scottish Legion's resolution was much 
wider. The Scottish resolution stated that the Legion should: 
petition the government to set up a commission of enquiry into the present 
condition of all ex-service men who fought in the late war and also their 
dependents who are suffering from physical and financial stress due to the 
lack of pension and employment, with a view to recommending such 
measures of relief as the condition demands. 69 
This resolution demanded a complete review of the pensions warrant which had 
operated since 1919. The British Legion (Scotland) had never surrendered the belief 
that the pensions warrant was inadequate and this resolution was an attempt to force 
the Government to review the condition of all ex-service men, not just those 
prematurely aged who needed immediate assistance. Not surprisingly, the Ministry of 
Pensions found no difficulty in refusing these demands and replied that the 
'Resolution does not indicate the special grounds of information which would be 
necessary to justify the Government in instituting a general inquiry at this date'.70 
69 AC BLS 1936. 
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This type of resolution did not cause any alarm amongst Ministry Officials; it was 
very easily deflected and there was certainly no intention to accede to the demand for 
a special inquiry. In common with other Scottish attempts at political pressure, the 
resolution was allowed to stand alone without any other immediate action being 
taken. 
However, the Legion's National Executive also decided that this was too 
important an issue to ignore and began to 'to formulate special instances of hardship 
and to obtain evidence from Branches throughout Scotland in support of this 
Resolution'.71 These investigations were two-fold. The Council considered that 
there was justification for an enquiry into the general condition of ex-service men 
who served overseas, as compared with those of non-service men of a similar age, 
and secondly, in all cases where a pension had been granted due to War Service to 
enquire whether the condition had worsened.72 
During 1938, when both Legions had completed their enquiries, pressure built 
up for a joint Deputation to the Prime Minister on the subject. But although the two 
Legions were pressing for ostensibly the same object, their approach to the question 
was entirely different. Fetherston-Godley during a telephone conversation with a 
Ministry of Pensions Official, IH.L. Ludgate, made it clear that: 
the Legion ... has no fault to find with the War Pensions system, which they 
regard as satisfactory and that they do not propose to make any 
recommendation that it should be altered.73 
By 1938, this had become the official line of the British Legion in England, but the 
British Legion (Scotland) had never accepted the system of pensions as was made 
clear in Lord Airlie's preamble to the Scottish report: 
It is submitted ... that the existing regulations which were framed within a 
few years of the cessation of hostilities are inadequate to cover the 
conditions under which many men find themselves at the present time.74 
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This was almost the complete opposite to the position of the British Legion in 
England. While the British Legion (Scotland) wanted a complete overhaul of the 
pensions administration, the English Legion was merely arguing for consideration for 
a special group of ex-service men; those who had been prematurely aged by their 
service. This also meant that the two Legions could not agree on how to mount the 
deputation to the Prime Minister. On 4 February 1938, the Prime Minister's private 
secretary, in his briefing for Chamberlain, seized upon the disunity: 
I submit that the fact that they have personal differences inside their own 
ranks, so far from affording any reason why you should see them 
separately, only strengthens the case for a joint deputation. They must 
compose their own differences before attempting to approach the Head of 
Government, and they must be ready to present a more or less common 
front. 75 
In the event, the deputation on 8 March 1938 was little short of a disaster. Both 
Legions were easily played off one against the other, and no concessions were made 
by Chamberlain. After the deputation, the Scottish questionnaire Committee 
reviewed the situation, remarking that: 
there was need for the closest co-operation with the British Legion 
England '" had preliminary meetings taken place before the joint 
deputation to the Prime Minister ... the case of the ex-service men might 
have been more strongly placed before him.76 
Thus it was only when the real costs of disunity were made plain by the deputation in 
March 1938 that the negotiations for co-operation were successful. The importance 
of co-operation was emphasized still further when the British Legion (Scotland) very 
'nearly missed the boat that never sailed'.77 When London Headquarters volunteered 
the services of the Legion for a Czechoslovakian Police Force during the Munich 
crisis, the Scottish Legion was almost overlooked, and Scottish representation was 
limited to 20 members out of a force of 1000 volunteers. 
75 Prime Minister's Briefing for the 1938 Deputation, 4 February 1938, PREMII285. 
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It was characteristic of both Legions that a personal friendship eventually 
brought about the co-operation where official negotiation had failed. When 
Fetherston-Godley became national chairman in 1935, he informed Hamilton that: 
I wrote to Airlie the other day to see if we could do something about 
bringing the Legion in Scotland and England nearer together ... there is no 
reason that I can see why something cannot be done, and as I was at 
Sandhurst with Airlie, perhaps we can do something where the official 
mind has failed. 78 
The plans for co-operation, which were finally adopted in 1939, owed more to the 
friendship between Airlie and Fetherston-Godley than formal meetings and 
negotiations. Under the proposals, all national matters such as foreign policy and 
negotiations with government were to be handled by the London Executive but all 
'domestic affairs' were to remain separate. Mutual representatives on each Executive 
Council and at each Annual Conference ensured that full contact took place between 
the Legions. 79 The plans worked well, and the two Legions learned to co-operate 
during the Second World War. 
The failure of earlier negotiations meant that both Legions suffered the 
consequences of disunity for twenty years. Their appeals and relief work was not co-
ordinated, and in deputations to Government departments, neither Legion could 
speak for all British ex-service men and the lack of communication between the 
Legions could only exacerbate the problem. But the poor bargaining skills and lack 
of flexibility which were demonstrated during the course of the unity negotiations 
affected more than just the relations between the two Legions. As we shall see, these 
defects also hampered the British Legion's work in many other areas and particularly 
in its negotiations with Government. 
However, disunity affected the British Legion (Scotland) more severely. 
While a British Legion branch in an English village might form a social centre for 
village life, the Legion in Scotland was rarely able to make such an impact on 
78 Fetherston-Godley to Hamilton, 21 January 1935, 1H29120. 
79 See Appendix I. 
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people's lives. This was due to its financial weakness, but also because, without a 
Relief Fund, it had no practical role to undertake in the wider ex-service population. 
With only two per cent of Scottish ex-service men within its ranks, the traditions and 
spirit of the Scottish Legion were always more intimate, and carried less weight with 
the rest of the community. By maintaining its independence, the British Legion 
(Scotland) reinforced conceptions of Scottish distinctiveness and independence, but it 
also closed itself off from a more powerful and active ex-service movement across 
the border. 
3 
'OURS IS A BROTHERHOOD WHERE RANK 
IS NAUGHT AND SERVICE EVERYTHING': 
THE MEMBERSHIP AND LEADERSHIP 
91 
Voluntary organizations exist only when there are members to control and 
motivate. The Legion was no exception and it is through a discussion of membership 
and leadership that we can hope to understand the character and motivations of the 
British ex-service movement. We must first examine the nature of Legion 
membership. The shared goals of the movement tell us much about the character of 
the Legion - and the type of ex-service man who would be attracted to join the 
organization. The influence of the Legion leadership is also very important as the 
officer-dominated hierarchy of the Legion determined many elements of the Legion1s 
make-up. Following on from a discussion of the Legion1s membership, we must 
examine the reasons for the comparatively low numbers of veterans in the Legion. 
As a voluntary movement, the Legion could never achieve the same numbers as a 
compulsory institution like the Armed Forces but compared with continental ex-
service groups, the British Legion was a small organization. Antoine Prost has 
estimated that French associations Irepresented between 2,700,000 and 3,100,000 
organized veterans, or almost one out of every two survivorsl.l In Germany, both the 
Stahlhelm and Reichsbanner boasted membership figures in excess of one million. 2 In 
contrast, the Legion never amounted to more than ten per cent of the total ex-service 
community. The reasons for low membership are bound up in external factors but 
also with the nature of the organization itself. 
The British Legion grew steadily from 1922 when there were 116,433 
members until 1938 when there were 409,011.3 The continued growth of the 
1 Prost, In the Wake of War, p.44. 
2 Diehl, Paramilitary Politics in Weimar Germany, pp.293-295. 
3 See Table 4. 
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Legion, until a second war intervened, proved that the Legion was a live movement. 
As General Sir Ian Hamilton remarked in 1933 on his eightieth birthday: 
We ex-service warriors who used to be so gay and larky are now 
becoming venerable beings who die by the dozen every day - just as leaves 
drop off from an aged oak in winter. And yet - here comes the miracle 
which will puzzle the historians - the British Legionaries who draw their 
recruits from the fast-diminishing ex-service men increase like the leaves of 
a sapling in the spring!4 
The Legion not only replaced members who 'faded away' or lapsed in their 
membership, but continued to attract new members. While membership may have 
decreased in 1926 after the General Strike,s the only period of stagnation on a 
national scale occurred in 1930 and 1932 with the onset of the Depression.6 
There are detailed statistics which give a clear indication of the strength and 
regional distribution of Legion membership. These figures are based on the affiliation 
fee receipts which give the total financial strength of the Legion in anyone year. In 
fact, this is the lowest estimate and actual membership would have been considerably 
higher. Each member of the Legion had to pay an annual affiliation fee of 1/6, but a 
member who became ill or unemployed could be excused payment with the 
agreement of his branch.7 Although many members continued to pay their fees if 
unemployed or ill, (or their branch paid for them) there were thousands of members 
who did not appear in the statistics. Somerset in 1934 had a financial membership 
amounting to 12,374 while membership returns reached 14,382.8 The financial 
membership of the Legion reached a high point in 1938 with 409,011 paymg 
members but the Legion claimed an estimated membership total of 560,000.9 
The membership figures also give clear evidence of great regional differences 
in the distribution of Legion strength. Membership was much higher in the South and 
4 BU, May 1933, p.l72. 
S See Tables 4 and S. Figures for 1926 are inexact because the Legion financial year was moved from December to September, 
thus the figures only show details for nine months of that year. 
6 ibid. 
7 Rule 4 - Funds (B), Royal Charter. 
8 Report of the Somerset County Committee, year ending 30 September' O'V 1'.17; found in , 1H29120. 
9 BU May 1939, p,390. 
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West of the Country and correspondingly weaker in the North and Wales. lo The 
statistics also reveal that, notwithstanding the overall growth of the organization, the 
regional distribution of membership remained relatively constant throughout the 
period. II Thus, the South Eastern Area, which was always the largest unit, contained 
14.43% of the total membership in 1922 and 15.41% in 1935; an average of 15.84%. 
The South West contained, on average, 11.38% of the total membership, while in 
contrast, the North East and North West comprised 4.75% and 9.55% respectively.12 
These figures provide striking evidence that the Legion drew its main strength from 
the villages and market towns of rural England. Within Somerset, a predominantly 
rural area with a strong County organization, it was calculated in 1934 that 37% of 
all ex-service men in the County were financial members of the Legion. 13 Indeed 
many village branches could boast that all ex-service men from the local community 
were members of the Legion. Forest Town attained this ambition after the 1922 'Big 
Push' recruitment campaign when '72 new members were enrolled'.14 High rural 
membership may be explained by the ability of the Legion to become well integrated 
into village life. At Trumpington the President, Mr G.R.C. Foster, a local worthy, 
presented the Branch with its standard in 1924 and held the annual Legion fete on his 
grounds. At Sunbury-on-Thames, the local vicar, the Rev. c.E. Thomas was 
Honorary Chaplain and served on the benevolent committee. At Ambergate, a town 
with strong railway connections, the President, Henry Kiddy, was a former Midland 
Railway accountant who was also the local choirmaster. 15 These examples are 
typical of the manner in which the Legion was woven into the fabric of traditional 
rural life. 
The situation was very different in urban areas. England's great cities, 
although containing large numbers of ex-service men, had small Legion memberships. 
10 See Table 6. 
II ibid. 
12 ibid. 
13 Report of the Somerset County Committee 1934, p.3. 
14 BU, June 1922, p.270. 
IS lnfonnation from the histories ofTrumpington, Uld Sunbury-on-Thames branches. 
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At the 1924 Annual Conference, the Newcastle delegate remarked that 'of the 30,000 
men and 5,000 officers in Newcastle only, about 600 men and about 50 officers were 
Legion members'.16 This was a very small percentage membership - 2% and 1% 
respectively. The Bristol delegate at the 1927 Annual Conference complained that 
his city was: 
practically the 'Black Hole' of the Legion, 48,000 men entered the forces 
from Bristol, but their Legion membership was not a thousand. It was a 
disgrace to a big provincial city that they had not a greater membership. 17 
Legion membership in Bristol only amounted to 2% of the total ex-service 
community. As these examples show, while the national average was roughly 10%, 
Legion membership in cities was often no more than 2% of the total ex-service 
community. Legion members recognized that: 
the greatest weakness was to be found in the large towns, and their 
problem was different from that of country Branches. There were all sorts 
of counter-attractions and people could hide themselves for years. IS 
Urban areas contained a more mobile population with a weaker community identity 
than rural villages. There were also none of the traditional structures of hierarchy 
which could be utilized to provide the Legion with extra funds and publicity. 
Whereas in a rural area a Legion branch could become a real focus for community 
life, in the cities there were already many different organizations and leisure activities 
based around working identities that provided 'counter-attractions' to the Legion. 
It is revealing that the large new housing schemes built by the London County 
Council on the outskirts of London in the twenties and thirties provided a fertile 
ground for Legion branches. In places like Becontree and Dagenham, there were 
large communities of 30,000 and more, but without the normal social amenities or 
traditional structures of British life. These areas were too far from the centre of 
London for the city to provide a 'counter-attraction' to the Legion. In Becontree the 
16 AC 1924, Res. No.124. 
~~ AC 1927, Rule No.4 (8). 
AC 1931, Res. No. 46. 
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L.C.C. actually left a plot of ground for an ex-service club and let the ground to the 
Legion at a nominal rent. In 1933 the Branch raised the funds for a headquarters 
building through voluntary effort on the part of the members since Becontree had no 
'Big Noise to come down handsomely' with a large donation. By 1935 the Branch 
was very successful and helped to provide a social focus for an area of35,000 people 
which had few other amenities. 19 The Legion was able to work more effectively 
where the local branch could harness local support and provide a social focus for the 
area. 
In 1922 Corporal Claude Brown gave a comprehensive answer to the 
question 'Why am I a member of the Legion?': 
Because, in the first place, I desire to perpetuate that wonderful spirit of 
comradeship forged in the service and especially on the battlefield, where 
ALL men were real chums and gave real service, friendship, shared joys 
and sorrows, work and play, and even their rations. I realised before 
hostilities ceased that Peace no less than War would want winning. I want 
to help all I can those chums who suffered so much with me. I want to 
help my fallen comrades widows and their orphans in their sad plight. .... I 
want to help all those partially and totally disabled chums who nobody 
seems to want and whose present position appears so hopeless. All this 
and more can be done through the British Legion if all ex-service men will 
join. What baffles me is why any decent thinking comrade stands outside 
leaving the others to fight the cause. 20 
Brown was expounding a profoundly collective ethic. Legion members saw 
themselves as a band of comrades who were working to help less fortunate ex-
service men and care for the widows and orphans of the Fallen. Legion members 
were greatly concerned by the issues of housing, training, pensions and employment 
because many of them were working men who had faced these problems themselves. 
There was also a strong commitment to the disabled ex-service man perhaps 
due to the large numbers of disabled veterans contained in the membership. Disabled 
veterans probably had a better realization of the problems which could confront ex-
service men than many able-bodied veterans. One delegate at the 1923 Conference 
19 BU, April 1935, p.439. 
20 BU, April 
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remarked that 'they had got to admit that seventy five per cent of the members of the 
Legion were disabled men'.21 This followed the same pattern found in French 
organizations. Antoine Prost has estimated that in the French movement 'almost all 
recipients of a war-pension belonged to a club, although six non-pensioned veterans 
out of ten remained outside the movement'.22 Many prominent Legion leaders were 
also severely disabled; Colonel Crosfield had lost a leg at St Eloi, Major IB.B. 
Cohen lost both legs at Loos, Douglas Pielou and Harry Caulfield both suffered from 
severe internal injuries, while Captain Appleby was blind.23 The problems of 
disability formed an important part of Legion identity, and helps to explain the great 
emphasis which was placed on pensions work. 
Although the practical efforts of relief work, pensions appeals and committee 
meetings were crucial aspects of the Legion, social functions and entertainment were 
also important. It was stressed in the 1933 County Handbooks that: 
Besides the benevolent work and the finding of employment, there should 
be an attempt to draw members to the Branch by the Social work which is 
carried on there. Sports should not be forgotten, and friendly matches 
should be played with local branches. At the present time, competitions in 
such games as billiards, air-gun, whist and cribbage, are run by the County 
and Area sports committees. In these branches are invited to compete. It 
is the social side or our work which holds the members together.24 
Many people joined the Legion branch and club to make new friends or meet old 
ones, but most importantly, people would only join and remain a member if they felt 
comfortable with the other members. The emphasis placed on sporting and social 
events was an echo of the sporting events which were encouraged by the Army, but 
they were also a reflection of the interests of the members. These games and 
competitions were popular pastimes for most of the British population and Legion 
members were no exception. As with any voluntary organization, social events were 
21 AC 1923, Res. No. 19. 
22 Prost, In the Wake of War, p.45. 
23 n-'~;ls taken from the Provisional Agendas oft"- '~~"1l Conferences, N.E.C. Nominations, 1923-1939. 
'taffordshire County Handbook IS33, p: 
'Ours is a Brotherhood' -- 97 
very important in maintaining interest in the more important and serious tasks which 
were accomplished. 
Legion members also displayed pride in the achievements of the British Army 
during the Great War - and in what the Legion accomplished for veterans afterwards. 
The emphasis on military symbols and trappings suggests that the British Legion was 
attractive to men who had found some meaning and purpose out of soldiering. There 
was great desire within the Legion to maintain martial pride, to remember old 
campaigns and battles and retain the military trappings of parades, rallies and 
reviews. It is safe to assume that men who had hated the army would have few fond 
recollections to recount and no wish to march again on parade. The most important 
and powerful Legion symbol was the Standard which was carried at the head of 
every Branch parade. The South Eastern Area Annual Report for 1931 described the 
standard with: 
The Colours of Old Gold and Oxford Blue with the Union Jack in the 
Corner; the latter reminding us of our duty to the Crown. The Old Gold 
reminds us of those who served under Fire and the Oxford Blue reminds 
us of those who served in the Air, on or under the Water. The Legion 
standard is an indispensable item of Branch equipment and should be 
carried by a selected Member of the Branch and an escort should be 
provided for all Parades or Ceremonies in which the Legion participates 
(in the same way as the Old Regimental Colours so dearly prized) and 
which are the visible symbols of our organization. 25 
The importance of military symbols to Legion members was underlined by the long 
controversy concerning medals within the letters page of the Legion Journal,26 There 
were many ex-service men who, although they volunteered, were never sent abroad. 
Those who fought in India or Ireland were not issued with any medals as this too was 
considered 'Home Service'. Many members believed that it was 'a great shame that 
the men who in 1914-15 voluntarily gave up all to serve their country were not 
rewarded with at least a volunteers' medal'.27 Members felt deeply about medals or 
25 Report of the South Eastern Area Annual Conference 1931, p7. 
26 See Letters Page of BU, 1932·10'l/l 
27 BU, January 1933, p.2t6. 
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their lack of them and this could cause embarrassment on parade. An ex-regular 
officer who had volunteered in 1914, but not served overseas, complained that he 
was asked: 
why I did not wear my medals by men who, to my knowledge, were called 
up, as conscripts, right at the end of the war, and who, having been sent to 
France and never been in the firing line, wore medals. Since then I have 
ceased to attend all parades and rallies where it was directed that medals 
and decorations should or must be worn. I am quite certain that there are 
many men who will not join the Legion owing to this medal business.28 
The possession of medals formed a visible distinction between members who had 
seen service overseas and those who had not. In fact, many divisions existed 
between Legion members. Although Legion membership was open to all ex-service 
men, the Legion was filled predominantly by Great War veterans. Most members 
drew their sense of identity from their service in the Great War, even to the exclusion 
of other ex-service men. Funds were available for all ex-service men, but Poppy Day 
money was reserved exclusively for Great War veterans. Many Legion branches did 
not open their doors to post-war ex-service men and even pre-war ex-service men 
were sometimes made unwelcome. As one member put it: 'I myself belonged to a 
branch who resolutely refused to allow post-war men to join keeping it a close 
preserve for those who served in the Great War'.29 We can thus characterize Legion 
membership as a small but active number of ex-service men with a belief in collective 
action and pride in the achievements and sacrifices of the Great War. Members 
of the Legion often described themselves as the 'cream of the ex-serv1ce 
community'30 - a view which contrasted with the need to build a mass voluntary 
movement and implied that members set an example to other veterans. In 1925, Haig 
claimed that: 
I believe, indeed I know, that the influence of the British Legion has 
worked powerfully in the past, not only for the fair and just claims of ex-
28 BU, September 1933, p.88. 
29 BU. August I(W, ".56. 
30 BU, IJarch ,\.317. 
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service men and their dependents but for the general good of the country. 
Its influence has been a steadying influence in times when dire distress and 
bitter sense of grievance have well nigh broken the hearts of disillusioned 
men. 31 
The Legion was proud to claim that it formed a body of men of all ranks who stood 
for the good of the country. But within the Legion itself, it was believed that the ex-
officer gave strong and stable leadership. The Legion had a highly developed 
hierarchy of leadership which had great influence on the character and development 
of the British ex-service movement. Legion leadership was not based on democratic 
and egalitarian lines and instead reflected traditional divisions of rank and class. 
Haig believed that it was essential that the officer should playa major role in 
the Legion. In 1919, during the formation of the Officers' Association, he argued 
that: 
any attempt now to start a special 'Ex-Officer's Association' would be 
harmful, first because it would withdraw the real leaders from the ex-
service men and secondly because such action at once divides Officers and 
men into two Camps.32 
Haig saw the ex-officer as the 'real leader' of the ex-service movement who would 
look after the welfare of ex-service men and guide them away from the 'pernicious 
doctrines' of socialism towards harmonious class relations. 33 In 1922, Haig argued of 
the ex-officer that: 
If he is out to do his duty as a comrade, he will seek election at the Legion 
club for .. .it may very likely be the means of putting him into a position to 
help less fortunate comrades and unless he goes amongst them from time 
to time, he is bound to get out of touch and be ignorant of how they are 
faring. 34 
The type of officer which Haig had in mind was the traditional officer and gentleman; 
the ex-regular, financially-independent and socially-confident, public-school educated 
man who had the time, money and energy to work for the Legion. These men were 
31 Haip~ Usher Hall Edinburgh, 11 November 1925, Acc.3155. No.235b. 
32 Earl Haig to H. Baird, 29 August 1919, Acc.3155. No.235.c 
33 AC 1923, Abertillery Delegate, Discussion of Annual Report. 
ig, Northampton, March 1922, Acc.3155. No.: 5.c. 
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assumed to know that their duty was to help and encourage less able, less fortunate 
ex-service men. The myth that ex-officers were somehow better suited to succeed in 
civilian life and thus lead ex-service men was perpetuated by most Legion leaders. 
The high-ranking ex-regular officers who called for greater officer participation had 
spent a lifetime in the Forces, and for men like Earl Haig, General Sir Ian Hamilton, 
General Bethune or Admiral R.S. Cuming, concepts of duty, honour and noblesse 
oblige came naturally. 
In reality, there was a low level of officer participation in the movement 
which conflicted with these assumptions. L.H. Duniam-Jones expressed a common 
sentiment in 1926: 
The ex-officer class especially takes very little interest in the Legion, and 
speaking as one of them, I do feel that they are not fulfilling their moral 
obligation to the rank and file, to leave them to fight their battles alone.35 
While bemoaning the lack of officers, Duniam-Jones was still supporting the 
mistaken assumption that officers should lead in the ex-service movement. The 
problem oflow officer involvement remained throughout the period; even in 1936 the 
Sussex County Chairman lamented that: 
In Sussex alone there must be hundreds, if not thousands, of ex-officers 
who take no part in this work, who are not even nominally members; and 
yet nearly all of these non-members are the first to value the comradeship 
which unites all ex-service men.36 
The lack of response from the majority of ex-officers had a number of different 
causes. The assumptions about the role of ex-officers in the Legion did not take 
account of the fact that the nature of the British Officer Corps had changed 
dramatically during the course of the Great War. The British Officer Corps before 
the Great War was composed of 12,738 regular officers, with 2,557 in the Special 
Reserve and 3,202 in the Reserve of Officers.37 However, the pressures of Britain's 
35 L.H. Duniam-Jones to Ian Hamilton, 9 September 1926, IH2912. 
36 Sussex Daily News, 31 December 1936, PRO, PINI5/722. 
37 Ian Beckett and Keith Simpson, A Nation in Arms: A Social Stlldy of the British Army in the First World War, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1983 •. 64. 
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first modem war saw mass commissioning; in all 229,316 combatant commissions 
were granted to men from the ranks.38 While many of these combatant commissions 
were given to soldiers with proven battle skills who made very good combat officers, 
they lacked the social status of the pre-war regular officer. 
The leaders of the Legion were trying to enlist the traditional type of officer 
who had social influence and could assist the Legion in its work. It was not generally 
recognised that the vast majority of ex-officers were no longer in this privileged 
position. General Sir Ian Hamilton considered that the officers recruited from the 
ranks were Inot officers at all, they are just like the men themselves, rankers, only 
they happen to have been promoted and given titles which makes their position more 
difficult'.39 
The Itemporary gentlemenl very often did not have the same social confidence 
and set of social beliefs as their regular predecessors. More importantly, many 
officers found themselves in financial difficulties after the Great War. During the 
Great War there had been little provision for discharged officers as it was assumed by 
the authorities that officers had the requisite skills and reserves of money to succeed 
in civilian life. By the same reasoning, officers were not entitled to the 
unemployment donation after the war, but many officers did not have the resources 
to merge back successfully into civilian life and even some regular officers had lived a 
pre-war life of 'shabby gentility' which was often totally dislocated by disablement or 
unemployment. 40 In 1921 the Officer's Benevolent Department (O.B.D.) assisted 
24,221 cases of officers and their families in distress but the number who had applied 
for help was 50,550.41 In the 1921 Annual Report it was stated that There can be 
little doubt but that if employment could be found in an adequate degree the calls 
upon the Department would be more than halved'.42 Thus, the O.B.D. assisted the 
38 ibid. 
39 Ian Hamilton to Admiral Sir Henry Bruce, 23 February 193I,1H29/14. 
40 Beckett, A Nation in Arms, p.67. 
41 O.B.D., Annual Report 1922. 
42 ibid. 
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same number of officers as were present in the pre-war army, and yet many more had 
applied for help. Many ex-officers were unable to help less fortunate ex-service men, 
because they found themselves in a similar situation. 
There were other reasons for the lack of officer involvement in the British 
Legion. Firstly, the officers and men in the British Army during the Great War were 
often drawn from different parts of the country. As John Keegan has described: 
throughout the industrial North, the West Midlands, South Wales and 
Lowland Scotland there existed populous and productive communities 
almost wholly without a professional stratum and so without an officer 
class. 43 
Many ordinary soldiers came from the mining and industrial areas of the North, while 
most of the officers came from the 'South, the West and ... half a dozen major 
cities'.44 When these men returned to their homes in the North, there was a natural 
dearth of officers in the district who could get involved in the Legion. 
It might be expected, given the low participation rate of ex-officers, that the 
Legion was dominated by ordinary ex-service men both in membership and 
leadership. But in spite of the real and perceived lack of ex-officers in the movement, 
there was a concentration of ex-officers in the leadership of the British Legion. 
While the majority of ex-officers did not involve themselves in the Legion, those who 
did had a disproportionate effect and influence. Of the five National Chairmen of the 
Legion 1921-1939, only the first, Thomas Lister, was not an officer. The ex-service 
movement and its development owed a great deal to his skilled handling of the 
complex unity negotiations and the first difficult years of Legion development.45 
After Lister, there followed Colonel George Crosfield, Colonel John Brown and 
Major Fetherston-Godley. All of these men had similar backgrounds and all had a 
long connection with the army. Crosfield had served as a captain in the Boer War, 
Brown had joined the Volunteers in 1903, while Fetherston-Godley had joined the 
43 John Keegan, The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincollrt. Waterloo and the Somme, London: Barrie and Jenkins, 1988, p.196. 44 ibid. 
45 OHBL, p24, 106. 
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R.A.S.C. in 1910 and had not left the army until 1925.46 The General Secretary, 
Colonel E.C. Heath, was in command of the 3rd Sherwood Foresters on the eve of 
the Great War and the South Eastern Area Chairman, Colonel Grantham, was a long 
serving officer and had retired prior to the Great War when he was 'dug-out' for 
service again.47 In common with many of the officers involved in the Legion, the 
National Chairmen of the Legion were long-serving ex-regulars to whom the army 
and its traditions were a way of life. This may have been a major reason for their 
involvement in the Legion. While serving, they had drawn their sense, meaning and 
identity from the Army, and it was possible to continue this in the British Legion. 
Notwithstanding their army careers, all of the Legion's National Chairmen 
were drawn from the middle class. Colonel John Brown explained his resignation as 
Chairman in 1933: 'I was obliged to give up the Chairmanship as it has become a full 
time job and the necessity to earn my own living compels me in these difficult times 
to give more time to my business'.48 Lister was an insurance underwriter, Crosfield 
the deputy-chairman of a family firm in Warrington, Brown was an architect while 
Fetherston-Godley was independently wealthy.49 Arthur Francks, the first 
Metropolitan Area Chairman, and subsequently a long serving member of the 
National Executive Council, was a London lawyer although he had served in the 
ranks. 50 Clearly many of the important posts of the Legion at national and Area 
level were only suitable for business men or retired ex-service men who had the time 
to devote to the work. 
The National Executive Council also contained a high proportion of ex-
officers. The twenty-six representatives (once Ireland had been incorporated) were 
elected by the Area Conferences and then approved by the National Conference. 
Over the period 1923 to 1939 nearly half the representatives held the rank of Captain 
46 Details taken from the Provisional Agendas ofthe ArulUal Conferences, N.E.C. Nominations, 1923·1939 
47 BU, May 1934, p.56. 
48 John Brown to Ian Hamilton, 24 December 1933, IH29/19. 
49 Details taken from Who Was Who? 1940.1972. 
50 Arthur Francks to Ian Hamilton, 18 February 1935, IH29/20 
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or above and, on average, each member served for over five years, although some 
served for as many as sixteen years.51 The concentration of officers in positions of 
responsibility continued at every level of the Legion. In the South Eastern Area over 
the period 1929-32, the Area President, the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman, the 
Organizing Secretary and the Employment Secretary (both paid posts) were all held 
by officers of the rank Captain or above. In the Area Council 10 out of the 18 
representatives held the rank of Captain or above, while every vice-president for the 
four Counties was a high-ranking officer. 52 The situation remained similar at Branch 
level. An examination of five Branches53 reveal that it was common practice to elect 
ex-officers to the main posts of responsibility. In many rural branches, the presence 
of officers was integral to the operation of the branch. At Sunbury-on-Thames, the 
branch was not established until a retired regular officer moved to the village and 
called a meeting of local ex-service men. 54 It is clear that officer participation in the 
Legion leadership was much higher than the simple proportion of officers to men 
might have warranted. 
The influence of officers had a number of important and far-reaching 
consequences for the movement. Many ex-officers brought the same method of 
leadership and command to the Legion they had utilized during the war. The 
hierarchy of Legion leaders was very similar to the rank structure of the Armed 
Forces and the position held by a retired officer in the Legion often depended on his 
military rank. In 1929, General Sir Ian Hamilton suggested that Lord Jellicoe might 
replace him as Metropolitan Area President. H.E. Cheeseman, the Organizing 
Secretary replied that II donlt think Lord Jellicoe would relish serving in a subordinate 
position to the Field Marshall.55 Jellicoe, who had been Admiral of the Fleet and a 
nominal equal of Haig, was not prepared to accept an linferiorl position. Just as the 
51 See Table 13. 
52 Annual Report of the South Eastern Area Council, 1929-1931. 
53 These are the Newark, Sunbury-on-Thames, Trumpington, Hatfield Heath, and Arnbergate Branches. Additional evidence can 
be found in the 'News from the Branches' section of the BU. 
54 Sunbury-on-Thames Branch History. 
55 H.E. Chee~eman to Ian Hamilton, 14 September 1927, IH29/4. 
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Legion's hierarchy was not determined by the approval of the membership, so the 
egalitarian approach of democracy enshrined in the Legion charter was often 
overlooked by leaders more used to having orders instantly obeyed than having to 
compromise and persuade men to accept their position. Colonel Crosfield, while 
Vice-Chairman, developed a dislike for Arthur Francks, the Metropolitan Area 
Chairman. He wrote to Haig in 1923 lamenting: 
the great detriment that Francks is to the Metropolitan Area ... .I think 
Lister does appreciate the harm that Francks is doing to the movement but 
he does not see how he can oppose the delegates if they persist in electing 
Francks as Chairman. The trouble is that Francks is a terrifically hard 
worker. He goes round to the branches night after night, tells them what 
the Legion is doing and what he is doing, and the majority of the branches 
are, I fear, disposed to vote for him. 56 
Crosfield did not understand that such problems were part and parcel of a democratic 
organization. Francks had served in the rank-and-file during the war and Crosfield 
clearly did not agree with Francks' values or methods. He may have been a great 
detriment to the Legion in London in Crosfield's view, but the branches which 
Francks worked for obviously did not think so. Crosfield's response was 'to get the 
right man elected' in Francks' stead; General Bethune took the post of Chairman in 
1925.57 In 1930, Bethune had to resign due to ill-health, and Francks decided to 
stand for Chairman again. He went to see Crosfield, now Legion Chairman, and 
asked if anyone else was standing. Crosfield replied that 'there might be and said also 
if there should be I knew Francks would take it in a friendly spirit and fight a sporting 
contest'.58 In fact, it was Crosfield who was not prepared to fight a fair election. He 
decided to support Admiral Sir Henry Bruce for the Chair, and Crosfield 'took the 
liberty of writing to him yesterday to sound him as to whether he would care to be 
nominated,.s9 Bruce had not been nominated by any Metropolitan branch and 
Francks was the logical candidate. Furthermore, canvassing for any candidate was 
S6 Colonel Crosfield to Earl Haig. 1 February 1923, Haig Papers, Acc.3155, H227.f. 
57 ibid, BL Annual Report 1925. 
58 Colonel Crosfield to Ian Hamilton, I February 1930, IH29/12. 
59 ibid. 
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strictly against Legion rules.60 Crosfield·s actions were a clear example of a Legion 
leader flouting the democratic rules of the organization. 
Another example of conflicting views of democracy occurred in 1934 when 
Admiral Sir Henry Bruce, now Metropolitan Area Chairman, published a letter in the 
Evening Standard criticizing the National Executive Councirs suppression of Legion 
Journal attacks on the Ministry of Pensions. The President, General Sir Frederick 
Maurice, wrote to Bruce saying: 
I may remind you that I got through an increased grant for the 
Metropolitan Area ... It seems to me to be a poor return that you should 
lead an attack upon the Headquarters of the Legion ... surely ordinary 
loyalty requires that some enquiry should be made as to the reasons for a 
leadds action before condemning him.61 
Maurice saw his role of President as commanding the same sort of loyalty and 
support to a superior officer which the Army had maintained during the War. Bruce 
was ·surprised at the tone of your letter ... we are a democratic association ruled ... 
by our Branches. As Chairman of an Area, it is my duty to carry out their resolutions 
and as such I do·.62 Maurice could not understand Bruce·s support of resolutions 
passed at the Metropolitan Area Conference. Clearly, traditional concepts of 
patronage and loyalty were more important to many Legion leaders than the ideas of 
consensus and majority rule. 
The method of selection for National President was another example of 
leaders contravening the democratic charter of the Legion. All National posts were 
supposed to be elected at the Annual Conference each year, but in practice, the 
President was chosen by the Royal Patron, the Prince of Wales. Earl Haig was 
indeed elected President at the Unity Conference in 1921, and then re-elected 
unopposed each subsequent year until his death in January 1928. This left a gap of a 
few months until the Conference in June but, instead of testing the delegates· opinion 
60 Rule 5 (B) 'No canvassing shall be pennitted at the election of officers', Royal Charter. 
61 Sir Frederick Maurice to Sir Henry Bruce, 31 May 1933, IH29/18. 
62 Sir Henry Bruce to Sir Frederick Maurice, 1 June 1933, IH29/18 
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In an open election, Earl Jellicoe was co-opted as President by the National 
Executive Council in March 1928. On the 2nd of February 1928, Colonel Crosfield 
was: 
sent for by HR.H. the Prince of Wales to discuss the question of a 
successor to Lord Haig as President of the British Legion. The Prince had 
stated that he thought it was the turn of a sailor and that he thought the 
position ought to be given to Lord Jellicoe.63 
Colonel Crosfield felt that 'the men would .... if asked wish to put' General Sir Ian 
Hamilton into the post. 64 Crosfield then delegated General Sir Frederick Maurice, an 
old friend of Hamilton's to sound him out on the question; Hamilton stood down. 
Thus when the decision went to the National Executive Council, and subsequently 
the Area Conferences, the delegates were not likely to reject the only candidate. 
Throughout February Hamilton received nominations from Branches who wished him 
to be President but were too late to affect the issue. Thus, the major decision had 
been taken by the Prince of Wales, and executed by Colonel Crosfield leaving no 
room for discussion by the Branches. 
The situation re-occurred when Lord Jellicoe, who had been a popular and 
effective President, had to stand down due to ill-health in 1931. The Prince of Wales 
now selected General Sir Frederick Maurice as President, and again, General Sir Ian 
Hamilton, although having substantial claims to the post, stood down. This time 
however, Hamilton, although feeling that Maurice would make a 'first class President 
and under whom I would be proud and happy to serve' thought it 'might be 
dangerous if a second time any ground should be given for the supposition that the 
Presidency of the Legion was a Court appointment'.65 However, although Hamilton 
had a 'long talk' with the Prince of Wales there was no open election at the Annual 
Conference. On this occasion there was dissent from Legion branches. Admiral Sir 
Henry Bruce, the Chairman of the Metropolitan Area feared that: 
63 Colonel Crostield 10 Ian Hamilton, 2 February 1928, IH29/37/4. 64 ibid. 
65 Ian Hamilton to Sir Frederick Maurice, 14 December 1931; to Colonel Crosfield, 17 December 1931; to T.F. Lister, 14 
December 1931; IH29/15. 
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the nomination of General Sir Frederick Maurice to take Jellicoe's place 
will not go down well in the Area. They seem to take exception to the 
way its been ... engineered from Haig House as rather barring and locking 
the door to any other nominations being brought forward at the National 
Conference at Whitsuntide especially as the Prince of Wales name has been 
brought into 'THE ARENA' and there are already some very strong 
resolutions being talked of in the air.66 
Maurice's nomination was accepted and he became President. When Maurice was 
attacked by Lloyd George in 1936, Bruce reminded the National Chairman, 
Fetherston-Godley that 'the Metropolitan Area were not in favour of his election. 
His reply to that was that they were "not the only one"'.67 For many Legion members 
there was always a question mark over Maurice's authority due to the manner of his 
election. Some of the Legion leaders, and certainly the Prince of Wales, did not 
consider it necessary to pay more than lip service to democracy. Their outlook and 
actions belonged more to the age of Victorian patronage and noblesse oblige than to 
a period of mass democracy. 
The ex-officer leadership had a major influence on the character and actions 
of the Legion. The leadership decided, through the National Executive Council, 
which policies would be adopted and pursued. It is also clear that the leadership of 
the Legion did not always hold to the avowed policy of democracy. The Branches' 
influence on policy, through the Annual Conference, was often limited by the action 
actually taken by the National Executive Council. On occasion there were serious 
differences in thought, action and approach between the leadership and membership 
of the Legion. However, these defects were not always recognized by the members 
of the Legion. To be sure, many of the above examples of undemocratic behavior 
were never made public, and the membership were not always aware of the decisions 
or attitudes of their leaders. But we can also explain the rank-and-file's acceptance of 
a strong and hierarchical leadership through an examination of the shared goals of the 
movement. 
66 Sir Henry Bruce to Ian Hamilton, 20 January 1932, 11-129/15. 
67 Sir Henry Bruce to Ian Hamilton, 25 July 1936, 1H29/21. 
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Although members might argue over how best to accomplish the aims of the 
movement, there was a very strong consensus on the most important elements of 
Legion policy. For the majority of Legion members practical work, comradeship and 
entertainment in their local branch were of greater importance than any faults in the 
movement. The Legion conception of democracy was also open to interpretation. 
At the 1939 Annual Conference, Fetherston-Godley stated that: IThe essence of 
democracy is that you elect certain people to lead you, and you loyally support them 
while they do so. If you are dissatisfied, you remove them at the next electionl . 68 
This view of democracy eliminated the principle of membership participation in 
policy decisions while emphasizing the role of the leader. In effect, it harked back to 
the relationship between officer and men within the armed forces. 
In 1932, military regulations were altered so that miniature medals could be 
worn on Parade unless Royalty were present. General Sir Ian Hamilton questioned 
the decision: 
How about the Legionaries? ... the rank and file attach some weight to the 
turn out of their officers. One of the most common remarks of the men to 
an inspecting officer when chatting in a friendly manner after a function is, 
IIWe think it so very nice of you to have put on all your medals and things 
just as we do when you come to see us! 1169 
On Legion parades, members wore lounge suits with their medals but the reviewing 
General wore full uniform. Many Legion members were proud to be reviewed by 
retired officers with whom they had served and paid great attention to the details of 
uniform and medals. Legion members with their fondness for military symbolism 
often believed that duty and loyalty were more important than democracy. The 
popularity of the National officers within the Legion proved that the Legion 
membership were fully prepared to support strong leadership, even at the expense of 
proper participation in the movement. 
68 AC 1939, Res. No.2. 
69 Ian Hamilton to Colonel Crosfield, 4 May 1932, IH29/15. 
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Furthermore, any criticism of the Legion provoked a strong protective 
reaction from its members which obscured many of the flaws inherent in the 
movement. In 1929, when a minor Legion official embezzled £400 from the 
Metropolitan Area, the Sunday Express mounted a sustained attack on the 
administration and accounts of the Legion. Most of the Sunday Express criticisms 
were unfounded. It was not true that 'the administration of the Legion is almost as 
secretive as the Secret Service'70 as Legion accounts were published and readily 
available. However, like many voluntary societies handling large amounts of cash, 
the Legion did have a minor problem with dishonest officials and members. Under 
continued pressure from the Sunday Express, the Legion commissioned Lord 
Bridgeman to chair a committee which mounted a full investigation into Legion 
affairs. During the proceedings Bridgeman spoke to General Sir Ian Hamilton and 
admitted that 'on the main subject he said he was rather worried about it all .... he 
wished to goodness Lord Jellicoe had not asked him to take up this business'.71 
Nevertheless, the Bridgeman Report supported the Legion while making some 
recommendations for improved efficiency. This also allowed the Legion to shelve 
the general problem of petty fraud which had precipitated the attack in the first place. 
The Annual Report for 1930 remarked that: 
The immediate reaction to anything in the nature of an attack against a 
great organization from outside sources is to link together more closely 
than ever before its individual units and component parts.72 
The subsequent Annual Conference had a number of resolutions of support for the 
National Executive Council; Legion members 'rallied round the flag'. In 1934 a 
similar incident occurred over the dismissal of the Legion Journal editor. The editor 
was convinced that he had been unfairly dismissed and began to criticize the Legion 
severely. He suggested that the Legion was losing membership, and also made false 
70 Sunday E-cpress. 5 January 1930. 
71 Ian Hamilton to Colonel Crosfield, 13 Febmary 1930, IH29/12. 
72 BLAR 1930. 
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allegations against the Chairman, John Brown.73 On this occasion the criticisms were 
extreme and unfounded and the Legion membership refused to accept them. 
However, the comments of the Witham Delegate, in moving a resolution which 
expressed confidence in the National Executive Council, are revealing. He said: 
In his branch they were 100 per cent loyal to the N.E.C. and 100 per cent 
loyal to John Brown ... He hoped the passing of the resolution would put an 
end to the diabolical, unfair, scandalous and un-British criticism of the 
Legion, which was being run democratically by the rank and file. 74 
Any criticism, whether correct or not, was likely to be dubbed 'un-British' by Legion 
members and they closed ranks on any occasion when the organization was 
questioned or criticized by outsiders. This was an understandable reaction, but it also 
ensured that some valid criticisms of the Legion were ignored. Although the 
members who proudly marched on Legion parades did not question the ideals of the 
movement which they represented, the thousands of ex-service men outside the 
organization clearly did. 
The methods and attitudes displayed by the ex-officer leadership did not 
appeal to all ex-service men. Many areas, particularly the large urban areas like 
London and Birmingham which held substantial numbers of ex-service men, 
maintained an anti-officer outlook. Prior to the formation of the Legion, the 
Federation, which had its main strongholds in London and other cities, had not 
allowed officers - other than those commissioned from the ranks - to join the 
organization.7s It was as late as 1929 that H.E. Cheeseman, the Organizing 
Secretary of the Metropolitan Area could write that the Chairman, General Bethune, 
had 'broken down the barrier which existed in many parts of London between ex-
officers and other ranks'.76 The effect of the anti-officer outlook was demonstrated 
by the membership of the Metropolitan Area Council. In 1929, the President and 
Chairman were both officers, as were the two paid posts of Administrative Agent and 
~! AC 1934, Maurice's Presidential Speech. 
7SAC 1934, Res. No.2. 
OHBL,p.2. 
76 H.E. Cheeseman to Ian Hamilton, 1 March 1929, 1H29/18. 
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Assistant Organizing Secretary, but fifteen out of the sixteen Council representatives 
were rank-and-file members.77 There was a definite feeling among many ordinary 
ex-service men that they should organize their own movement without the 
interference of the officers who had led them during the war. This undoubtedly 
lowered the membership of the Legion as ex-service men with these feelings would 
not wish to join an organization which had such an officer-dominated leadership. 
The values and beliefs of the ex-officer leadership did not necessarily coincide 
with those of many ordinary ex-service men. One of the main preoccupations of 
Legion leaders was to construct a movement which would offer 'unwavering 
opposition to the Bolshies'.78 In 1922 Earl Haig wrote that: 
Subversive tendencies are still at work, short cuts to anarchy are still the 
fool's talk of unstable intellectuals. There is all the greater need for men of 
all ranks who are determined by steady, patient and self-sacrificing work to 
bring comfort to the sore-stricken nations, to stand stoutly together. A 
rallying ground for such men is offered by the Legion. It appeals to all 
who have worn the King's uniform, and who, therefore, realise the nobility 
of service, to enrol themselves to win the peace, even as they won the 
war.79 
Haig firmly believed that the Legion should form a body of men from every rank and 
class who stood for the good of all. This was a conservative, reactionary creed 
which stood against all of the social changes which had taken place during the war. 
His use of military metaphors and images of men rallying together against unstable 
intellectuals and anarchists may have appealed to the Legion membership, but it is 
unlikely that they appealed to all ex-service men. While Haig and other Legion 
leaders propounded an anti-socialist and anti-Labour theme in speeches to British 
Legion audiences, these did not match the beliefs of many ordinary ex-service men 
who developed a deep suspicion of Legion motives - it was characterized by the 
77 Metropolitan Area Council, 4 December 1929, IH29/1l. 
78 AC 1923, Earl Haig's Presidential Address. 
79 BLS AC, 1926, Haig's Prt"sidential Address. 
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Daily Herald as 'Haig's White Guard'80 which would give assistance to the authorities 
in any civil disturbance. In 1927, Colonel Crosfield had to warn Haig that: 
a great number of our members are supporters of the Labour Party 
and ... they are little suspicious of Empire, Imperialism etc ... Then too if 
one rubs in the word duty without making it quite clear that the duty falls 
on all, rich and poor alike ... the person ... turns round and says 'Oh yes! 
This is Haig's White Guard!'81 
At the 1924 Annual Conference, the East Anglia Area moved a resolution that this 
Conference views with alarm the increasing tendency of the general public 
to dub the Legion as an organization with a motive for keeping ex-service 
men together with a view to their use in cases of national emergency. 82 
The delegate explained that when the Legion in East Anglia had invited a Union to 
take part in the Remembrance Day Service, the Union secretary had refused, saying 
'You are nothing more or less than Haig's White Guards'. 83 The delegate was clearly 
disturbed that union officials might believe there was a conflict between Legion 
membership and trade union affiliations. Members of the Legion were able to 
reconcile these different identities; other ex-service men were not. 
There were other, more practical, reasons for low Legion membership. In 
1926 H.E. Cheeseman explained that: 
A difficulty which every branch encounters is getting the majority of the 
ex-service men of a district sufficiently interested in the Legion to become 
members. It is not so much antipathy towards the Organization, as sheer 
apathy. 84 
Some ex-service men may have disliked their time in the Forces and did not wish to 
spend their free time involved in an organization like the Legion. But apathy and 
involvement in other interests does not necessarily suggest a rejection of Legion 
ideals and beliefs, simply that many ex-service men had other concerns. The 
experience of one post-war ex-service man is illuminating - John Mark Smith joined 
80 OHBL, p.66. 
81 Crosfield to Haig, 9 November 1927, Acc.No.3155 No.227.b. 82 AC 1924, Res. No.118. 83 ibid. 
84 H.E. Cheeseman, Area Organisation, Sunu n6. 
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the army at the age of 15, and, after serving for nine years, left in 1932. After this, 
his time was spent looking for employment and working extremely long and tiring 
hours in the catering trade. Although he served throughout the Second World War, 
it was not until his retirement in 1973 that he became involved in Legion work, for 
which he gained a certificate of merit. 8s For many ordinary ex-service men, the 
concerns of work and family probably filled most of what little spare time was 
available. 
One underlying problem which certainly affected Legion membership was the 
trade depression and resulting unemployment in many communities in England and 
Wales. The decline of Britain's main staple heavy industries of steel, mining and 
shipbuilding during the inter-war years meant that the industrial towns of the North 
of England and Wales were badly affected by unemployment. 86 When we examine 
Legion membership figures with the only available figures for ex-service 
unemployment in 1936, we find a direct correlation between low Legion membership 
and high unemployment in different regions. 87 In the South of the Country, there 
were 181,387 financial members of the Legion and only 93,863 unemployed ex-
service men. Thus, for every unemployed ex-service man there were two members 
of the Legion. In the North there were 74,363 Legion members but 177,975 
unemployed ex-service men; for every Legion member there were two unemployed 
ex-service men. Yet Northern industrial towns like Darlington and Newcastle were 
areas with large numbers of potential recruits for the Legion. During the war, the 
main sources of manpower had come from London, Scotland, and the industrial and 
mining districts of Britain and the rural areas of the Country had supplied a lower 
percentage of men to the Army.88 Thus, large-scale unemployment did have a major 
effect on the membership and success of the British Legion. 
8S John Mark Smith, The Extraordinary Life of a War Veteran. London: Cortney, 1986, p.8S. 
86 S.V. Ward, The Geography of Inter-war Britain: The State and Uneven Development. London: Routledge, 1988, p.1,14. 87 See Table 9. 
88 John Keegan, The Face ofBal/le, p.196., J.M. Winter, The Great War and the British People, London: Macmillan, 1983, 
p.34,38. 
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Unemployment could and did lower the membership of the Legion - not 
because unemployed ex-service men were prevented from joining the Legion but 
because the economic impact on the whole locality could be severe. Legion 
Branches depended on their local ex-service community and the general public for 
support, volunteers, members and funds. In a comparatively prosperous provincial 
town like Oxford there were lower levels of unemployment than in the industrial 
areas of the North - due to the large Morris car works at Cowley, and the various 
light engineering concerns which sprang up in Oxfordshire during the 1920s and 
1930s. Given this more favourable economic situation, Legion members had the 
spare money to pay their affiliation fees and to drink in a club bar. When fund raising 
events took place, the local population had spare money to spend at the regularly 
organized Legion events like the summer fete, the annual dinner dance or the dug-out 
night. In Oxfordshire both Branch and the County fetes became very important 
sources of income for the Branches and the County Relief Fund which assisted cases 
of hardship outside the remit of the National funds. 89 
Furthermore, in a prosperous area, the Legion was more likely to enlist the 
help of a wealthy benefactor; the 'Big Noise' who could be expected to 'come down 
handsomely'.90 The experience of Solihull is revealing in this respect. The secretary, 
Mr Ludlow, wrote to General Sir Ian Hamilton in 1930: 
Yesterday I unveiled a very charming memorial tablet in the Billiard room 
to Mrs Grenville the donor of the Club House and furniture, she was 
present and we had a great function ..... we should awfully like Mrs 
Grenville to extend the Club for us, she can well afford it and only wants 
egging on!!! 91 
Having found a wealthy patron, the Solihull branch continued to 'butter her up' and in 
due course the extension was paid for. In Solihull there were 250 paying members, 
with all the 'activities of the club ... extraordinarily well attended, Rifle Shooting, 
89 F.R.L. Goadby, British Legion Oxfordshire: The First Forty Years, Maidstone: British Legion Press, p.28. 
90 BU, April 1935, p.439. 
91 Mr Ludl~' ~ .. "l1ilton, 21 December 1930, lH29/13. 
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Public Whist Drives, Dancing etc'.92 A successful Branch with a club recruited 
members because the social functions and events made it a popular and attractive 
organization. If a branch was popular then more members joined, and consequently 
the branch had more funds to spend on the objects of the Legion, thereby keeping the 
branch attractive to its members. A branch with a strong financial position could also 
utilize its large branch funds for local assistance of hardship cases and thus present an 
active social and welfare organization to the local ex-service community. 
In an area with high unemployment, a branch could be starved of funds and 
unable to fulfill its objectives, thus making it an unattractive proposition for most ex-
service men. In 1934 the replies from several branches to the Journal fund, set up to 
help poor branches attend the Annual Conference, reveal the problems which could 
be encountered: 
'Over 75 per cent of our members are permanently unemployed.' 
'We have 46 members who have been unemployed for a considerable 
period yet we pay our affiliation fees regularly to Headquarters.' 
'The Branch is a struggling one. We would be able to find the money for 
the railway fare, but not for the maintenance of the delegate whilst absent.' 
93 
Many of the branches in depressed areas simply did not have the funds to build 
branch premises or to organise local relief funds, and the members and the public did 
not have the money to spend on fundraising events or in a clubhouse. This is 
demonstrated by the figures for Poppy Day 1927-28.94 The North East Area 
contributed only 2.3% of the total for Poppy Day, although there were many ex-
service men and people in the area - the problem was simply a lack of spare money. 
A Wales Area delegate explained at the 1928 Conference that 'Last year in the 
Rhonda Valley they collected £414, the whole amount in coppers'95; many people had 
92 ibid. 
93 BU, May 1934, p.378. 
94 See Table 8. 
0< 1928, Res. No.S. 
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given money, but the amount collected remained small. Thus, branches in the 
depressed areas were often reduced to being centres for relief without the many and 
varied activities which other more prosperous Legion branches could pursue. Again, 
this was unlikely to make the local Legion branch attractive to prospective members 
or popular with existing ones - it was more difficult to see the relief given out as a 
comradely gesture of goodwill when it was all the branch could offer. This could 
breed resentment as in 1932 when a man from Barrow in Furness wrote to Sir Ian 
Hamilton saying: 'It is no good going to the British Legion, there is a lot of poverty 
amongst ex-service men here, but I never knew of one case who has got anything 
from them'.96 In fact, the local relief committee had disbursed £325 during the year. 
But obviously, this was not nearly enough to relieve all the distress in one of the most 
depressed areas of Britain, particularly since the Legion relief committees were 
mainly dependent on the amount of money collected in their own areas during Poppy 
Day.97 Unemployment and poverty blighted many areas of Britain during the inter-
war years and low Legion membership was only one symptom of its overall impact. 
However, the Legion still attempted to reach the mass of ex-service men 
through widespread recruitment campaigns, which were of variable effectiveness. 
There were at least six major recruiting campaigns; the 1922 'Big Push', 1923, 1924, 
the 1925 'Comradeship Campaign', the 1927 'Members Membership Movement, with 
the member as the magnet' and the 1931 tenth anniversary celebrations.98 The first 
and most memorable of the Legion campaigns was the 1922 'Big Push', from 31 
March to 8 April 1922, which took its name from the Somme offensive of 1916. The 
aim was to increase membership and to form new branches in districts where the old 
ex-service organizations had not yet joined the Legion or where no Legion Branch 
had yet been established. As with all the membership campaigns, the main efforts 
were to be made at branch level; this meant that the effort and success of the 
96 John Watson to Ian Hamilton, 11 February 1931, IH29/14. 
97 This is discussed in Chapter Four. 
98GSCLB,1922, 1923, 1924, _ •• -n7,1931. 
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campaign could vary greatly from district to district. The recommendations for the 
membership campaign were fully carried out in Darieston, Lancashire, where: 
many letters, detailing the aims of the Legion, were sent out to employers, 
tradesmen, clergy, and members of civic bodies. All ex-service men were 
post-carded to attend the various Committee rooms; recruiting agents 
were given special rosettes so that all ex-service men could easily identify 
them for the purpose of receiving enlightenment on the movement; a series 
of indoor and outdoor meetings were held; a house to house canvass of all 
ex-service men was made; every factory and every shop showed a Legion 
poster; and in practically every street posters were displayed on the 
hoardings and the walls.99 
Such intensive efforts could bring impressive results; Darieston gained 460 new 
members. In Hull 'the great public meeting under the auspices of the Hull Branch of 
the British Legion at the City Hall rivalled in enthusiasm the war time meetings'.100 
However, the Legion was to learn that there could be a big difference between 
expectations and reality. It was hoped that the week 'should show an increase of one 
million new members',101 but instead increased membership by under five per cent -
only 23,340 new members joined Up.l02 
In later membership campaigns a very different approach was adopted. It 
was realized that 'Monster Demonstrations' were 'expensive' and 'attended by people 
who are ineligible for membership'103. Thus: 
by far the greatest factor with regard to the increase of membership is the 
personal appeal, the drawing in of others by personal influence rather than 
relying on the intense but evaporating enthusiasm created by mass 
meetings. 104 
Such personal influence was dependent entirely on local conditions and a dedicated 
membership who were prepared to spend large amounts of time canvassing ex-
service men in the area. Indicative of the change of approach was the provision of 
99 BU, June 1922, p.270. 
100 BU, December 1922, p.134. 
101 GSCLB, SC, Membership Campaign, 31 March 1922. 
102 GSCLB, SC, Membership Campaign, 31 March 1922. 
103 GSCLB, SC, Membership Campaign, February 1927. 
104 GSCLI" n~ • ·'tumn Campaign, 1923. 
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gold, silver and bronze medals as an incentive for the best canvasser in each Area. 105 
The techniques involved using old membership and relief returns to target lapsed 
members and people who had received Legion assistance. 'Flying squads' of Legion 
recruiters with transport (either cars or bicycles) became common as a means of 
reaching outlying rural districts. In Oxfordshire, the efforts of the Banbury Branch 
extended over a ten mile radius with a flying squad of 20 members which managed to 
establish six new branches in 1930.106 These efforts did result in a growth of Legion 
membership every year, but Legion publicity could not persuade most ex-service men 
to join the movement. 
The underlying factors of unemployment and the difficulties of organization in 
urban areas could only be compounded by unfavourable perceptions of the British 
Legion. Much of the explanation for low Legion membership must lie with the 
predominance of ex-officers in the leadership and the anti-socialist outlook they 
sponsored - both of which alienated many ex-service men. At no time did Legion 
leaders recognise that their views or beliefs might be unattractive to many ex-service 
men. At Northampton in 1922 Earl Haig saw the membership problem in a simplistic 
manner: 
Private Jones will say to himself, there is Major Smith who was my boss in 
the army, he will want to be my boss in the Legion. Major Smith on his 
side will say to himself, Private Jones saw quite enough of me in the 
trenches, and won't want to see me hanging about his club. And so these 
good and true men drift apart for the rest of their lives through want...of 
realising that ours is a brotherhood where rank is naught and service 
everything, and that no ex-officer can get elected to a position of 
responsibility in the Legion unless he is prepared to give service and 
enthusiastic service. 107 
Not only was Haig's description of the Legion inaccurate, but his analysis of British 
society was mistaken. In 1920s Britain, there were still large gulfs of understanding 
between officers and men, who did not necessarily wish to share in each other's social 
105 GSCLB, SC, Membership Campaign, February 1927. 
106 Goadby, British Legion Oxfordshire, p.29. 
1 n7 Earl Haig Northampton, March 1922, Acc.3 J '5. No.235.c. 
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activities. Furthermore, the Legion could not ever be the idealistic organization 
which Haig wanted. Matters of class, status and rank were just as important within 
the Legion as in ordinary society, and while many soldiers had experienced 
comradeship in the trenches, their feelings did not generally extend even to men 
outside their own unit, let alone to staff officers. Legion membership was conceived 
round the idea of a universal comradeship but, as we have seen, distinctions of 
service, medals and rank were erected between veterans of different wars. Haig 
believed that his message appealed to all ex-service men but, in truth, it appealed only 
to those who still accepted the traditional tenets of loyalty, duty and deference to 
social superiors. It may be said that the leaders of the Legion simply did not know 
how to develop a mass movement based around the ideas of full democratic 
participation and the voluntary principle. 
In 1927, Thomas Lister remarked: 
I think that the secret of Legion success has been the fact that we have 
attracted to it men who, outside of their daily occupations, are determined 
to place the Legion first in their thoughts, and who really and genuinely 
want to do service in peace, just as they did service in the war. 108 
The development of a 'Legion spirit' ensured that the Legion grew into a national 
organization. Too many ex-service men lay outside Legion ranks to characterize this 
Legion spirit as a collective veterans' mentality born out of the experience of the 
Great War. The Legion character was a unique blend of local community spirit, 
pride in the Armed Forces and benevolent work as found in the myriad voluntary 
societies and institutions which characterized British life. The differences between 
the working class membership and officer class leadership were frequently masked by 
the common ideals which united the organisation but the large gulf of understanding 
between them had serious consequences for the development of the British ex-service 
movement. We shall examine these consequences through the specific examples of 
practical work, politics and foreign policy. 
108 AC 1925, T.F. Lister, Chai,.."an's Address. 
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NOT FOR DOLES AND DEPRESSION DID WE FIGHT: 
THE PRACTICAL WORK OF THE BRITISH LEGION 
For the majority of the general public, the purpose of the British Legion lay 
with the symbolic red Flanders Poppy; to collect and utilize funds for the benefit of 
ex-service men facing hardship. Indeed, most members of the Legion also saw 
benevolent work as its most important purpose. Admiral Sir Henry Bruce remarked 
in June 1933 that 'I joined the Legion to do my best for the Ex-Service man, 
especially the disabled one, which I take it, is after all, our one and only object'.1 
Certainly, the British Legion's benevolent work was its most visible and extensive 
purpose. During the inter-war years the scope and extent of Legion benevolent 
activities increased year by year, and the Legion became an acknowledged charity of 
great proportions. 
One of the major objectives of this study is to assess the impact of the 
Legion's relief work. This must include an evaluation of the actual methods adopted, 
but an examination of the Legion's expenditure of funds is not sufficient to determine 
the full significance of the Legion's benevolent role. Members' opinions concerning 
relief work must also be discussed to gain a full picture of the Legion's benevolent 
activities. In particular, any perceived changes in attitudes towards ex-service men, 
both nationally and within the Legion, are very important. Charles Kimball has 
argued that the war, and later the ex-service movement, failed to change the pre-war 
patterns of social relationships established between veterans, the state and British 
society2 and it is crucial to understand why this change failed to take place. 
Many of the aims for Legion practical work were couched in vague rhetorical 
terms. In Haig's 'Appeal to All Ex-Service Men' in June 1921 he wrote: 
1 Admiral Sir Henry Bruce to General Sir Frederick Maurice, 1 June, IH29/IS. 
2 Kimball, The Ex-Service Movement in England and Wales. Abstract. 
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Not for doles and depression did we fight, but for progress and prosperity. 
The interest of the whole is the interest of each one of us. The better 
world and the brighter Britain we envisaged as the outcome of the Great 
War have not materialised. Several million men combined and fought 
shoulder to shoulder to win victory - the same men must now organise and 
play their part in winning the peace.3 
The general message was that ex-service men should attempt to create a brighter 
Britain through their own efforts and the image of millions of ex-service men 
marching shoulder to shoulder to win the peace was inspiring. The real aim of the 
Legion was to draw ex-service men together through good works - loyalty to 
comrades being the key motivation, rather than any belief in social justice. Over the 
period, the Legion took on the character of a major charity rather than a body 
advocating justice from the Government. 
However, Government provision for ex-service men was also a vital plank of 
Legion policy. Although Legion benevolent work was important, it could not hope 
to deal with the great amount of unemployment, poverty and deprivation in inter-war 
Britain. In the Legion National Constructive Programme of 1921, there were eight 
major objects, of which five directly mentioned the need to secure Government 
assistance, and the other three indirectly implied such assistance.4 The objects were 
all concerned to 're-establish ex-service men and women in civilian occupations'S 
through training and job creation. The Legion also wished 'to educate public opinion 
to the view that the maintenance and the welfare of ex-service men, women and 
dependents is a national duty'.6 This did not demand maintenance for all citizens and 
made a distinction between ex-service men in distress and other poor citizens. 
Veterans were to be given assistance because of their service in war: 'because he has 
been willing to die for his country he must be given a fair 'fighting chance' in life as 
we live it'. 7 
3 BU July 1921, p.7. 
4 See Appendix E. 
S ibid. 
6 Objects 4(D), Royal Charter. 
7 Clifford, The Ex-Soldier, p.5. 
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These objects were also intended to ensure that there was no return to the bad 
old days of destitute ex-service men driven to the workhouse. In Legion propaganda 
the immediate post-war situation appeared to be very similar to pre-war days when 
veterans were left to starve by a 'grateful nation'. Legion articles portrayed ex-
service men and their families forced into the workhouse due to unemployment with 
thousands of veterans tramping the country looking for work. 8 In fact, the scale of 
Government assistance was a major break from the past and represented a tacit 
acceptance of responsibility for ex-service welfare. Millions of ex-service men, 
widows and dependents were compensated for injuries, disabilities and widowhood 
on an unprecedented scale by the Ministry of Pensions. Ex-service men received the 
out-of-work donation for 39 weeks after demobilization and the 1920 Unemployment 
Insurance Act, extended this benefit permanently, while a series of Acts in 1921 and 
1922 increased the rates and extended the period during which benefits could be 
drawn. Government Training Schemes for disabled and unskilled ex-service men 
were established to assist them in finding work. At the same time, such assistance 
was not sufficient; the Government Training schemes for ex-service men did not 
provide useful skills or training while the extended unemployment benefit was only 
available for 2 blocks of 16 weeks each - which were separated by periods when no 
benefit could be drawn. Even in the thirties, 'the social services left many gaps where 
people crouched unprotected,9 and the role of the Legion through its benevolent 
work was to plug these gaps in Government assistance. 
One of the most pressing issues facing ex-service men and the nation at large 
during the inter-war years was unemployment. In the editorial of the first issue of the 
Legion Journal in June 1921, the facts of mass unemployment were clear: 
On January 1st this year there were 20,000 disabled men unemployed, and 
270,000 non-disabled discharged men in a like condition. To-day there are 
23,000 disabled men unemployed and 449,374 non-disabled discharged 
8 BU February 1922, p.174. 
9 C.L. Mowat, Britain Between the Wars 1918-19./0, London: M~thuen, p.495. 
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men. The total on the day which sees the British Legion take the field is 
therefore nearly double the total of six short months ago. lO 
Many men who had gone to fight found that their position at work had been filled or 
removed, others found their businesses ruined or their skills and training out-of date. 
When the process of retrenchment began in 1921, such men were often the first to be 
laid off. Many young men had joined the Army straight from school or left 
apprenticeships and had thus missed the chance to train and gain a skill. 
Consequently there were roughly 300,000 unskilled ex-service men throughout the 
inter-war period. ll These men, in particular, found it difficult to secure permanent 
employment. For Haig, the problem of mass ex-service unemployment meant: 
the fact that they gave four years or more, it may be, of their manhood to 
the dangerous and arduous service of their country has not been permitted 
to counter balance in the eyes of their fellow country men, the loss of 
industrial efficiency which the sacrifice of those years entailed. 
Such an attitude on the part of their fellow country men appears to 
me to have the effect...of turning war service into a permanent 
disqualification for civil employment. I can conceive of nothing more 
unjust. 12 
In fact, it was difficult, in the absence of any official statistics after 1921, to prove 
that ex-service unemployment was proportionally higher than the rest of the insured 
workforce and the Ministry of Labour always played down the importance of ex-
service unemployment. The Legion laid the blame for mass ex-service unemployment 
on the attitude of their 'fellow country men', but of course, there were economic 
forces at work outwith the control of employers, trade unionists and the Government. 
As W.G. Clifford stated in 1916: 
With the best heart and intentions in the world an employer dare not 
manufacture artificial openings for appreciable numbers of unsuitable men, 
simply because they have fought for their country. 13 
10 BU July 1921. p.12. 
11 GSCLB, Leaflet, Do You Know?, 1923. 
12 Haig, Speech at the Usher Hall, Edinburgh, 11 November 1925, Acc.3155 No.235.b. 
13 Clifford, The Ex-Solider, p.17. 
'Not for Doles and Depression' -- 125 
The harsh economic conditions of the inter-war years soon outweighed the 
'sentiment' for the men who had saved the country during the Great War and there 
were always a large number of ex-service men contained in the 'intractable million' 
unemployed. 14 It was estimated in 1929 that one quarter of those receiving Poor 
Law relief were ex-service men. 1.5 
Given the limited nature of Legion funds, the main aim was to alleviate 
distress and to assist ex-service men back into jobs, whether through job creation 
schemes or Government training programmes. The disabled were a special case, with 
their injuries being directly related to their war service. The King's National Roll had 
been instituted in 1920 as a voluntary system whereby employers undertook to 
employ a small percentage of disabled men in their workforce. It was hoped that this 
would solve the problem of unemployed disabled men, but without compulsion it 
proved impossible to absorb all disabled men into industry. The Legion's aim of a 
compulsory system was never adopted by Government, despite the introduction of 
numerous Bills sponsored by the Legion for this purpose. With the failure of the 
legislative approach, the Legion attempted to ensure that the King's National Roll 
worked as efficiently as possible, as well as developing schemes for the employment 
of disabled ex-service men. 
The British Legion 'Manifesto On Unemployment' of 1923 attempted to 
influence the Government into creating work for the 'intractable million' through large 
employment schemes funded by a National Work Loan. 16 The manifesto also gave a 
clear indication of Legion attitudes towards unemployment. The Manifesto argued 
that mass unemployment constituted a terrible waste of the country's resources, but 
also that the dole was degrading and demoralising: 'Doles of a charitable or even 
official character only act as an opiate giving temporary ease, leaving the social body 
14 For more infonnation on the 'intractable million' see Mowat, Britain Between the Wars; Stephen V. Ward, The Geography of 
Interwar Britain: The State and Uneven Development, London: Routledge, 1988; David Vincent, Poor Citizens: The State and 
the Poor in Twentieth Cenlllry Britain, London: Longmuns, 1991. 
15 Vincent, Poor Citizens, p.l04. 
16 GSCLB, British Legion Manifesto on Unemployment, 1923. 
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weakened and enfeebled without touching the real source of the trouble',l7 This was 
a classic statement of traditional attitudes towards unemployment and the position of 
the unemployed. Although the Legion's National Constructive Programme had 
demanded work or maintenance, by 1923 the Legion believed that 'In work and work 
alone, lies the healing of the people, and the folly which permits thousands of men to 
deteriorate, through long continued idleness .... must cease'18. The Legion aim of full 
employment through construction and projects of national importance was not based 
on a desire to recast society, or to redistribute income on an egalitarian or socialist 
model, but to provide stability and security for the existing social structure. The 
Legion wished the 'organisation of the unemployed for useful productive work and 
not their organisation for disruptive purposes'.19 This was a clear reference to the 
National Unemployed Workers Movement (N.UW.M.) which organized numerous 
Hunger Marches to London and whose members expressed their frustration by 
skirmishing with police outside Labour Exchanges. 20 Legion relief and work 
schemes were designed to wean unemployed ex-service men away from Bolshevism 
and the violent tactics of the N.UW.M. by allaying discontent and assisting in 'the 
healing of the people'21 but not to stimulate any far reaching social programme. 
It must be stressed that the Legion, as a benevolent organisation catering for 
ex-service men, was only one of many; an article in the Legion Journal counted as 
many as 500 funds for ex-service men.22 However, most of these were small, 
specialized funds and the Legion was one of the largest, standing beside the United 
Services Fund (US.F.)23 which had been established in 1919 to distribute the £8 
million profit of the Expeditionary Forces Canteens amongst the men who had used 
the Canteens. This included all Army, Airforce and Royal Naval Division personnel; 
the Navy took its share of the money and set up its own fund. Due to the difficulty in 
17 ibid. 
18 ibid. 
19 ibid. 
20 See Vincent, Poor Citizens, p.61. 
21 GSCLB, Manifesto on Unemployment, 1923. 
22 BU August 1936, p.343. 
23 See prologue for more infonnation on the U.S.F. 
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finding an equitable way of spending the money, over £2 million was spent in a 'local 
welfare' scheme, which gave each area a certain amount of money per ex-service 
man. Most of this money was spent on building ex-service men's clubs or War 
memorials. However, the majority ofUS.F. funds were spent on providing care and 
education for the orphans of ex-service men and women, assistance for short term 
illnesses, and specialized care for ill or disabled ex-service men. 24 One of the 
secondary aims of the Legion's practical work was to ensure co-ordination between 
the Legion and the U S.F. and the other benevolent funds to minimize overlapping. 
In 1927, closer links were forged between the Legion and US.F., and by 1934 
amalgamation of their local committees and administration was achieved. 25 
In providing any assistance to ex-service men and their dependents, the 
Legion was limited to the income it received through its Appeal work. The Unity 
Relief Fund, when first set up in December 1920, obtained a grant of £150,000 from 
the Prince of Wales Fund which was earmarked for schemes of employment, and 
£22,000 was granted by the Officers' Association for general relief. Smaller donations 
from the other three ex-service organisations, and the proceeds from Warriors Day 
(all the money from theatre and cinema shows donated to the Relief Fund)26 also 
helped to establish the Relief Fund, but it was not until the first Poppy Day in 
November 1921, that the Legion gained a means of regular funding. This event, 
which began almost by accident, soon became the Legion's main source of income. 
The Flanders Poppy was an almost universal symbol of the Great War throughout the 
Allied Countries, and the first artificial ones were manufactured by women in the 
devastated areas of France and Belgium for sale in America. A Madame Guerin 
approached the British Legion in October 1921 and asked whether they would buy 
poppies from her organisation for sale on 11 November. After investigation, a few 
million were purchased, and demand far outstripped supply. Many of the poppies 
24 United Services Fund Annual Reports, 1921-34, and British Legion and United Services Fund Benevolent Department Relief 
Guide 1927. 
25 ibid. 
26 BLAR 1921. 
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worn on the day were produced at Legion H.Q. from pink blotting paper.27 The 
success of the first Poppy Day prompted the Legion to establish its own source of 
supply by employing badly disabled men to manufacture the poppies. The factory 
was first housed on the Old Kent Road in London and initially employed forty men 
which by 1922 produced a large proportion of the poppies for Poppy Day. The 
growth in demand for poppies meant that more men could be taken on so that by 
1926, when the Factory moved to a better site at Richmond in Surrey, over 200 
disabled men were employed manufacturing 25 million poppies each year. 28 Much of 
the work was repetitive and uninteresting, but the Factory gave severely disabled men 
a secure job and housing. In 1928 the Legion Annual Report could say: 
it can be claimed without exaggeration that the Legion Poppy Factory is 
the largest employer of disabled labour in the world, and that no other 
concern of a similar nature can claim that every man employed, from the 
manager downwards, is a disabled ex-service man. 29 
This statement worked very much to the advantage of the Legion as the 'public know 
by now that the Poppies they buy are all manufactured by badly disabled ex-
servicemen, who but for this would be unemployed'.30 By purchasing a Poppy the 
public were not only remembering the dead, but also helping the living. 
Poppy Day was essentially a local collection and depended almost entirely on 
voluntary work. At the beginning of every Autumn, the President of the Legion sent 
out a letter to every Lord Mayor, Chairman of District Council and the clergy asking 
for their support. A Local Poppy Day Committee was set up to co-ordinate the 
effort, with the main organizing influence being that of the Poppy Day Organizer, 
while the Lord Mayor was invariably invited to act as the Committee's Chairman. 
This was seen as desirable since 'not only does the active participation of the civic 
head give due importance to the effort, but it inspires confidence, and his influence 
27 OHBL, p.39-40. 
28 BLAR 1926. 
29 BLAR 1928. 
30 BLAR 1924. 
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can be of particular value'.31 Just as with the formation of branches, the Legion 
utilized local dignitaries - and the services of local newspapers and bank managers -
to gain prestige and assistance. The Committee organized transport and advertising 
and recruited volunteer collectors. Much of the work for Poppy Day was undertaken 
by women - often drawn from the local Women's Section if one was in existence. 
In 1923, the Legion Annual Report stated that 'great credit is due to the 
thousands of ladies who, regardless of the weather, sold Flanders Poppies from early 
morning until, in many cases, well on in the evening'.32 On Armistice Day, Poppies 
were sold in street and house-to-house collections and churches supported the appeal 
by making collections during services on the Sunday before Armistice Day. The 
majority of the money was gained through the street and church collections, but 
wreath sales, hunt caps, liner and overseas collections also made significant 
contributions. 33 Through its organisation and the support of many thousands of 
voluntary workers, the sale of Poppies on Armistice Day became an established and 
successful part of the ritual of Remembrance. Even as early as 1923, the 
Headquarters Appeals Department took on 100 voluntary clerks in October to help 
pack and despatch the 23 million Poppies which were sold that yearY The amount 
collected increased dramatically in the twenties, and with the exception of 1931 and 
1932, the income in the thirties also showed a steady increase.35 
The Legion explained this success in terms of the national debt owed to ex-
service men through their sacrifice in the Great War: 
In the first place, the British public, when effectively reminded, have not 
forgotten what they owe to ex-service men, and being so reminded, and 
being satisfied that the need is urgent and that the funds are wisely and 
economically administered, they give generously.36 
31 W.G. Willcox, The Appeals Work of the Legion, British Legion Sununer School, 1926. 
32 BLAR 1923. 
33 Poppy Day interim Reports, IH29/12, 13, 14. 
34 BLAR 1923. 
35 BLAR 192J .1.1 
36 AC 192. .dential Speech. 
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The argument that the Poppy was a stimulus to remind the public that the 
'maintenance and welfare of ex-service men .. .is a national duty' was a retreat from the 
previously held belief that such maintenance was a Government responsibility. The 
Legion gained large sums from Poppy Day but stressed that it was not simply a 
means of winning funds. Captain Willcox, the Appeals Organizer, claimed that: 
Poppy Day is not a flag day. A cynic might define a flag day as a day upon 
which one either buys an emblem in self-defence, or one to be spent in 
dodging flag sellers .... the public look for poppies on November 11 th and 
complain if they find any difficulty in buying the emblem they want.37 
The Red Flanders Poppy became a symbol synonymous with Armistice Day, 
Remembrance and their spiritual connections with sacrifice and the Fallen. These 
symbols were taken very seriously indeed. Each Armistice Day, the Legion placed a 
wreath of Poppies on the Cenotaph with the inscription 'The Legion of the Living 
Salutes the Legion of the Dead - We Will Not Break Faith with Ye'.38 
However, the dual function of Poppy Day as part of the ritual of 
Remembrance and for the collection of Legion benevolent funds brought tensions 
within the Legion as to the real purpose of the collection. The Newcastle Delegate at 
the 1925 Conference remarked that they had: 
five separate Poppy Days last year near Newcastle. It was a 
disgrace .... Any other day did not appeal to them but was just like any 
ordinary flag day. The Poppy Day was too sacred to be hawked about on 
any other day.39 
These problems arose because many districts faced practical problems in holding the 
collection on Armistice Day. Many rural and industrial areas could only obtain 
women volunteers on a Saturday. Others were concerned about the loss of income if 
Poppy Day were held on a week-day when workers had less money than on a Friday 
or Saturday (after pay-day). However, this need to collect money when practicable 
conflicted with the desire to enshrine the symbolism of the Poppy and link it with 
37 W.O. Willcox, Summer School 1926. 
38 I3l J December 1921, p.126. 
(925, Res. No. 109. 
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Armistice Day. Ultimately, the Conference in 1926 passed a resolution demanding 
strict observance of Poppy Day with some consideration for districts with special 
needs. The phenomenon of ragged collections did decrease but was never fully 
eradicated.40 
Although Poppy Day was the largest and most important Legion Appeal, 
constant efforts were made to supplement this income through other Appeals. The 
Remembrance League was established to encourage annual subscriptions to Legion 
funds. Its initial title of the 300th Remembrance League, the idea being that the 
person should give 1/300th of their annual salary, was dropped after suspicions that 
Income tax inspectors would be able to calculate the total income of the generous 
donor. This League was reasonably successful, garnering £43,000 by 1926; but a 
Gratitude League for wage earners to donate weekly or monthly amounts was a 
conspicuous failure. Two other Annual Appeals, on 4 August, commemorating the 
outbreak of War, and one at Christmas could never match the symbolic importance of 
Poppy Day and thus declined in importance. Money was also raised through 
newspaper competitions, film screenings and charity concerts - the most notable 
being in 1925 when Paderewski, the famous concert pianist, donated all the income 
from his British tour. 41 All of these Appeals were nationally organized, but the 
Areas, Counties and Branches also launched local appeals and fundraising events 
which established special relief funds to deal with particular needs not covered by the 
national funds. The local funds varied and covered many areas of relief from dental 
treatment to pensions for prematurely aged ex-service men. The fundraising methods 
included Sports Matches, Whist Drives, Concerts, Tea Parties, Raffles, Jumble Sales 
and the Summer Fetes. 42 These events could become regular features of local life 
and bring in funds annually for local Legion benevolent work. Some Branches 
became rather too enthusiastic for National Headquarters' liking; it was discovered 
40 ACs 1925-28, Res Nos. 109 (1925), No. 50-51 (1926), No.6 (1927), No.8 (1928). 
41 BLAR 1921-25. 
42 W.G. Willcox, Sununer Sl _.26. 
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that 'occasionally Branches organise street processions and parade with the Legion 
standard, and on these occasions use collecting boxes ... during the procession'.43 
Branches were emphatically instructed that such collections would not maintain the 
prestige of the organisation. Again, the tension between the desire to collect funds 
and the need to preserve the respectability of the organisation could cause discord 
between Branches and National Headquarters. 
All National Appeals money wo..s sent to the National Headquarters. Once 
counted, the money was passed onto the Central Relief Committee which decided on 
its use. The general policy of the British Legion in relief work was four-fold, and 
was aimed mainly at combating unemployment and its effects. The Central Relief 
Committee made grants to the Local Relief Committee for the relief of hardship due 
to unemployment, loans to individual ex-service men to help establish them in 
business, loans and grants to promote or maintain larger employment schemes, and 
grants to other organisations which assisted or employed ex-service men. However, 
the majority of the money collected on Poppy Day went back to the districts which 
had collected it. After 1923, the Local Relief Committees received 85% gross of the 
money collected, with 5% going to the Officer's Benevolent Department, and 10% 
going to the general funds to assist in general administration. 85% gross amounted 
to over 50% net, which meant there was little direct redistribution between areas, 
apart from on a voluntary basis. 44 In the 1922 instructions it was: 
hoped that districts in which there may be little distress will agree to waive 
their claim in part or altogether in favour of poorer districts which have 
little chance of collecting the money required for their needs. 45 
It need hardly be said that a more centralized administration for the Relief Funds 
would have enabled the Legion to direct the money to those areas which most needed 
assistance. However, the voluntary principle, of 'Service not Self was integral to all 
Legion work, and indeed was essential in harnessing the energies of the many 
43 GSCLB, October 1930. 
44 GSCLB, Rel!lIiations for Poppy Day, October 1923. 
45 GSCLB, i )epartment Letter, Augurt 1922. 
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thousands of people involved. This not only reduced administration costs to very low 
levels, (4.73%),46 but without a local voluntary system, the Legion would not have 
been able to collect the money in the first place. Thus the Legion was shackled to a 
fairly traditional approach to the distribution of its funds, which were considered to 
be held in trust for the subscribing public, and not Legion property. 
The Local Committees for distributing Relief were in place even before the 
official formation of the Legion. By 1922 there were 968 while by 1930 there were 
over 3,000 Legion Local Relief Committees covering the entire country.47 Just as 
with the Poppy Day Appeal the Committee was not entirely composed of Legion 
members. The Local Benevolent Committee was a sub-committee of the Branch, 
with elected Branch members, together with representatives from the U.S.F., other 
benevolent societies, Poppy Day workers, and the local branch of the Women's 
Section.48 With the other groups' participation, the Legion ensured local support for 
the Committee while maintaining an overall Legion majority. Just as there were 
controls on who could be elected to the Committee, there were tight regulations on 
how the money could be spent. This was to limit the total expenditure to a figure 
which the Legion could afford. As General Maurice explained at the 1926 Summer 
School: 
When they urge us to launch out into this or that new form of relief, 
branches must remember that in order to be fair to everybody, we have to 
consider the probability of having to multiply each local estimate 2,000 
times, and the expenditure of so large a sum as £200,000 a year only 
means an average per branch of £100 a year.49 
The controls limited the decisions of the Local Committees to fairly minor individual 
expenditures, and larger sums were referred for approval to the Area or National 
level. The major role of the Local Relief Committees was to co-ordinate the Legion 
and U.S.F. funds, and to distribute relief to ex-service men suffering distress due to 
46 Bridgeman Committee Report, p.18. 
47 BLAR 1921.30. 
48 British Legion and United Services Fund Benevolent Department Relief Guide 1927. 
Jeneral Sir Frederick M.mrice, The Benevolel. :Vork of the Legion, British Legion Summer School 1926. 
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unemployment. Normally, the Local Relief Committee dealt only with temporary 
distress due to unemployment or short-term illness, and assistance came in the form 
of vouchers for food or clothing which could be redeemed at selected local shops. 
Assistance could be granted for a maximum period of sixteen weeks in the year, but 
no more than eight weeks continuously. 50 This paralleled the government regulations 
concerning unemployment benefit and was intended to fill the gaps between the 
statutory provision. In providing this assistance the Legion felt it was important 'to 
ensure that neither tradesmen upon whom relief vouchers will be issued nor persons 
likely themselves to require assistance from the funds are appointed to the 
Committee'. 51 Although fairly tight control was exercised on the local committees, 
mistakes and abuse did occur. Legion members might give trade to their own 
business or embezzle funds, and while some Committees operated in a sympathetic 
manner, others might be more harsh and unbending in their distribution of relief. One 
secretary of an I.L.P. branch (and not wholly sympathetic towards the British Legion) 
wrote to General Sir Ian Hamilton complaining that: 
Late President of Local Branch had a Grocery Store for which vouchers 
for distressed Ex-Service men were made out to "Freydale Stores" I 
witnessed voucher? 
Mrs West "widow" put through 3rd degree treatment by Committee 
for Relief Fund Relieving Officers being present she receiving 15/- per 
week herself and 4 children from the Parish: Shame to the British 
Legion?52 
Faults such as these were bound to creep into a decentralized system, but a local 
branch could quickly exhaust its fund of goodwill amongst the ex-service community 
if these problems became common. The Legion Area and National Organizers 
maintained vigilance, and did not hesitate to deal with serious problems in court. 
With the exception of the Sunday Express attacks in 1929,53 the Legion managed to 
keep such problems localized and out of national attention. 
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It must be stressed that, with such a large organisation, there were many 
different views and opinions which varied greatly from locality to locality. Legion 
attitudes displayed could be ambivalent, with traditional, reactionary and progressive 
opinions co-existing in a sometimes uneasy alliance. The ideal of the Legion, and its 
image of a 'Brighter Britain' was for all ex-service men to be given work and 
prosperity as a reward for the sacrifices during the Great War. The ideals of the 
Legion were expansive and all-encompassing, but the reality was different. 
Within the Legion there developed a certain tension between the desirability 
to help all ex-service men, and the limited nature of Legion funds. Very quickly, a 
distinction came to be made between the 'waster' or 'scoundrel' and the deserving ex-
service man - the man who had fallen on hard times and needed some assistance 
through no fault of his own. In 1922 Thomas Lister argued at the 1922 Conference 
that 'The Legion had enabled men who had demonstrated their worth to stand on 
their own two feet and look at life with a brighter vision'. 54 The concepts of self-help 
and comradely assistance, rather than charity, were always stressed by the Legion. 
The belief that the Legion should only be helping deserving ex-service men was 
probably in the minds of the founders at the inception of the Legion. General Sir Ian 
Hamilton remarked to'vJ. Birrell, the Metropolitan Area Secretary that: 
We must not regret the time and trouble taken up by this dirty rotter, 
because, after all, this is just the kind of case I can quote to show how our 
energies and time are taken up, not so much by good men in distress, as by 
shirkers of the sort who would swallow a gold mine and be none the better 
for it. 55 
The desire to help 'good men in distress' while discouraging the 'shirker' became 
common, and although this was a traditional attitude, it can also be explained with 
reference to the "ituation in the twenties. In the early years of the organisation, the 
Legion was an easy target for men who posed as ex-service men or who made 
fraudulent claims. From 1922 until 1932, the General Secretary's Circular contained 
54 AC 1922, T.F. Lister, Chainnan's Address. 
55 Hamilton' J. Birrell, 5 February 1926, IH29/1. 
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over a page each month of 'Warnings to Branches' of men who had extracted cash or 
clothes from Branches fraudulently. 56 By 1924, the situation was so serious that 
Legion branches were instructed to cease giving assistance to ex-service men on the 
road who were passing through looking for work. Ex-service men had to apply to 
their own districts for relief and could receive rail tickets to travel to a prospective 
job. 57 However, this policy harked back not only to Victorian times but to the 
Elizabethan Poor Law of 1572 - another era of rising population and increasing 
vagrancy. 58 This hardening of attitude combined with the tension of distributing 
limited funds brought a logical extension to the idea of the 'deserving ex-service man'. 
By 1924, the Legion was dispensing a large amount of money in relief to over 
400,000 ex-service men a year, of whom eighty to ninety per cent were not members 
of the Legion. 59 This led to some understandable resentment among members that 'it 
was hard for loyal men who could ill-afford to give time and money to the movement, 
to feel that men who cared nothing for the Legion should benefit'.60 This sense that 
members should receive some special consideration did not derive solely from the 
grievance that Legion members were working hard for other ex-service men's benefit 
- after all that was part of the creed of the Legion. Instead, the logic was that all 
deserving ex-service men believed in self-help, self-respect and desired comradely 
assistance to tide over a difficult period and not to rely on charity from others. If the 
Legion represented the 'cream of the ex-service community'61 then all deserving ex-
service men would be members; by extension all those outside the Legion were 
undeserving. Thus, 'if an ex-service man would not protect himself and his wife and 
children during his distress, it was not the duty of the Legion to nurse him',62 as it 
could be argued that he should have sufficient sense to 'protect himself by joining the 
Legion. This argument was never adopted by the Conference, and the Legion's 
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official policy was maintained as assisting all ex-service men but this attitude could 
make a great difference to the type of help which an ex-service man received. 
Colonel Crosfield, Chairman of the Legion, remarked at the 1929 Conference: 
Personally, I think we do not want to help the sponger and I believe in 
discrimination. If you have a fellow who shows no gratitude for help and 
comes back time and again, turn him down every time. We have a limited 
amount of money and we cannot help everybody, but only those who are 
most deserving.63 
The most disturbing aspect of such an attitude within the Legion, was that the 
discrimination was not part of official Legion policy, but operated on an informal, 
almost personal basis. In some minds at least, the 'deserving ex-service man' had 
changed from being 'those less fortunate than yourselves' and 'all ex-service men' to 
either members of the Legion, or to someone who knew how to display old-fashioned 
gratitude towards what can only be described as old-fashioned charity. The problems 
of relief work placed the greatest strains on the organisation and attitudes towards 
relief certainly coloured Legion opinions on all aspects of its practical work. 
However, Legion relief had only been intended as emergency assistance until 
the long hoped for prosperity returned and the real intention of the Legion, as 
expressed in its 1923 Manifesto on Unemployment, was to create work. Initially, the 
Legion had two main strategies for providing work; small business loans, and loans 
for larger employment schemes. An ex-service man wishing to start up in business 
could receive up to £25 from the Legion in an interest free loan. However, each 
candidate was examined very carefully; there was a limited amount of funds devoted 
to this purpose and many applicants were not deemed suitable. For example, in 
1921, there were 8,250 applications, but only 950 loans granted. 64 This caused 
widespread local resentment at the scheme during the early twenties. The 
Southampton Delegate at the 1923 Conference complained that: 
63 AC 1929, Res. No. 11. 
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The best thing they could throw against the Legion was the Small Loans 
Department. Southampton had sent up nearly 100 cases and had only got 
two ... They did not get any reason why the cases were turned down. The 
only reason they ever got was that the references were unsatisfactory.6.5 
Although the Local Committee made recommendations, only the Central Relief 
Committee examined the two confidential references with each application. This 
meant that many applications were turned down without the Local Committee 
understanding the reason why. Eventually, this situation was accepted by most Local 
Committees and, as Legion case-work shows, these loans could make a significant 
contribution to an individual's prosperity: 
An ex-service man in Hertfordshire received a loan of £20 to enable him to 
purchase the necessary tools in connection with his proposed business as a 
cabinet maker, upholsterer etc. A steady trade has resulted, and he is now 
repaying regularly in addition to supporting his wife and six children.66 
The Legion also claimed that the amount received in repayments indicated that most 
of the recipients remained successful, but increasing pressure was brought to bear on 
men who declined to repay the money. With only 800 to 1,000 loans issued a year, 
the system meant the difference between unemployment and prosperity for many 
individual ex-service men, but it left the major problem of unemployment untouched. 
The unwillingness of the Legion to invest in individual ex-service men through the 
small business loans must be contrasted unfavourably with the initial eagerness to 
invest heavily in a few large companies. 
At the inception of the Legion, it had been hoped that large loans made to 
companies set up to employ ex-service men might provide the answer to large-scale 
unemployment. These schemes were established collectively by ex-service men and 
ranged from ship-breaking, house-building, painting and decorating, to boot-repairing 
and toy-making. 67 Unfortunately, this led the Legion to invest heavily in many 
unviable schemes. In consequence, the Legion lost considerable amounts of money -
65 AC 1923, Discussion of the Annual Report, p.34. 
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£5,500 due to the failure of a ship-breaking scheme at Ramsgate, £8,801 due to the 
failure of a house-building company among others.68 General Maurice admitted the 
problem in 1926 when he said that: 
The Employment schemes were entered upon with considerable hopes that 
we would be able through them to provide employment for a really 
considerable number of men. Experience has, however, taught us that it 
requires real business capacity, considerable skill and much patience to 
launch a successful business these days.69 
These large schemes depended entirely on the general economic situation and, in the 
difficult years of the early twenties, the chances of success were obviously limited. It 
was naive of Legion leaders to imagine anything else but it has to be remembered that 
Legion leaders and members were ex-service men; few of them were experienced 
business men. In 1929 they argued: 
that more schemes could have been started that year had it been possible to 
secure the interest of business gentlemen in various parts of the country to 
advise, promote, and if possible, attend to the management of schemes of 
employment for ex-service men. 70 
However, the Legion did learn from its mistakes; most importantly, it learnt that 
good will and intentions backed up with money did not guarantee success. Having 
lost large sums of money through investing in many failed companies during the 
1920s, such large business loans became very infrequent in the 193 Os. 
Subsequently, although the Legion was much more cautious in developing 
large employment schemes, a number of important successes were recorded. Of 
these, the most successful were based around the growing motor car industry. 
Through the initiative of General Bethune, the Metropolitan Area chairman, a 
London taxi-driving school was set up in 1927 to teach driving and to train drivers to 
pass the rigorous 'knowledge' test. The rationakbehind this was that: 
it was better to spend £50 in making a man into a London taxi-cab driver 
than to give him a dozen food vouchers during the year. Result: 100 
68 Bridgeman Committee Report, p.37. 
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Legionaires are now driving cabs who, when they came to us were 
unemployed, some were almost unemployable, emaciated, and almost 
without any heart to go on.71 
The factor which convinced a 'very dubious committee' was that the men were 
learning a skill which would make them employable. By 1938, 816 men had passed 
out to become taxi-drivers, while 366 found other driving jobs.72 This was an 
inventive scheme which gave some men a chance of employment, but was relatively 
small scale and could not absorb large numbers of unemployed men. 
Another idea which became a minor success was the Car Park Attendants 
Scheme which the British Legion Scotland began in Glasgow in 1927. This was soon 
adopted elsewhere since its advantages were described as: 
a means of absorbing some of our disabled ex-service men into permanent 
employment, without in any way competing with those in existing 
businesses, breaking fresh ground in a practical and lucrative way that 
would render their services practically indispensable, doing work which 
benefits all and injures none.73 
The local branch or Area organized the scheme by forming a limited company which 
then employed disabled ex-service men as car park attendants. The men were 
supplied with a uniform, and had to ensure that the 'cars were properly parked, 
guarded and their contents cared for'. No statutory charge could be made for the 
service, making the payment of 6d a day or 2s a week entirely voluntary, but as might 
be expected, most motorists did pay for the service. The scheme exploited the 
growth in motor traffic, by providing a service in which few other businesses had 
become involved but this meant the Legion could only provide low paid work with 
little chance of improvement. No training was necessary; the men were disabled or 
aged veterans who had found difficulty gaining any other employment. The wages 
for the men were quite low; the superintendent received £2 lOs while the attendants 
earned 30s a week, although there were weekly bonuses and all insurances were paid. 
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The scheme became quite successful; by 1936 it operated in over 50 towns and cities 
and employed 345 ex-service men.74 For the Legion as an organisation it had a 
number of advantages; it enabled the uniformed attendants to represent the Legion as 
an efficient organisation of public utility which could gain the Legion support 
amongst the local Council and police. 
The British Legion Village at Preston Hall, Maidstone, Kent was perhaps the 
flagship of the Legion's work for the disabled. From its inception, the Legion had 
been acutely interested in the fate of tubercular ex-service men and had followed up 
every new technique which seemed to offer hope for these men. In particular, they 
had followed the developments at Papworth Hall, where Dr Varrier Jones had 
established a settlement whereby men with TB were given sanatorium treatment and 
then given occupational therapy to test their 'economic and physical resistance to the 
disease'.75 When the Legion took over the management of the Preston Hall 
sanatorium in 1925, the help of Dr Varrier Jones was enlisted in developing the 
settlement on the lines of Papworth. At Preston Hall, once the men had become well 
enough, they were given a job (light at first) in the various Preston Hall industries. 
The full range of activities were described in 1927 by Colonel Crosfield: 
The population of the British Legion village, Aylesford, is now 506, which 
number includes 147 patients in the Sanatorium. The industries there are -
Portable Appliances (Huts, Poultry and Pig Houses, Garages, Summer 
Houses etc.), Printing and the making of fibre and leather trunks, suitcases 
etc. Over 80 cottages are occupied by the settlers and their families and 25 
are in the course of erection. The settlement has its own Village Stores, 
Post Office, Hall, its branch of both Sections of the Legion, and its troop 
of Boy Scouts and Girl Guides. Moreover negotiations are in progress for 
the establishment of a village school. 76 
For the residents in the Village, the British Legion became less of a voluntary 
organisation and more a way of life. The industries also provided the useful function 
of providing men with jobs which allowed them to earn a living, something which 
74 BU March 1936, p.375. 
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would not have been possible on the open market. This was a progressive scheme 
which made a decided impact on the problems of tubercular ex-service men. 
The Legion's developments for disabled men were continued in Wales, at the 
Cambrian Wool Factory, and through support for many other industries employing 
disabled men. Further, the Legion used modem marketing techniques to expand these 
businesses. A Central Sales Agency was opened in London to market all the 
products and elicit orders from the public. As might be expected, Legion branches 
were particularly targeted; by the thirties the printing department at Preston Hall was 
printing for the majority of Legion branches. These attempts and developments were 
admirable, but could not deal with the entire problem of disabled ex-service men. 
Even by 1925 there was a waiting list of 300 for the Poppy Factory and no man with 
a disability of less than 70% could be considered77 and in 1936, despite Legion 
efforts, there were still 33,497 disabled men unemployed. 78 
One Legion policy which harked back to previous Government undertakings, 
and gained legitimacy from ideas of Empire and colonization, was overseas 
migration. The Murray Committee in 1915 had recommended that Government 
should assume responsibility for the settlement of ex-service men on the land, both in 
a 'Home Colonisation' programme of small holdings, and Imperial settlement. By 
1923, nearly 19,000 ex-service men were settled on small-holdings in Britain, but 
only 3,000 had been assisted overseas.79 With the unsettled situation in the early 
twenties, successful overseas migration had seemed unlikely, but by 1926 many 
Legion leaders saw emigration as the answer to unemployment. Crosfield believed 
that 'in emigration lies the solution of dealing with our over population'80 which 
would, at one and the same time, maintain the flow of British people to the colonies. 
The Legion policy of emigration, which was developed from 1926 onwards, owed 
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more to the beliefs and opinions of the Imperially-minded Legion leaders than to any 
major ground swell of membership opinion. However, there was some clamour for 
emigration, as demonstrated in a resolution at the 1925 Conference, which demanded 
a wider scheme of emigration to enable men of lower medical standard and higher 
age to travel overseas. The delegates were reminded by Major Gilbert Cohen, who 
had spent 12 years in Australia, that 'ClII men could not do the work of AI men ... to 
make good a man wanted good health and a mighty big heart.'8l Such problems were 
overlooked in the general policy as articulated by Haig at the 1926 Annual 
Conference: 
We have no desire to force out of the Homeland those who have fought 
for King and Country. What we do want to say to them is this, - "Here is 
a sound scheme of settlement. We want the vacant lands of our Empire 
people!.with settlers of our own flesh and blood". Those great dominions 
cannot remain British, with British ideals, unless their vast vacant spaces 
are peopled by settlers from the Mother land, of British blood and British 
ideals, and love of liberty and justice. We think that for many of our 
comrades there are better prospects, for them and their families overseas, 
and if any of them wish to go we will give them an early opportunity of 
realising their desires. 82 
For Haig and many of the Legion leaders, it was important that the Empire remained 
'British'. This meant sending settlers to the less well-populated areas of Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand - but not to Africa. In some respects, the Legion policy 
on emigration sat uneasily with other Legion beliefs concerning the sacrifice of ex-
service men during the Great War in defence of their country. It could not appear 
that the Legion was forcing, or aggressively advertising this scheme on ex-service 
men, hence the careful phrasing used by Haig on this occasion. From 1926, grants 
and loans of up to £25 per family were available to assist with the cost of passage, 
but only where definite employment abroad was assured. Until 1929, a substantial 
number of people were helped with their passage to the Dominions; at its peak during 
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1928-29 3,473 people were assisted to emigrate. 83 However, this type of scheme 
was operated by many other societies, and could really only assist those who already 
had a future in the Dominions. The Legion's experimental work on emigration began 
when it organized a training scheme to instruct unemployed men and their families in 
the farming skills they would need in Canada. Crosfield felt that there would not be 
any: 
disinclination to emigrate provided confidence was established in the 
Emigration Authorities and provided the families knew that they were 
going to be restored physically, mentally and morally before they went 
overseas and were going to be given such a grounding that they would be 
of value when they arrived at the other end'.84 
This was a new departure because the Legion took families from urban areas and 
trained for them for a 'new life in Canada'.85 The underlying idea was that the scheme 
might be replicated on a much larger scale with greater Government assistance. It 
was expected that 'given a scheme which fulfills all these conditions there would be 
no ... reason why at least half a million of our people should not emigrate to other 
parts of our Empire.'86 The actual Legion experiments were more modest. In 1927, 
the Legion scheme involved 21 families who were trained at Government expense at 
the Government Training Centre of Brandon. Out of these 21 families, 15 were 
successful. 87 Following this, the Legion in 1929 set up at its Training Centre at 
Wenvoe Grange a similar scheme, this time funded only by the Legion. Roughly fifty 
families were successful through the scheme,88 but from 1930 onwards, the economic 
situation in the Dominions became very difficult, and Legion work on emigration 
dropped to almost nothing. Government assistance was not secured for further large 
scale emigration. In fact, the difficulties of successful emigration had been glossed 
over by the Legion. The small number of families on their schemes were carefully 
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selected out of a large number of applicants; large scale training and emigration 
would have proved much more complex and much less successful. Assisted 
emigration was more an ideologically driven policy, than a considered appraisal based 
on the real needs of the unemployed in Britain's depressed areas. 
During the twenties, the greatest criticism that could be levelled at Legion 
work was the preponderance of money expended on relief work when employment 
creation was the major plank of Legion policy. In 1930, the Bridgeman Committee, 
established to investigate fully all Legion activities, recommended that a greater 
proportion of the funds should be devoted to 'real constructive work and the 
provision of employment'.89 There were a number of difficulties confronting the 
Legion in attempting to achieve these goals. The Bridgeman Committee recognised 
that 'To refuse aid to any man in difficulties is at no time easy, and when the 
application is made by one who possesses the special claims of an ex-service man it 
becomes infinitely more difficult'.90 The large expansion of Legion relief work had 
been entirely unplanned; the real growth in Legion income and in ex-service hardship 
had forced the hands of the Central Relief Committee. With the failure of large 
employment schemes in the early twenties, and the continued trade depression, it was 
difficult to find productive avenues for investment. Crosfield explained that 'in the 
ordinary employment scheme the ratio of capital employed to men employed is 
generally so high that the number of individuals who can be helped bears too small a 
ratio to the vast number who need help'.91 In a situation where perhaps £ 1 00 would 
need to be spent to employ one man on a solid scheme, it was felt that relief work 
gave assistance to a greater number of ex-service men. 
The Legion also tried to circumvent the problems of large employment 
schemes by establishing Employment Bureaux. In 1922, Earl Haig, defended the 
early Employment Committees: 
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You may say that this is mere duplication of the work of the Labour 
Exchanges. To a certain extent that may be true, but have the Labour 
Exchanges been altogether a success? Have they not sutTered in too many 
instances from the worst features of bureaucracy? Have they not lacked 
the personal touch of sympathy which means so much, especially to the 
man who, having fought for his country, feels that he has a right to be 
allowed to work for that country?92 
Once again, the moral dimension of service in the Great War was used to maintain 
the rights of ex-service men in the face of mass unemployment. The Legion's 
organisation relied heavily on the Local Branch committee to register all local 
unemployed ex-service men and with active personal canvassing of local employers 
and foremen, the branch could select a suitable candidate for any available job. 
Another role for local employment committees was to ensure that the privilege of 
75% preference for ex-service men was maintained on all local Government 
employment schemes while also 'checking the unauthorized and improper admission 
of aliens into this countryl.93 Local Legion branches often exerted considerable 
pressure through publicity campaigns and deputations on employers, labour 
exchanges and municipal authorities to reject female and foreign labour. 
It was soon realized that Branch Committees alone would not be sufficient to 
tackle the problem of finding men work, and in 1922 the first Area Employment 
Bureaux was established in London because 'the branches have been ... handicapped 
in obtaining employment ... by reason of the fact that there has been no co-operation 
with an authority which could pass on enquiries to the respective branches'.94 Area 
and County Employment Committees were able to pass information between 
branches, and place men who were willing to move out of a locality. By combining 
the etTorts of a number of Branches, these committees could also start larger 
employment schemes, such as the Hairdressing Training Centre established by the 
Oxfordshire County Committee in 1928.95 
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However, the moral claims of all ex-service men for employment were diluted 
in the Legion employment finding operations. Legion Headquarters suggested that 
'Publicity should be given to the fact that all ex-service men may apply for 
Employment through the Branch, though naturally preference would be given to 
members, other things being equal'.96 More importantly, the Employment 
Committees were selective in their approach as 'any unsuitable or unreliable man 
recommended for employment will react adversely against the Branch and the 
Legion'.97 Thus, the Legion attempted to provide a service to employers with the 
assurance that the Legion could supply reliable, honest men for jobs. This was the 
message of a 1935 leaflet: 
To all Employers of Labour 
EMPLOYEES who give conscientious and loyal service are valuable assets to any 
BUSINESS. 
The BRITISH LEGION specialises in providing MEN of this type for all kinds of 
work. 
The LEGION has Branches all over the country from which suitable EX-SERVICE 
MEN are provided at short notice. 
THE LEGION'S MOTTO 
IS 
SERVICE NOT SELF.98 
This was an astute piece of advertising; it reinforced the connection that ex-service 
men who joined the Legion and adopted its motto were loyal, honest and good 
workers and that the Legion was able to provide an efficient service. But at the same 
time by implying that only Legion members were the type of ex-service men who 
would give 'conscientious and loyal service' it made a distinction between Legion 
members and other ex-service men in their claims for employment. 
Given the depressed economic conditions, the actual impact of the Legion 
Employment Committees could never be vast, but in the 1930s, when given priority 
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over other practical work, they did place more ex-service men in jobs than otherwise 
would have been the case. Obviously, the Employment Committees did not create 
jobs, but simply assisted ex-service men to find and obtain the jobs that were around. 
In the first year of full operation during 1930, the Legion filled 10,262 vacancies, 
while in 1934 48,364 vacancies were filled. 99 The figures rose steadily so that in 
1938 the Legion could claim to have filled 225,588 over the last five years. IOO 
However, many of the jobs found by the Legion were for temporary or casual posts. 
In 1936, out of 49,745 vacancies filled, 14,740 were permanent with 22,118 
temporary and 12,887 casual jobs. lol The Legion Employment Bureaux thus did 
nothing to solve the problem of the unskilled ex-service man. Despite the great 
efforts and hard work expended by Legion Employment Committees in the thirties, it 
was impossible to make a major impact on the numbers of unemployed ex-service 
men. 
After the 1934 Government Act which highlighted the problem, the Legion 
turned its attention to helping the 'Special Areas'.102 West Cumberland, industrial 
Scotland, Tyne-Tees, South Wales and industrial Lancashire were all badly hit by the 
decline of Britain's heavy industries. With very high unemployment among the local 
population, these areas collected small amounts of money on Poppy Day, and yet 
needed proportionately more to assist the large numbers of people facing hardship. 
The Legion began to operate a scheme of 'adoption' based on a previous example; 
after the Great War certain British towns had adopted French and Belgian towns in 
the devastated areas of France and Flanders, sending gifts of cash and clothing.l03 
The Legion scheme consisted of wealthier areas in Britain adopting the distressed 
North-Eastern, North Western and Wales Areas. Cash was sent to pay for 
employment schemes, clothing and bedding was distributed to needy families, and 
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assistance given in individual cases of distress. This scheme allowed large re-
distributions of resources; in 1937 the North Eastern Area received £2,783 and 
several hundred bales of clothing. The Melksham Branch alone provided enough 
clothing for the needs of eight towns in Wales during 1937. 104 The Women's section 
played a very important role in this work, particularly through its 'Wardrobe Scheme' 
which sent thousands of items of clothing to poor districts in the North. The 
adoption scheme was only necessary due to the inability of normal Legion channels to 
distribute resources effectively and while the government response was relatively 
sophisticated, taking the form of incentives for business to relocate to the special 
areas, Legion assistance was simple and remedial charity. 
Having examined every major Legion effort, we must estimate the actual 
effect of the Legion's work. As early as 1923 Haig claimed that 'the lot of the ex-
service men of all ranks, thanks to the efforts of the Legion is very much better than 
it would have been had so many of our old comrades not united to form the British 
Legion'.105 The Legion and U.S.F. were large-scale organisations compared to any 
other ex-service charity which had gone before. By 1926, the Legion Relief 
Departments and U.S.F. were spending nearly £1,000,000 year and Maurice could 
claim that 'there is no other single organisation in the country which does benevolent 
work on anything like so large a scale'.106 For over 400,000 people every year, 
Legion relief vouchers for food and clothing provided welcome additional assistance 
to Government provision. 107 The figures for employment are not impressive 
individually, but taken together, Legion business loans, employment and training 
schemes, and the Employment Bureaux did find jobs for thousands of people. The 
greatest Legion work was for the disabled ex-service man, which was of great benefit 
to the lives of many individuals. Even so, Legion expenditure was minuscule 
compared to the budget of the Ministry of Pensions. In 1928, this Government 
104 ibid. 
105 AC 1923, Haig's Presidential Address. 
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Department spent £59,000,000 to the benefit of 1,500,000 people. l08 Ultimately, the 
work can only be judged on its benefit to the individual, for Legion efforts alleviated 
some of the hardship, provided some employment, and thus made a difference to 
many lives, but could not address the underlying problems of mass unemployment 
and poverty. 
Legion attitudes to the poor and unemployed reveal a serious dichotomy 
between the aims and reality of Legion benevolent work. The most important and 
expansive aim of the Legion to build a brighter Britain, where ex-service men 'should 
have their just rights and demand their dues'109 was not fulfilled. Even within the 
Legion, traditional attitudes towards ex-service men were not eradicated and given 
the ambiguity present in Legion attitudes it is perhaps unsurprising that the basic 
relationship between ex-service man, the state and society was not considerably 
altered. However, whatever faults and omissions were present within the Legion, 
Poppy Day was the most effective and vivid means of reminding the public about the 
needs of ex-service men. Ironically, Legion attitudes became progressively more 
archaic as time went on. The Legion adopted traditional charitable attitudes by 
making the distinction between deserving and undeserving poor. Even the Legion's 
most expansive aim of justice and maintenance for ex-service men depended on their 
service in war as a justification for their special treatment. By the 193 Os, the 
development of the 'middle way' in political thought laid the foundations for much 
more progressive attitudes to the poor. Thinkers like J.M. Keynes, David Lloyd 
George and even Harold MacMillan were advocating a comprehensive welfare state 
which would make provision for all citizens, regardless of their condition or previous 
service. lIO The Legion played no part in these developments and instead, its opinions 
remained shackled to a traditional charitable approach which became increasingly out 
of date as time went on. 
108 BLAR 1928. 
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'THE LEGION IS AN UNREASONABLE BODY': 
NEGOTIA TIONS WITH THE MINISTRY OF PENSIONS 
On 23 November 1918, James Howell, President of the National Association, 
We discharged men are placed in the same category as demagogues who 
spout against the short-comings of the Government - and such a condition, 
though distasteful, has to go on, until the Government trusts the men who 
fought for it. 1 
At the time, ex-service protests borne out of pension, employment and 
demobilization grievances caused serious alarm amongst the Government. Ex-service 
organisations, notably the National Federation, were placed under Special Branch 
surveillance. 2 Clearly in 1918 and 1919, the Government did not trust the returned 
soldiers of the Great War. Although by 1921, with the formation of the Legion, 
much of the tension between ex-service men and the Government had been de-fused 
with higher pension rates, the history of the British Legion's involvement in politics is 
largely concerned with the balance of trust and understanding between ex-service 
men and the Government. The importance of the Legion's political activities lie in the 
fact that, as one of the first mass movements, the Legion developed its political 
stance in the first years of mass franchise. By examining the Legion's political efforts 
we can gain an insight into the nature of British politics in the years after universal 
franchise. 
Charles Kimball has argued that the Legion's political effectiveness was 
hampered by its ex-officer leadership. He argued that: 
neither government recalcitrance nor public indifference deserve the lion's 
share of the blame for the failure of the Legion's lobbying endeavours over 
the years. Equally important was the way in which the organisations ex-
1 James Howell to Major Jellicorse, 23 November 1918, IH29/37/4. 
2 Stp~1 --" "'ard,Inle/ligence Surveillance ofBrilish r. "--- 'ice Men, 1918-1920, The HisloricalJourna[('973) pp.179-l.'!8. 
'An Unreasonable Body' -- 152 
officer leadership shied away from any form of protest or pressure tactic 
that could be construed as committing the Legion to a wider challenge to 
the legitimacy of the government in power.3 
Kimball suggests that the leadership of the Legion failed to exert significant pressure 
on the government due to their establishment and conservative character. Thus, 
these 'self imposed strictures'4 limited the effectiveness of the Legion's political 
pressure tactics. However, Kimball was unable to show directly the consequences of 
Legion leadership motivations and the reasons behind the ineffectiveness of the 
Legion's pressure tr.ctics has yet to be described. Why were the Legion's techniques 
of influence unsuccessful on the issues which were considered most important? Why 
was the Government able to resist Legion pressure, and often neutralise Legion 
activity? Which issues caused rifts within the Legion over these political events? 
These are the main problems for anyone examining the Legion's political activities. 
We must discover the nature of the Legion's 'self-imposed strictures' and evaluate 
their impact on the dynamics of the movement - the rifts between leadership and 
membership. With the benefit of hitherto unresearched material, this chapter hopes 
to contribute a deeper understanding of Legion political motivations and give further 
important detail to the lengthy negotiations between the Legion and Government. 
When established in 1921, the Legion became the sole ex-service organisation 
claiming to represent all British ex-service men. Considering the wide range of needs 
and problems of ex-service men, particularly on the questions of pensions and 
employment, it was inevitable that the Legion would involve itself in negotiations 
with the Government on many of the most pressing ex-service issues. The matters 
which were of 'vital interest to the Legion' covered many subjects from employment 
and housing to tubercular ex-service men, but the most important issue for the 
Legion and its membership concerned War disability and pensions. The relationship 
between Government and the Legion is a complex one and for the purposes of this 
3 Kimball, The Ex-Service Movement in Fn1dand and Wales, p.225. 
4 ibid. 
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study it is best to concentrate on the most important negotiations which concern the 
Legion and the Ministry of Pensions. By examining in detail the relations between 
the Legion and the Ministry of Pensions, we can discover the impact not only of the 
'self-imposed strictures' of the Legion, but also the position of the Ministry of 
Pensions. 
The flaws and injustices in the Pensions Warrants were the main cause of 
dispute between the Government and the Legion, and this tension also caused 
divisions within the Legion itself. The numbers of men disabled in the Great War was 
vast and it is estimated that almost one-quarter of those who served, roughly 1.2 
million men, were entitled to disability pensions. 5 With large numbers of disabled 
veterans in its ranks, war pensions remained a crucial issue for the Legion. War 
Pensions were also a major concern of the post-war Governments. Once government 
had accepted its responsibility to compensate the disabled soldier, which occurred in 
1917 with the 'Barnes Warrant', war pensions became a major burden on state 
finances due to the numbers of men, women and children involved. The Pension 
system was often modified in minor ways but the Pension Acts of 1919 and 1921 
formed the basis of the post-war settlement for disabled men, widows and orphans. 
The amount of compensation for a disabled man was based on his physical 
condition in comparison with a healthy man, and the disability was then assessed in 
degrees of 10%; from 20 to 100%. For example, men who had lost both legs, eyes 
or arms, or suffering from T.B. received 100% pension. However, the onus of proof 
lay with the applicant who had to prove to the Ministry that the disability was either 
attributable to or aggravated by his service during the war. Many disabled ex-service 
men were denied war pensions because it was impossible to prove that their disability 
was attributable to war service. A more progressive section of the Pensions 
settlement was the existence of an independent Appeals Tribunal established in 1919. 
Any claimant who was dissatisfied with the Ministry decision on entitlement or 
5 Winter, The Great " the British People, p.273. 
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degree of disability for men, widows or dependants could appeal through these 
tribunals which helped to ensure the equity of the pensions system. Under the 1919 
Warrant, pensioners had to attend Medical Boards every six months where their 
condition, and rate of pension were reassessed. This led to a great deal of anxiety 
amongst pensioners, who were never sure of their status; their pension might be 
increased, reduced or removed at any of the frequent medical boards. The earlier ex-
service organisations, notably the Federation and the Comrades pressed the 
Government for a stabilisation of pensions, so that pensioners would not have to 
attend constant medical boards and the basis of their pensions would be permanently 
settled. 
These pleas, combined with Government interests, resulted in the 1921 
Pension Warrant which contained a number of controversial features. There were 
two aspects of this Act, final awards and the seven years time limit, which later 
caused much dissatisfaction to pensioners and a real sense of grievance amongst 
Legion members. At the time the Bill passed rapidly through Parliament without 
much dissent. It was assumed that the Bill was in the interests of the pensioners 
themselves, and the Warrant was considered an advance on any previous legislation. 
However, Government considerations played as much a part in the formulation of the 
Act as the pleas of the ex-service organisations. The major motivation was to reduce 
Government liability for Great War Pensions. The expenditure on war pensions had 
become a major component in Government expenditure; in 1919 Local War Pensions 
Committees had spent £9,748,400, but in 1920 this figure had risen to £21,188,500. 6 
It was clear to Treasury Officials that the system of Pensions was costing the country 
a vast sum of money, and the 1921 Pensions Warrant was an attempt to limit, if not 
to reduce, the liability. Under this Act, the powers of the Local War Pensions 
Committees were reduced and administration was centralised on London, with 
greater powers given to the permanent officials of the Ministry's secretariat. The 
6".. b, War PenSions, Britisl. Legion Summer Sch, I, 1926. 
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second main provision was for a system of final awards to stabilise pensions. 
Looking back at the system from the perspective of 1926, A.G. Webb, the Legion's 
pensions expert, wrote that for the majority of pensioners 'the scheme has merely 
acted as a means whereby the Government have finally disposed of their liability with 
regard to pensions and allowances'.7 
Medical Boards were asked to assess a pensioner's disability and whether the 
injury or illness had stabilised so that the condition would become no better or worse. 
In these cases a Final Award was made. If the disability was assessed at 20% or 
over, a weekly pension was granted for life, but if the disability was assessed at under 
20%, a gratuity spread over a maximum of 156 weeks was granted, after which no 
further payment was made. For pensioners with over 20% disability the scheme was 
satisfactory, but for the majority of pensioners with less than 20% disability it 
represented a small payment for a permanent disability. Between 1 January 1922 and 
11 December 1923, 371,428 Final Awards were made, but of these only 136,080 
received permanent pensions while 235,338 pensioners received Final Awards. 8 
Legion leaders complained that doctors were 'asked to do something which it was 
impossible for them to do ... They were asked to forecast for all time what the degree 
of incapacity would be'.9 It was clear that the Ministry of Pensions was wiping off 
thousands of pensioners from its books, sometimes with little regard to the actual 
condition of the pensioner's disability. 
The 1921 Pensions Warrant also introduced a seven years time limit in which 
claims to a pension could be considered. This regulation applied equally to disabled 
men and to widows. The first claim for pension had to be made within seven years 
from the date of discharge (or 1 August 1921 whichever was earlier) otherwise the 
claim would be ruled out of time and not considered. If a man had a dormant wound 
or condition which reappeared seven years after his discharge, he was not entitled to 
7 ibid. 
8 ibid. 
9 AC 1925, Lister, Chairman's Address. 
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pensIOn. In widows' cases the time limit operated in a particularly harsh manner, as 
explained by A.G. Webb: 
At present if her husband dies one day after the seven years he leaves his 
wife pensionless. Picture the feelings of a mother watching her invalid 
husband's bedside on the last day of the seventh year. Imagine the feelings 
of the dying man! The thing would be ridiculous - if it were not tragic. 10 
The unbending nature of the rule produced a terrible situation and a great deal of 
hardship for many widows. Again, from a Government and treasury point of view, 
this was a way of limiting the Government's liability by ensuring that no new pension 
claims would appear after 1928. Initially, the Legion campaigned only for the 
removal of the widow's pensions time limit, but after 1924, when there were changes 
in procedure for widow's pensions which removed most of the injustice caused by the 
time limit, it began a campaign for the removal of all time limits. Both the operation 
of final awards and the seven years time limit became the source of major grievances 
for the ex-service community. 
Although the 1921 Pensions Warrant had passed quickly through the House 
of Commons, the Legion soon looked on this fact with suspicion. In 1922 A. G. 
Webb remarked: 
how very significant it was that the 1921 Act was passed at the time when 
the Legion came into being. Whether by accident or by design I know not, 
but in view of the far-reaching effects of this Act, rushed through the 
House, I am inclined to the opinion that it was no accident that the 
Ministry caught the ex-service men just at the transformation period. 11 
This typified the early Legion response to the Act, and demonstrates the mistrust felt 
by the Legion towards the motives of the Ministry of Pensions. George Coppard's 
experience may give some impression of how many ordinary ex-service men were 
treated by the Ministry. Coppard had been severely wounded by a machine gun 
bullet at the battle of Cambrai which severed the artery in his left leg - and nearly cost 
10 BU January 1923,' ',67. 
It BU August 1922, p .. 5. 
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him his life. After the war his case was reviewed by a Local War Pensions 
Committee: 
My leg had shrunk a bit and I was given pension of twenty-five shillings 
per week for six months. The pension dropped to nine shillings a week for 
a year and then ceased altogether. At my last medical board in 1920, one 
of the members, repeating my replies to questions, drawled, 'Says femoral 
artery has been severed'. 12 
George Coppard did not understand the complex Pensions regulations or the reasons 
why his pension had been stopped, but he did know that he had been seriously 
wounded during his service. Similarly, Frank Richards who had been gassed during 
the war wrote 'I have never been the same man as what I was before. Indeed no man 
has been treated with greater contempt than what I was.'l3 A. G. Webb knew the 
sense of grievance which could develop among disabled men who felt that they had a 
right to pension: 
These disabled men have a very distinct distrust of the Ministry and all its 
ways. They rarely feel satisfied with the rulings given by any of the 
Ministry officials, with the result that a disabled man goes away 
disgruntled, nurses his grievances (which does not improve with keeping) 
and airs it to all and sundry. 14 
For ordinary ex-service men, as well as for Legion officials, pension issues became 
and remained the most important grievance between the Legion and Government. 
Relations between the Legion and the Ministry of Pensions reached a very low ebb in 
the period 1923-25 and much of Legion literature reflects this. Legion officials 
argued that the Ministry was economising at the expense of the disabled men: 
Many years experience of pensions problems has almost driven me to the 
conclusion that it is easier for a rich man to get into Heaven than for a 
poor man to ascertain his pension rights single-handed. And it isn't only 
the complexity of problems he has to tackle. There is an even bigger 
bogey - the officialness and the Treasury point of view that places 
parsimony before humanity. 15 
12 George Coppard, With a Machine Gun to Cambrai, London: Papermac, 1980, p.134. 
13 Frank Richards, Old Soldiers Never Die, London: Faber, 1933, p.167. 
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Attitudes like these were prevalent, and largely motivated the constant Legion 
campaigns on the pension issues of final awards and the seven years time limit. On 
pension issues, the Legion was quite prepared to use strong language and campaign 
vigorously for the repeal of these regulations. 
While it was believed that action could and should be taken for the needs of 
ex-service men and their dependants, there was no scope for political action which 
would radically alter the political balance between ex-service men and Parliament. 
The Legion was there to protect and advocate ex-service rights within the existing 
framework of Parliament and Constitutional Monarchy. This attitude was clear in 
Rule 1 (C) which was 'to inculcate a sense of loyalty to the Crown Community State 
and Nation, to promote unity amongst all classes'. 16 Given this sense of loyalty to the 
institutions and establishment of the British 'State and Nation', the British Legion 
could not and would not have attempted a radical revision of politics. To this extent, 
Kimball's criticism of the refusal of the Legion leadership to challenge the 'legitimacy 
of the Government in power' cannot be supported. The Legion's Rules and Charter 
were not conceived in this light; a challenge to the constitution and legitimacy of the 
Government was unthinkable. As T.F. Lister remarked at the 1927 Conference: 
I think you may take it that whatever form our policy takes, one thing 
which will be omitted, and that will be active propaganda upon matters 
which are the subject of acute political difference. 17 
The Legion was not the organisation to stir up political passions. At the same time, 
this clearly limited the Legion's political scope to a very narrow spectrum, and this 
was bound to limit the Legion's political effectiveness. 
Given that the Legion would not use party politics as a means of influence, 
there remained the problem of how best to enact its policy. In the first editorial of 
the Legion Journal, members were exhorted to 'Determine to make the Legion's 
policy grill.'18 To a very large extent that could only be achieved by gaining some 
16 British Legion Royal Charter and Rules 1925, Rule I (C). 
17 AC 1927, T.F. Lister, ChaimJan'~ Address. 
18 BLJ July 1921, p.12. 
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sort of purchase on Parliament and the Government of the day. The success of the 
Constructive Programme of the Legion,19 depended heavily on influencing National 
Government and Local Authorities. After the discussion of ' Domestic', 'National' and 
'Imperial' Objects, it was stated that 'the aforesaid objects to be carried out by co-
operating with Government, Employers and Trade Unions and bringing the necessary 
pressure to bear by Constitutional methods'.20 The mission of the Legion was clear 
from the outset; it was essential to influence 'the powers that be'. 
The Legion attempted to achieve influence through many indirect methods: 
attempting to build a strong membership, influencing public opinion through 
speeches, rallies, and myriad Branch events. In combination with the indirect 
approach, the Legion could draw on the expertise of the leaders of the earlier ex-
servIce organisations in the deployment of direct techniques of influence, which 
ranged from the deputation to a Government Department to petitions and 
questionnaires. 
The Legion's commitment to constitutional methods of change and influence 
led to a great enthusiasm for representation on all kinds of Government and Local 
Committees. It was believed that with large scale representation on many 
committees, the Legion could make the voice of the ex-service man heard, above all 
the other competing interests and influences. However, the Legion was much more 
circumspect when it came to direct political representation at the national level. The 
National Federation had attempted to gain direct political representation for ex-
service men, by sponsoring sixteen candidates at the 1918 General Election. The 
complete failure of this attempt meant that no other ex-service group contemplated 
similar action again. 21 Within British politics the creation of a new ex-service 
political grouping was not a possibility after 1918. Given the strength of the existing 
19 See Appendix E. 
20 ibid. 
21 Wootton, The Politics oflnflllence, p.133. 
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political system, it is unlikely whether such a party would have been successful and 
the Legion was certainly not the organisation to attempt such a move. 
The clearest indication of the Legion's political approach was given before the 
1922 General Election, when the General Secretary issued detailed instructions to the 
branches informing them of the correct behaviour to adopt during the campaign. The 
instructions stressed the non-party nature of the Legion: 
the Legion is in no way whatever associated with any particular political 
party, or with any party political organisation. For this reason the Legion 
at the forthcoming General Election will not be supporting any particular 
party, although members in their INDIVIDUAL capacity and WITHOUT 
committing their branch may be doing SO.22 
This made it clear that the Legion in its corporate capacity would not engage in party 
politics. However, some individual members did cross this fine line. A speaker on a 
political platform, wearing a Legion badge next to his coloured rosette was obviously 
associating the two and his audience would do the same. 23 Indeed, although the 
guidelines made the corporate non-party stance of the Legion clear, the same was not 
true for individual branches. Legion branches were supplied with questionnaires for 
candidates which outlined the main Legion policies, and invited the candidate to reply 
in writing to the branch. 24 These replies were then to be 'published to all members of 
the branch who will then be entirely free to decide for themselves how they propose 
to vote'.25 This was certainly well within the Rules of the Legion - its members had a 
legitimate right to discover the views of each candidate on ex-service issues. 
However, the instructions went further for it was decided that: 
it is within the power of a local branch of the Legion, after having 
considered at a General Meeting of the Branch the replies received from all 
the candidates for Election in the Constituency, to decide to take action if 
they so desire in support of, or in opposition to, any particular candidate, 
22 GSCLB, SC reo The General Election, October 1922. 
23 Kimball, The Ex-Service Movement in England and Wales, p.187. 
24 See Appendix G. 
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but this should NOT be done unless one or more of the candidates is 
distinctly unfavourable.26 
This was a very important proviso; although the Legion as a national organisation 
was not going to declare for one party or another, individual branches were allowed 
to support one candidate if the others had given unfavourable replies to the 
questionnaire. This did allow Legion branches to engage in local party politics albeit 
in a limited sense. The intention was clear; candidates might gain support if they 
were favourable to ex-service policies and lose support if they were not. Conversely, 
candidates would not be criticised because of their wider political beliefs or party but 
solely on the grounds of their views on ex-service issues. Clearly, the Legion 
leadership was sailing fairly close to the wind on this issue, and many branches 
subsequently complained that the instructions had embroiled them in unintended 
political controversy. Nevertheless, it was this fine line between ex-service issues and 
wider political issues which gave the Legion's policy campaigns in the twenties an 
impression of vigour and success. 
A good example of this lies in the final message delivered by the General 
Secretary before the 1922 Election. There was a feeling of enthusiasm for the 
electoral process and an inflated opinion of the Legion's ability to influence the 
election in his exhortation: 
The Welfare of Ex-Service Men, Widows and Dependents hangs on the 
sort of Parliament we return as the result of this Election. 
Let us see to it that we get a Parliament which shall be unanimous in 
support of the just claims of all ranks of the Ex-Service Community. 
THE LEGION HAS NOW THE OPPORTUNITY TO CREATE 
THE PARLIAMENT THAT IT WANTS. DON'T LOSE THIS 
WONDERFUL OPPORTUNITY.27 
The enthusiasm was understandable. Not only was 1922 the first general Election 
since the formation of the Legion, but it was probably the first truly representative 
election under the new reforms of mass franchise. Many of the soldiers who had 
26 ibid. 
27 ibid. 
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been unable to vote in 1918, voted in 1922 as ex-service men. The Legion also had a 
wide programme of policies designed to redeem some of the war-time pledges and 
alleviate the hard situation of many ex-service men. Such enthusiasm was allowed to 
obscure the hard facts that the Legion, of itself, could not create the Parliament that it 
wanted. In an era of mass franchise there were many interests and forces at work in 
producing the new Parliament of which the Legion was but one. 
However, this fact was not recognised by Legion leadership or membership. 
In January 1923, two months after the election, the General Secretary informed the 
branches that: 
a very large number of the Members of the Present House of Commons 
are greatly in favour of the Legion programme, and are in fact pledged to 
help the cause of ex-service men in many mattel5which are of vital interest 
to the Legion.28 
The Legion branches and leadership believed that when a prospective candidate 
signed his name with a favourable reply to the questionnaire this was a pledge to vote 
in favour of such policies in the House of Commons. Since Legion Headquarters had 
collected over 460 favourable replies to the questionnaire from successful candidates 
it was naively assumed that a large measure of success for the Legion's programme of 
policies could be achieved through Parliamentary legislation. 
Having built up these false hopes, the disillusionment with reality was all the 
harder. On a number of occasions in this first Parliament, the inflated hopes were 
proved unfounded and ex-service men developed a great sense of grievance and 
bewilderment when Legion proposals and Bills were voted down in the House of 
Commons by Members of Parliament who had seemed favourable to Legion policies. 
Perhaps the most important of these occurred in 1923 over the vote for the budget of 
the Ministry of Pensions. 
On 27 April 1923 the Minister of Pensions informed the Legion that no 
concession on the seven years time limit for widows could be contemplated. The 
28 (,SCLS, SC, British Legion Policy Campaign, Janual 
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General Secretary wrote to the 400 :MPs who had favoured the abolition of the time 
limit and told them that they would have an early opportunity of honouring their 
questionnaire pledge.29 On 5 June Mr 1.I. Macpherson, the:MP for Inverness, and a 
former Minister of Pensions, moved a reduction of £1 00 in the budget of the 
Ministry. This was essentially a vote of no confidence in the policy of the Ministry, 
and in the ensuing debate, the Minister, Major G.C. Tryon, and his policies came 
under considerable attack. However, the debate did not follow Legion lines or 
Legion arguments; Members of Parliament had their own interests and motivations. 30 
The Legion's two self-appointed spokesmen, Major lB.B. Cohen, and Mr D.P. 
Pielou, threatened to vote against the Government, but ultimately voted with their 
Party when a select committee was promised to look into the seven years time limit 
for widows. Time and again and on a number of issues Legion measures were voted 
down by Members of Parliament who had seemed favourable to those policies at 
election time. 
A revealing exchange took place at the 1925 Conference 
delegate asked: 
when a 
would it not be better to ask all Members of Parliament who signed the 
questionnaire to honour their signature? 
THE CHAIRMAN: Do you seriously think we have not done all this 
already? 
DERBY: Then we have no redress against them for refusing to honour 
their signature?31 
Legion members did not recognise that there was no realistic way in which the 
Members who had signed the Legion questionnaire could be mobilised to vote 
against their Party. At the same Conference, Swansea moved that the N.E.C. should 
find out the reasons why 'ex-service men fail to obtain justice in their demands when 
made in the House of Commons', when the 'majority of Members of Parliament sign 
the Legion Manifesto upon seeking election and pledge their support'. He 'could not 
29 OHBL, p.62. 
30 See the Debate in the House of Co nun OilS. Hansard,S June 1923. 
31 AC 1925, Motion of Urgency. 
'An Unreasonable Body' -- 164 
understand why ex-service Members of Parliament did not firmly stand together and 
walk out of the House of Commons when ex-service men did not get a square deal'.32 
Ex-service men were bewildered and angry because they did not understand the 
political process. Members of Parliament did not conceive their ultimate loyalty to 
the British Legion, or to ex-service men but to Parliament and, in particular, to their 
Party. 
F or the Legion leaders, who were actually negotiating with Ministers, there 
was little alternative but to continue using the questionnaire as the principal means of 
influence. The Legion had to be seen to be doing something, and there was still hope 
that these methods might have an impact. The Legion was accepted by the Ministry 
of Pensions as an interest group which deserved representation. At every level, from 
the local War Pensions Committees to the Central Advisory Committee, the Legion 
could make its views known to the Ministry. It might be assumed that the Legion 
was bargaining from a position of some authority, even strength. However, in 
discussions at the various Pension Committees, it became clear to Legion 
representatives that the major policy decisions of the Ministry were not going to be 
altered through the consultation process. Although the Legion with its knowledge of 
conditions countrywide could be of value to the Ministry, both in framing new 
legislation and regulations, the Minister and his advisors had the final say in every 
decision. Mentioning the 'dead wall' which faced the Legion in its attempts to alter 
Pensions policy, lM. Hogge remarked that 'they don't buy new records at the 
Pensions Ministry, they repeat old ones'.33 
By 1925, it was clear that this strategy, and the constant use of deputations to 
the Ministry of Pensions, was not having the desired effect; the time limit and the 
operation of final awards were still on the statute books. Thus in May 1925 the 
Legion decided on an unusual course of action to influence Parliament. The General 
32 ibid. 
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Secretary wrote to the branches giving the National Executive Council's decision to 
raise a National Petition. The letter explained that: 
Discussions at the Government Standing Joint Committee, Central 
Advisory Committee, Ministry of Pensions Area Advisory Councils, 
deputations to the Pensions Minister, and even discussions in the House of 
Commons itself have failed to secure any redress. The National Executive 
Council have, therefore, decided as a last resource, to organise a National 
Public Petition to Parliament. 34 
The National Public Petition really was a last resort because it was highly unlikely 
that Parliament would be swayed by such an archaic form of representation and 
supplication when more modern and direct means of influence had already failed. An 
emergency motion was raised at the 1925 Conference, desiring to halt the Petition, 
arguing that if it failed it might do great harm to the Legion's cause. A Swansea 
delegate warned that: 
All the petitions in the world would not help them to get their demand 
satisfied. Somebody would stagger into the House of Commons with the 
Petition and there it would be allowed to die. 35 
The Petition was presented by Major Cohen to the Speaker of the House (he did not 
stagger, but only brought the first paper - the large bundles were brought in by 
others) but although the Legion's petition of 825,000 signatures was the largest since 
the Chartist petition of 1848, it had little direct effect on Government policy. It is 
true that Major Tryon, the Pensions Minister, in a case of 'remarkable coincidence',36 
announced the temporary stabilisation of pension rates until 1929. This was a large, 
if indirect concession. Soon after the Petition was presented, the Minister of 
Pensions announced further concessions; there would be a correction of errors 
scheme for the final awards procedure and special warrant pensions would be 
awarded to men who applied outside the seven years time limit. Both of these 
procedures depended on the discretion of the Minister and his advisors and there was 
34 GSCLB, SC • National Public Petition, May 1925. 
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no statutory right of appeal. This did not satisfy the Legion, as the Independent 
Appeals Tribunal had often overturned Ministry decisions. Legion records showed 
that from 1921 to 1925, over 62 per cent of appeals were successful. It was argued 
by the Legion that: 
while this is a very potent argument in favour of the establishment and 
retention of the Independent Courts, it also shows that without the 
retention of the Independent Courts, ex-Service men would not have a fair 
deal if the final decision lay with the Ministry.37 
All of the concessions announced by the Minister of Pensions were alterations in 
procedure rather than changes in legislation, and thus an independent appeal could 
not be granted. At the same time, the Ministry was not prepared to draft new 
legislation, because it would have been a tacit admission that large errors had been 
made. 
After the failure of the National Petition, the Legion cast about for more 
effective means of influence. As early as 1923 TF. Lister had suggested at the 
Annual Conference that the real influence lay at branch level: 
When you are a big national organisation your strength and power do not 
rest upon the activity of some people you are pleased to call 'Headquarters' 
- your power and influence depend upon the strength and determination of 
the individual branches throughout the country.38 
The implied message was that Legion Headquarters could not be successful without 
the co-operation of every Legion branch - and that this help had not always been 
forthcoming. Indeed, this was a wider problem of considerable difficulty. Although 
the General Secretary's Monthly Circulars kept the branches informed of 
developments, it was often difficult for branches to maintain contact with 
Headquarters, let alone mount a local campaign against Government policies. At the 
1925 Conference, Major J.B.B. Cohen advised the branches that: 
Members of Parliament as individuals paid comparatively little attention to 
communications they received from organisations, but if deputations from 
37 BU April 1923, p.240. 
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Branches to local Members were organised, it was possible to make the 
life of their own Member extremely unpleasant '" Worry your own 
Member of Parliament in your own constituency .. .If you worry them hard 
enough, you will get the things that you want done. 39 
This advice implied that most of the national effort made by the Legion did not have 
a great deal of impact. However, a Legion branch might well be able to harass the 
local MP, but when the issue was national, with national consequences, the MP 
would be unlikely to change his voting patterns in the House of Commons. The 
logical extension of deputations and polite local pressure was to mobilise ex-service 
opinion both nationally and locally against M.P. s who had voted against their 
signatures. 
By June 1926, the Legion had attempted most constitutional methods to 
change Governmental policy on training for the disabled, compulsory employment of 
the disabled, the seven years time limit and final awards, widows and orphans 
pensions, and a National Work scheme. None of the pressure of questionnaires, 
National Petitions, Private Member's Bills or publicity had brought much in the way 
of tangible results on these questions. A delegate explained at the 1926 Conference: 
It was known that candidates for Parliament exploited the ex-service man 
on every possible occasion. The men were a long suffering community, 
but the limit of their endurance had been reached. They must show 
candidates that they could not play fast and loose with the Legion. Men 
who obeyed the 'party' call in the House were a disgrace to the cause they 
professed to represent and traitors of the very deepest degree. 4o 
Clearly, this subject evoked strong passions within the Legion. Ex-service men who 
conceived their loyalty to the Legion and to one another could not understand the 
realities of British politics. At the 1926 Annual Conference, two Resolutions, 
numbers 33 and 34, demonstrated anger and frustration at Legion defeats in 
Parliament, while Resolution 125 proposed changes to the political stance of the 
Legion. Resolution 33 'viewed with disgust and misgiving the continual breaking of 
promises given by Members of Parliament' and demanded that Members of 
39 AC 1925, Motion ~ ... Tr~''1CY. 
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Parliament should fulfill their pledges. 41 Similarly, Resolution 34 protested against 
the House of Commons Branch of the Legion which had 'with few exceptions voted 
against the revision of government measures affecting ex-service men'.42 Even the 
Legion branch of MPs could not 'stand together' and make common cause on the 
floor of the House of Commons. The House of Commons Branch contained over 
150 members of Parliament, but was never able, or indeed designed to marshal MPs 
in opposition to the Party whips and the amendment which demanded the expulsion 
of the branch was not carried. Major Cohen, one of the MPs with Legion interests, 
who voted against his party on certain ex-service issues, tried to explain the realities 
of Parliament to the Legion Conference on this resolution: 
The House of Commons was the centre of all political life and it was 
difficult, when the Whips were on, to get Members to vote as they wanted 
to. He personally was not elected to Parliament by the British Legion. 
Members were elected by their separate divisions and pledged themselves 
to support a certain Party. He always considered that his primary duty was 
to those who elected him. They were not members of the British 
Legion ... Could they be asked to support the British Legion, which was 
only one section of the public - an important section if they liked - and tum 
down the Government, and so be false to what they stood for at the 
General Election?43 
Cohen defended Parliamentary Government by arguing that the Legion was only one 
pressure group, one interest out of many. However, at the 1926 Conference, the 
Legion came very close to adopting a more aggressive political stance which might 
have allowed it to exert more effective pressure on M.P.s. In the discussion over 
Resolution 33 the Swansea delegate argued that 'if Members failed to support their 
promises, the Legion should vote solidly against them at the elections'.44 Resolution 
Number 125, proposed by Southbourne suggested exactly that: 
This Conference resolves that in view of the reply given to the deputation 
of the Council by the existing Minister of Pensions with regard to the 
Seven Year's Time Limit, and having regard to the existing unsatisfactory 
41 42 AC 1926, Res. No. 33. 
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working of the Pensions Administration, we amend the Constitution and 
Rules of the Legion so that definite steps may be taken to use the whole 
force of the Legion in a constitutional manner to oppose every 
Parliamentary Candidate who has voted against the Pensions policy of the 
Legion.45 
In effect, this resolution would have meant the organisation of the Legion to ensure 
that its members 'voted solidly against ... Members who failed to support their 
promises'.46 It would have allowed the Legion to become a political bloc which was 
prepared to mobilise support against any candidate who failed to support Legion 
policies. Instead of the Legion being able to mobilise only local or national support 
for their policies, this resolution would have allowed the 'whole force' of the Legion 
being used at election time. This was the final sanction which the Legion could apply 
to induce MPs to honour their pledges. However, the resolution was not framed or 
voted on by people who understood political realities or who knew how to mobilize 
opinion at election time. The resolution sounded impressive but it is unlikely that the 
Legion could have exerted a powerful pressure against Parliamentary candidates 
when so many Legion members held differing political viewpoints. However, the 
Southbourne resolution of itself did not change the Legion's political stance. The 
only way to amend the Constitution and Rules was to have an amendment passed 
with a two thirds majority at a following Annual Conference, which then had to be 
accepted by the Privy Council. The difficulties inherent in this procedure made it 
highly unlikely that the Legion would ever actually adopt this militant stance. It is 
revealing that the Legion leadership saw little danger in Resolution 125. When The 
Times wrote a scathing attack on this resolution, on 4 August 1926, T.F. Lister 
replied in a letter that 'the resolution will have no effect upon the fundamental non-
party character of the Legion'.47 The Legion, he continued, would not affiliate to any 
political party or use its funds for party political purposes. The intention of the 
resolution to use the whole force of the Legion at elections would be ignored and 'if 
45 46 AC 1926, Res. No. 125. 
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anyone is foolish enough to suggest anything of the kind as a serious proposition to 
the next, or any Annual Conference, the verdict will be sufficiently emphatic to 
discourage any repetition of the attempt'.48 Soon after, Lister wrote to General Sir 
Ian Hamilton that Resolution 125 had caused in high places: 
some perturbation on the subject of our non-party attitude ... This 
resolution was of academic interest ... I pointed out the unwisdom of the 
resolution at the time, but it was really in the nature of a demonstration 
against the Government for not doing certain things, and was not intended, 
and will not be treated as a serious suggestion to amend the Royal Charter. 
I think all the people who were very upset at the time are now reassured, 
and of course, if they had known as much as I know of the Legion it would 
never have caused alarm. 49 
The leadership of the Legion did not take seriously one of the most important 
resolutions of the Legion Conference and did not implement the wishes of the 
membership.. Lister saw the Resolution solely as a protest and was not prepared to 
treat it as a demand to change the Royal Charter. There were good reasons for this 
attitude. Many Legion branches subsequently complained about the resolution (even 
though most of them had not been present at the Conference to vote upon it) and 
there would have been serious repercussions for the Legion had the spirit of the 
resolution been adopted by the leadership. It was not simply a matter of a 
conservative leadership holding a radical membership in check because the 
Government, and particularly the Minister of Pensions, began an immediate counter-
attack. 
The Minister of Pensions, Major G. C. Tryon, realised that the Privy Council 
would not agree to such a major change of the Legion constitution, but he believed 
there was evidence that the Legion had already taken 'concerted action in the sense of 
the resolution' by attacking MPs in their constituencies, with 'leading members of the 
Legion making speeches against Government policy on pensions'. 50 In reality, the 
Legion was simply following its interest in pensions policy with no greater political 
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motive involved, and this shows a great misunderstanding between the Legion and 
the Ministry. Tryon argued that the Royal Patronage of the Legion was used: 
in the press as arguments to induce or compel the Government to depart 
from a definite decision of policy. If that decision is maintained, as I 
presume it will be, and if the intentions of the Legion are carried out as can 
hardly be doubted, the Prince of Wales will be placed in the position of 
supporting as Patron an agitation directed against His Majesty's 
Government and their supporters and the Crown itself can hardly fail to be 
gravely embarrassed. 51 
Most of Tryon's argument rested on supposition rather than fact. Although two 
newspapers, The Times and Lansbury's Labour Weekly, had used the Prince's name in 
connection with the Legion's policy, the Legion itself had never used the name of the 
Prince of Wales in their campaign against the time limits. However, Tryon was 
concerned enough to organise a cabinet committee to discuss the implications of the 
constitutional question, but more importantly the 'steps to be taken to deal with the 
political campaign which has been launched by the British Legion against the 
Government in the Constituencies'. 52 Tryon's real concern was not over the technical 
and somewhat hypothetical constitutional issue. Rather, it was that the Legion's 
campaign of 'worrying M.P. s in their own constituencies'53 might actually be 
effective. Tryon, an ex-service man himself, knew how to handle politically naive 
soldiers and he used the constitutional issue as a lever to limit the effectiveness of the 
Legion campaign. The Cabinet Committee wrote to Earl Haig, urging him 'in the 
interests of the British Legion, to invite those responsible to exercise restraint'. 54 
Lionel Halsey, the Prince of Wales' Secretary, who had been involved in the 
discussions, wrote to Tryon that Haig's reply made it clear that: 
51 ibid. 
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there can be and will be no change in the constitution of the British 
Legion ... and he is convinced that the strength of the organisation is 
heartily opposed to political action which can never take place. 55 
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Tryon had thus made sure that the leaders of the Legion would exercise restraint in 
their campaign. Haig would never have countenanced a change in the political stance 
of the Legion and Tryon had ensured that the Legion would not be able to 
concentrate effective political force by drawing their attention away from the real 
issues in their campaign over pensions. Unsurprisingly, the Cabinet Committee 
decided that 'on no account' should a fresh Parliamentary Committee be set up to 
examine Pensions administration. 56 
Not for a moment did it occur to Tryon, or anyone else in Government, that 
Legion protest and campaigns in the constituencies might be the legitimate action of a 
democratic pressure group, perfectly entitled to press M.P.s to support Legion 
policies. Tryon's suspicion that the Legion attacks were politically motivated merely 
increased his determination to neutralise the Legion. Tryon was solely concerned 
with protecting Government policy against attack and ensuring that it remained as it 
stood. As Charles Kimball has pointed out, British inter-war politics displayed the 
resilience of the Victorian and Edwardian polity, and this example demonstrates these 
attitudes in action. 57 It was very difficult in such circumstances for the Legion to 
make its policy 'grip'. 
After the somewhat dramatic events of 1926, and the failure of the Legion to 
adopt a more aggressive political stance, there was much debate on how to proceed 
with the abolition of the seven years time limit. The Legion leadership turned its 
attention away from the problem of pensions administration while maintaining an 
interest in the situation. At a deputation to the Ministry of Pensions to discuss the 
effects of gas poisoning on 27 June 1928, Colonel Crosfield, the Legion Chairman, 
remarked that: 
he hoped the omission from the subjects to be discussed of the questions 
of Time Limits and Final Awards would not be regarded as an implication 
that the British Legion were satisfied about either of these matters. They 
had not been dropped, and the British Legion intended to ask that another 
56 Conclusions of Cabinet Meeting, 9 June 1926, PIN 15/3630. 
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deputation might be received at a later date, when further information in 
regard to these questions was available. 58 
By this time the Legion had run out of steam on these issues and Crosfield's 
protestations would not fool Tryon. Almost every form of pressure had been exerted 
and there was little more the Legion could do to press the Government to change its 
position. At the 1927 Annual Conference Lister talked of the Government's 'definite 
decision' on time limits and final awards: 
I cannot help regretting that ... but if you are a practical people, you will 
not do very much good simply by hammering at a door which is locked 
against you for the time being, but you will find other means of entering 
the citadel which seems to be closed. 59 
After 1925, the Legion tried to try to find a new way of unlocking the door to the 
Ministry of Pensions. Part of that response came from the Branches, who wished the 
Legion to fight Parliamentary candidates at election time, or who wished the Legion 
to mount national demonstrations to gain public support for Legion policies. One 
Branch even suggested that 'Demonstrations should be held in Hyde Park, with Earl 
Haig denouncing the Prime Minister because of the Pensions scandal'.60 Many 
outspoken delegates at the Annual Conferences accused the N.E. C. of a lack of 
determination on the matter. The Allentown Delegate at the 1927 Conference, when 
Resolution 125 of 1926 was removed, said: 
He listened to members of the N.E.C. when they told the Legion how to 
deal with various Governments, and if their reports were read they 
appeared to be rods of iron, but in reality they were nothing but the 
proverbial painted laths. 61 
Without the sanction of political action, the Legion had to fall back onto the same 
methods of influence; discussions in committee, deputations and delegations -
methods which had been tried and failed. This was all part of a misunderstanding 
between the leadership and the membership of the Legion. Although the leaders 
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would engage in activities to influence Parliament and its Ministers, they would not 
go much further. The image of Earl Haig in Hyde Park denouncing the Prime 
Minister is a fine one; suffice to say it would never have become reality. Not only 
would Earl Haig have refused to take part, but any major public demonstration by the 
Legion would have been fiercely attacked by the government. Instead of these rather 
dramatic gestures, the Legion leadership preferred to marshal their forces again, 
using similar pressure to make the Government relent. But instead of the earlier 
approach that the seven years time limit should be abolished on the grounds of 
principle and right, the Legion under the Chairmanship of Colonel Crosfield 
attempted to make use of the number of cases of hardship caused by the Time Limits. 
In 1928, Crosfield at the Annual Conference stated that 'we are going to have 
a thorough comb-out to find out the extent of the sufferings under the seven years 
time limit and the final awards'.62 At the 1929 Annual Conference, he repeated the 
need for hard cases; 
Once again may I ask Branches - you may be getting rather tired of this; 
still I have got to do it - to let us have examples of hard cases. We have a 
certain number and we have some very good examples at Headquarters, 
but we should like to have more. We are satisfied they do exist in greater 
numbers up and down the country than we have at Headquarters, and we 
do want branches to let us have them. 63 
One problem by 1929 was that, although the Legion maintained a policy of the 
abolition of the time limit, the injustice of its operation had been limited. Crosfield 
was able to boast at the 1928 Conference that: 
Because of that work and the pressure brought to bear by the Legion - and 
the Legion only - the seven years time limit has been considerably 
modified ... As a result of our action, 5,400 widows now get pensions who 
otherwise would have been debarred ... With regard to Final Awards, here 
again, owing to the pressure of the Legion, the Ministry of Pensions have 
looked into the whole question again. 64 
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Legion work in pension committees, rather than the more glamorous and public 
approach, had made some difference to the administration of pensions. Minor 
alterations in procedure did not require fresh legislation but closed the largest 
loopholes which had caused the greatest injustices. After 1924, the seven years time 
limit for widows pensions was ignored and after 1927 disability cases were being 
examined after the time limit which made the Legion search for hard cases more 
difficult. Legion pressure had forced the Ministry to remove some of the discontent, 
making it more difficult for the Legion to mount an effective campaign which would 
gain full public support. However, these minor changes had not made any difference 
to the basic equity of the situation - all cases outside of the seven years limit were 
considered outside of the Great War Pensions warrant. Cases produced after the time 
limit were granted pensions only at the discretion of the Minister and there was no 
statutory procedure or chance of appeal. A Southbourne Delegate at the 1929 
Conference remarked that 'right did not depend on cases, although cases could be put 
forward ... The fact that certain men had got justice should not be used as a weapon 
against others who had not'.65 The Legion membership was determined to continue 
to press for the complete abolition of the time limit, so that all ex-service men might 
have consideration under the Great War Pensions warrant. It was unfortunate that 
minor Legion successes in altering the operation of the Pensions Ministry had 
diminished the chances of the total removal of the seven years time limit. 
However, the Legion scented an opportunity for change when the second 
minority Labour administration gained office in 1929. The Labour Minister of 
Pensions, F.O. Roberts, had introduced a Private Members Bill for the abolition of 
the seven years time limit in 1923, and had briefly held office at the Ministry of 
Pensions in 1924. Further, he had made election pledges during the 1929 campaign 
that 'The limit of seven years which has meant so much injustice to ex-service men 
65 AC 1929, Res. No. 137. 
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will be removed so that cases may still be considered'.66 The Legion assumed that 
this was an undertaking to abolish the time limit and accordingly lost little time in 
pressing Roberts to fulfill the election pledge. A large deputation was sent to meet 
with Roberts on 27 June 1929. The Legion report on the deputation in the August 
issue of the Journal was optimistic: 
Experience has taught that it is impossible to count on anything as a result 
of a deputation, for very often a favourable reception has led to nothing 
more tangible; nevertheless, one came away from the Ministry with a 
feeling that there had been throughout the whole discussion a most 
favourable atmosphere; that the Minister was not unmindful of the 
opinions he had expressed in the past (when a private Member) on the 
subjects raised and that one might look for an early introduction of some 
of those reforms for which the Legion had been working during the past 
few years.67 
In fact, this deputation, just like most of the others, achieved very little directly. The 
Minister took a very long time to reply to the deputation, and when he did, the 
answer was unfavourable. His reply to a question in the House of Commons, in 
December 1929, suggested that there would be a new procedure for all cases. No 
case would be rejected solely due to the time limit, but there was to be no 
independent appeal after the seven years limit because the award of a special sanction 
pension still lay at the sole discretion of the Minister and his advisers.68 This reply 
produced consternation amongst Legion members. In the Special Circular sent out 
concerning the Minister's decision, the Legion leadership came to this conclusion: 
The Legion is still faced with the fact that Section 5 of the 1921 War 
Pensions Act, imposing as it does a time limit of seven years from date of 
discharge, within which first claims for pension can be submitted has not 
been abolished .... in the scheme announced by the Government, the 
Ministry will have the last word on questions of entitlement and 
assessment, and the claimants will have no statutory right of appeal to an 
independent body.69 
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Given the fact that the Independent Appeals Tribunal had reversed thousands of 
Ministry decisions, and that the Ministry had acted harshly in numerous cases, it was 
not surprising that the Legion was disappointed. This sense of disappointment, 
combined with the fact that Roberts and the Labour Government had promised the 
'removal of the time limit so that all cases can be considered', maintained Legion 
resolve to press the case. The N.E.C. instructed Branches to: 
arrange for a Deputation to their local Member of Parliament in order to 
discuss the matter. The Member should be asked definitely whether he or 
she will support in the House of Commons a demand for the deletion of 
Section 5 from the 1921 War Pensions Act. 7o 
This was simply the employment of methods which had been used before but, unlike 
the earlier questionnaires, this was the first attempt to co-ordinate a national 
campaign through consistent local pressure on M.P.s at constituency level. Unlike the 
previous Conservative administration, the Labour Government did not have a large 
majority in the House of Commons which could be used to shrug off any serious 
Legion complaints. If the Legion could mount a well-organised campaign in the 
constituencies, it could threaten the hold of the Government on power and this was a 
scenario which was bound to frighten a minority administration. Roberts had decided 
to issue a leaflet from Party Headquarters to all its M.P.s warning them of the 
Legion's proposed action but he was advised by C.F. Adair Hore, his principal 
Assistant Secretary, that: 
This action on the part of the Legion is a definite intervention in political 
matters, although their Charter expressly excludes political action on their 
part .. .It is intolerable that direct political action should be taken by a body 
which is under Royal Patronage. 71 
Thus, the Legion's organisation at branch level which put pressure on individual 
M.P.s was seen as a breach of constitutional practice. The Prince of Wales, the 
Legion's Royal Patron could not be associated with an organisation making a direct 
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attack on the policy of His Majesty's Government. Adair Hore pointed out that the 
issue had occurred previously over the Legion's Resolution No. 125 in 1926. The 
Government, through its Civil Servants, used the precedent of a different incident to 
silence the Legion. Adair Hore went on: 
What has happened at the present time is clear. Lord Jellicoe has been ill 
for some time, and no doubt has been unable to attend to Legion business. 
Colonel Crosfield, th~ General Secretary, has chosen the moment to 
embark on this political campaign without the knowledge of his chief. 72 
This reveals a large gap in understanding between the Ministry officials and the 
Legion. Not only did Adair Hore mistake the role of Colonel Crosfield as General 
Secretary, rather than Chairman, but he was ignorant of the purely figurehead 
position of Jellicoe. It was ludicrous to paint Crosfield as a political radical who had 
been held in check by Jellicoe. Crosfield was acting on the wishes, and after full 
discussion, with the National Executive Council. This campaign was not the 
brainchild of anyone man, but a reflection of genuine feeling across the country, as 
the Legion picked it up at Area, County and Branch level. Finally, Adair Hore was 
adamant: 
In my judgement, this canvassing of Members with a view to obtaining 
pledges which can be used against them subsequently by a body which 
enjoys Royal Patronage should be stopped without delay.73 
For the Labour Government, any such canvass could have serious implications for its 
position in Parliament; for the Ministry of Pensions, a successful Legion campaign 
could upset the post-war pensions warrant which had been in place for a number of 
years. For Whitehall and the Government, this seemingly political action by a body 
with Royal Patronage was simply quite unacceptable. It was this last point which 
gave the Ministry, and the Government a real lever on the Legion's actions. 
Thus, when Jellicoe and Crosfield were called on to see the Minister for a 
'frank conversation' which 'seemed the best method of dealing with the matter', 74 
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Roberts was actually accusing the Legion leaders of unconstitutional action, and 
threatening them with the removal of the Legion's Royal Patronage. Both Jellicoe 
and Crosfield denied that there had been any breach of Constitutional practice, and 
further, argued that without some action on the seven years time limit or some other 
concession, the Legion might break up. Jellicoe argued: 
There was, in fact, the strongest possible protest against the attitude of the 
Government, and unless the Legion could announce that strong action was 
being taken their extremists would break away and join the Labour League 
of Ex-service men. If this should happen the Government might 
experience considerably more trouble than they were experiencing now.75 
The Labour League of Ex-service men was a communist party attempt to form a 
radical ex-service movement, but its challenge was limited, and its impact local and 
short-lived. 76 It was very revealing that the Legion leaders should use this kind of 
threat as a reason for Government action. Firstly, it demonstrates that Legion leaders 
actually believed that there were political extremists present in the Legion which they 
felt they had to control. In fact, Legion branches were simply venting their justifiable 
grievances over pensions and it is highly unlikely that any political extremists would 
have joined the Legion in the first place. In effect, the Legion threat was an 
admission of weakness because the Legion leaders themselves would 'experience 
considerably more trouble than they were experiencing now' before the Government 
ever did. Further, if the Government could withstand Legion pressure, it was not 
likely to bow before a radical group like the Labour League of Ex-service men which 
had no direct establishment links. Instead of threatening Roberts with a strong and 
effective Legion campaign, the Legion leaders were pleading with him to act on their 
behalf Roberts, on the other hand, had no qualms about threatening the Legion. He 
said 'that at the moment he could not see how the matter would ultimately be 
divorced from Party politics'.77 He pressed the constitutional point and although he: 
74 Draft ofthe Meeting between the Minister of Pensions and Lord Jellicoe and Colonel Crosfield, 22 January 1930, PIN15/3631. 
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made it clear that he did not, and could not, object to the criticism by the 
British Legion of the policy which the Government had decided to pursue, 
but as a Minister of the Crown he could not overlook the potentiality that 
the present campaign might develop into action which would affect the 
conditions of their Royal Patronage.78 
His seemingly conciliatory language did not disguise the barb contained within; if the 
Legion continued with a fully blown attack on the seven years time limit, Roberts and 
the Labour Government would remove the Legion's Royal Patronage. This was the 
true weak spot of the Legion leadership. Although Iellicoe and Crosfield made a 
spirited defence of their campaign and the reasons which made it necessary, when 
Patronage was mentioned they both: 
reiterated the desire of the British Legion to take no action which could be 
possibly interpreted as an embarrassment to their Patron. Colonel 
Crosfield ... suggested that the situation could be eased and the circular 
"called off' if the Minister would make certain concessions. 79 
This meeting, more than any other, reveals the Legion leaders as political innocents 
who were completely out of their depth when faced by a competent and manipulative 
politician. Crosfield made no attempt to call Robert's bluff or make a counter-threat 
to force a concession from the Minister. Instead, Crosfield and Iellicoe capitulated in 
the face of Robert's threats. For the establishment leaders of the Legion, the loss of 
Royal Patronage was unthinkable. The loss of prestige and the embarrassment which 
such an action would cause would have been a serious blow to the Legion, but one 
from which it would eventually have recovered. What the Legion leaders failed to 
appreciate was that the removal of the Legion's Royal Patronage would have 
produced a great deal of unwanted controversy for the Labour Government as well. 
Robert's threat was probably an empty one, but the Legion leaders took it seriously. 
Faced with a determined (or desperate Government) the Legion leaders lacked the 
conviction or the political sophistication to press their point. 
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When the campaign did go ahead in 1929-30, it was not pressed with 
sufficient vigour for any significant results. The canvassing of M.P.s was 
disappointing with 77 favourable, 66 unfavourable and 43 non-committal replies. 80 
The Members with favourable replies were invited to a meeting of the House of 
Commons Branch of the Legion. This meeting set up a committee which decided to 
ask for an extension of the time limit to 17 years, rather than ask for an abolition of 
the time limit. This was not, and never had been, part of Legion policy. When 
writing a report of the meeting Roberts mentioned that he 'formed the impression that 
when the deputation saw me that they were themselves not too sanguine of 
success'.81 In 1931, Major Cohen introduced a Bill to remove the time limit which 
was not afforded a second reading. In 1932, Mr Smedley Crooke's attempt to 
introduce a similar Bill was ruled as out of order. 
Once the Government had established this weak spot in the Legion's armour, 
it had no hesitation in using the constitutional position of the Prince of Wales as a 
powerful lever with the Legion. Although the Legion leadership was aware of the 
problem they failed to inform the membership and, not surprisingly, this caused a 
great deal of misunderstanding within the movement. As far as the Legion leadership 
was concerned after 1929, the issue of the seven years time limit was always going to 
be more trouble than it was worth because any sustained campaign by the Legion 
would bring a sharp rebuke from the Government. However, the periodic re-
appearance of rank-and-file grievance over the issue was a reflection of the lack of 
real communication between different levels in the Legion organisation. 
Although by 1930 claims for pensions were a fraction of the flood just after 
the war, and the time limit was never the sole reason for the rejection of a claim, it 
appeared to ordinary Legion members that very little had changed. Men who applied 
after the time limit still had their cases examined by the Ministry which either 
80 BU June 1930, p "A' 
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accepted or rejected the claim without any explanation or chance of appeal. 
Unsurprisingly, for ordinary Legion members and Local War Pensions Committee the 
effect appeared to be the same - injustice and closed administration which could not 
be influenced by ordinary evidence or experience. 
This was very frustrating for Legion members working on Local War Pension 
Committees or Branch Pension Committees, and the situation caused a breach 
between the leadership and membership in 1933-34. Before the 1933 Annual 
Conference, Admiral Sir Henry Bruce, the Chairman of the Metropolitan Area, wrote 
to General Sir Ian Hamilton explaining that 'most of this bother could have been 
avoided. But nothing could have prevented a strong disunion on Pension matters at 
the forthcoming national Conference so many are wound Up'.82 He felt the problem 
had begun at a dinner given by the Metropolitan Area for the Minister of Pensions on 
12 December 1932 when: 
General Sir Frederick Maurice made an unfortunate speech that must have 
given the Minister an entirely erroneous conception as to the feelings of 
the branches on pensions work. He must have led him to think that all was 
very well and that nowadays there was little doing re Pensions work, in 
fact more routine work than heretofore and further that the Legion had 
more to do in turning its attention to benevolent work. So much did this 
stagger one of my Council that he unwittingly began to whistle. 83 
Maurice had not reflected the concerns of the branches to the Minister of Pensions 
because he was being conciliatory to the previous speech at the dinner which had 
been given by Tryon himself. Tryon had suggested that the British Pensions system 
was sounder and the pensioner more secure than in any other Country. He remarked 
in his speech that: 
I believe that the war pensioner is in a safer position and that the pension 
system is sounder here than in any other country ... At the present time 
there is hardly a country outside Great Britain in which there is not a 
demand for the reduction of war pensions ... In this country there is no 
suggestion of a reduction of war pensions, and this fact, in face of the 
82 P~-op h Hamilton, 1 June 1933, IH29/18. 
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severe financial crisis which we have suffered, is the best evidence that the 
pension system is sound.84 
Tryon's speech gave all the credit for the stability and fairness of the system to the 
Ministry of Pensions and to himself It was true that most other countries had had to 
reduce their pension rates; Franklin Roosevelt had just reduced veterans' pensions in 
the United States, and most European countries had reduced their more generous 
rates. But this did not prove that the British pensions system was equitable and 
simply demonstrated that Britain had been more parsimonious in the past. Tryon also 
pushed the role of the Legion to the sidelines; he suggested the major reasons for the 
stability of the British pensions system was the scheme itself, the agreement of all 
political parties, and the fact that the Legion had never 'pressed demands without 
forethought of their consequences'.85 However, the complacent position of the 
Minister, backed up by the Legion President, did not match the mood of the Legion 
branches, nor that of the Editor of the Legion Journal. In January 1933, Tryon's 
speech was published in the Legion Journal, but in February, the Editorial warned 
that next month the 'story of the Legion's long-drawn struggle with the Ministry of 
Pensions' would be told: 'The roseate survey of War Pensions by Major Tryon, the 
Minister, reflects no credit on the Ministry itself It is at best a record of rights 
wrung, only after the bitterest struggles, from an unwilling hand'.86 
Tryon had been trying to reflect credit on himself and his Ministry, but this 
conflicted with the Legion creed that concessions and improvements in pensions 
procedure had only been achieved through Legion efforts. The Editor, C.E. Carroll, 
was strident in tone but his statements were essentially similar to many articles 
written by the Legion's pensions expert A.G. Webb, in the earlier days of 1922-25. 
Carroll wanted to build up the Legion Journal by popularising its subject matter; one 
of his methods was a moral attack and crusade against the Ministry of Pensions. This 
was a large and easy target since many ex-service men did not feel that the Ministry 
84 BU 1933, p.243. 
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had done its best for them. In the April 1933 issue of the Journal, Carroll mounted a 
serious attack on the Ministry of Pensions. The title of the article was 'The Ministry 
of Pensions - Has it fulfilled its trust?' The answer was an unequivocal "No": 
We know of war-shattered wrecks driven to desperation by the red-tape of 
the Ministry of Pensions. We know of long, disheartening fights waged by 
men in whose cause we believe. We know of the pain, the destitution, the 
sordid sickening horror of these things. And, with that knowledge, we 
have no hesitation in affirming, and we believe that the whole ex-service 
community of this country is of one mind with us in this, that the Ministry 
of Pensions had failed signally to fulfill its truSt. 87 
These were indeed strong words which struck a chord with many ordinary ex-service 
men, as shown by the large numbers of letters supporting the articles and editor in 
subsequent months. However, a general attack on the Pensions Ministry and the 
basis of the British Pensions settlement was bound to provoke a reaction from Tryon, 
who had always been concerned to maintain a good image. He summoned the 
Legion leaders to the Ministry on 25 April - and called them to account. General Sir 
Frederick Maurice explained to General Sir Ian Hamilton: 
I was ... informed that if these attacks were continued in the same form 
and in the same manner the question of the Constitutional position of the 
Prince of Wales would be raised, and if that was done the Prince would be 
compelled to sever his connection with the Legion. I rang up 
Headquarters and found that an article on the same lines as that in the 
April number was in print for the May number and I thereupon ordered it 
to be cancelled and reported what I had done to the National Chairman.88 
Once again, Tryon had utilised the question of Royal Patronage to silence 
troublesome attacks on his Ministry. He also forced the Legion leaders to recant the 
opinions contained in the articles at the Women's Section Annual Conference on the 
17 to 18 May 1933. Tryon foreshadowed this in Parliament on 3 May when he made 
a short speech claiming that the article was untrue and that 'the Legion leaders know 
87 BU April 1933, p.338. 
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it is untruel.89 No further articles of this nature were allowed to be published, and the 
Legion editor was placed under closer scrutiny by the Legion1s Journal Committee. 
This episode demonstrates the true nature of the relationship between the 
Legion, the Pensions Ministry and the Government. In 1925-26, the Government 
was genuinely concerned that the Legion might engage in party politics and political 
manoeuvring. In 1929, the Ministry of Pensions was concerned that a Legion 
canvassing campaign might be effective enough to force a reversal of Government 
policy, which might have had serious repercussions on the position of the minority 
Labour Government. In 1933, the Minister of Pensions was angered by a bout of 
adverse publicity in the Legion Journal. The reasons for Government threats over the 
Royal Patronage of the Legion became less important on each occasion, yet just as 
effective in dealing with the Legion leadership. By 1933, it was clear that the Legion 
had been effectively neutralised by Government pressure, to the extent that the 
Legion was not even able to criticise Government policy. 
Part of the explanation for this neutralisation lies in the changing leadership of 
the Legion during these years. The prestige and experience of the early leadership of 
Earl Haig and T.F. Lister may well have made the Government more disposed to 
listen to the Legion. It was also due to the novelty of the situation: the government 
was unused to dealing with mass pressure groups formed of voters. By 1933, the 
Legion and the Ministry of Pensions were very well acquainted with each other, and 
while the Legion could not make much headway with its policies, the Ministry had 
learnt how to control the Legion. Just as importantly, leaders like General Sir 
Frederick Maurice and Major Fetherston-Godley held very different opinions to those 
expressed by the early leaders of the Legion. 
Initially the Legion and its leaders did have a determination to make its 
policies Igripl. Although they eventually found no means of achieving their goals, 
89 Hal lfd,3 May 19J3. 
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they did maintain their resolve even after many disappointments. This early attitude 
was characterised by Thomas Lister at the 1924 Annual Conference: 
He understood there was a growing apprehension among members of 
Parliament about questionnaires and that a movement to form a Trade 
Union of Members of Parliament to abolish altogether these questionnaires 
would receive the hearty support of the House of Commons. They were 
not going to subscribe to that particular Trade Union but they were going 
to subscribe to a Trade Union to see to it that M.P.s kept their written 
promises.90 
This was a naive attitude, but it involved a determination to affect the political 
process. By 1933, the attitude of Legion leaders was entirely different. Maurice 
made an astonishing speech at the Bedfordshire County Rally at Ampthill Park in 
September 1934. Although Tryon had forced a climb-down on the part of the Legion 
in 1933, there was still a great deal of rank-and-file grievance over Legion pensions 
policy. Maurice addressed himself to the problem: 
I want to tell you this: that behind those attacks ... are the same people who 
desire to turn the Legion into a body of agitators to put pressure on the 
Government for our particular and special advantage as ex-Service men ... 
You have had your County Colour presented to you to-day, and you have 
heard again that which you well knew before, that it stands for loyalty to 
our King and our Country and to the communities in which we live. We 
intend to stick to that, and if anybody asks our policy this is our answer: 
We are not going to become at any body's instigation a body of agitators 
to set out to rob the public treasury for our own advantage. 91 
This was the gut reaction of a soldier who did not wish to be involved with politics. 
Yet the whole point behind the Legion's Rule 1 (D) was that the Legion should put 
pressure on the government to cater for the needs and problems of ex-service men. 
Legion leaders had constantly stressed the special claims of ex-service men for 
Government assistance and maintenance and the entire raison d'etre for a political 
pressure group is to exert influence on the political process for the group's benefit. 
Maurice did not understand the importance of politics and by falling back on the 
90 AC 1924, T.F. Lister, Chainnan's Speech. 
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concepts ofloyalty and duty he turned the whole of the Legion's policy and principles 
on its head. 
The consequences of Maurice's attitude are clearly demonstrated in the 
Legion's campaign over prematurely aged ex-service men which began in 1936 and 
culminated in 1938. This campaign arose because thousands of men had slipped 
through the inadequate pensions net. The Legion had long recognised the problem of 
ex-service men who, although they could not prove that their disability or infirmity 
was caused by or attributable to war service, were prematurely aged and unfit for 
work. Their position was made worse because these men could not receive 
unemployment assistance as they could not declare themselves fit for work. The only 
other recourse was to the Public Assistance Committee - the last vestige of the poor 
law. The Prince of Wales Pension Fund had been set up to grant pensions of lOs a 
week to ex-service men and women in this predicament. By 1936, it was clear that 
further action would be necessary to deal with the problem. The issue was first 
raised by the Chairman, Major Fetherston-Godley, in a Journal article in May 1936. 
Other countries, such as France, Canada, New Zealand and Australia did have 
pensions specifically for men in this situation which led Fetherston-Godley to remark: 
'A great country like our own, which is admittedly beginning to solve its economic 
difficulties, should not have to learn from her colonies and dominions how to treat 
men disabled in fighting her battIes'.92 Three solutions appeared possible to 
Fetherston-Godley: the introduction of a separate State Pension scheme for such 
cases, an amendment of the Contributory Pensions Act enabling prematurely aged ex-
service men to receive a pension of lOs a week before the age of 65, or a 
Government grant to the Prince of Wales Pension Fund. At the 1936 Annual 
Conference, five resolutions covering these alternatives were withdrawn when 
Fetherston-Godley suggested that a Legion special committee should be set up to 
inquire into the matter. 
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The special committee laboured over the issue and it was not until late 1937 
that its findings were published. The committee was convinced that there were a 
number of men prematurely aged due to their war service, although it was not 
possible to give clear medical evidence that the infirmity was caused by the war 
service. However, the Committee estimated that there were at least 95,000 ex-
service men in need who were unable to work through ill-health or incapacity. 
Ultimately, the real problem was that such men had to apply to the Public Assistance 
Committees: 
There is undoubtedly a very strong feeling among the ex-service 
community ... that men who served their country in its hour of need should 
not in their own hour of need have to seek help from Public Assistance 
Committees.93 
Legion arguments which were used to support this campaign were essentially 
different to those of earlier endeavours. While Legion agitation over the time limits 
and final awards had been based on principle - that all ex-service men should have the 
benefit of the same rights when applying for pension regardless of when the claim 
was submitted - the campaign over prematurely aged ex-service men was grounded 
on much older conceptions of ex-service men and their role. This attitude was 
revealed by Maurice when he spoke at a Legion rally in August 1938. His view 
articulated the attitudes at the root of the Legion claims on war worn ex-service men: 
What I believe to be our aim is that we shall see to it that the man who has 
done good service ... and who is broken in health and incapable of earning 
a livelihood, shall not have to go to the Public Assistance Committee for 
relief 94 
Maurice continued with the example of the Prince of Wales Pension Fund: 'We have 
not experienced any difficulty in deciding what is good war service, nor what degree 
of incapacity, nor what degree of need entitles a man to a Prince of Wales Pension'.95 
Maurice's arguments did not rest on principle, or on statistical fact, but on the much 
93 Report of Special Conunittee established to examine the problem of prematurely aged ex-service men, GSCLB, June 1938, 
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older idea of the campaign pension, which was occasionally granted to small numbers 
of veterans in need who had a good service record. This was an entirely different 
approach from that of the Dominions or France, who granted pensions to 
prematurely aged ex-service men on the basis of right because all ex-service men in 
this predicament deserved such treatment. The Legion's was a less compelling 
argument, and less likely to succeed. When a Legion deputation saw the Premier, 
Neville Chamberlain, it was arguments such as these which were used to advance the 
Legion's case. Not surprisingly, the Prime Minister, under the advice of the 
Government Actuary, did not accede to the demand for a government mqUlry. 
Chamberlain was assured that no concrete evidence could be found to support 
Legion claim's that there was a large proportion of ex-service men suffering from the 
effects of their war service. This effectively ended the progress of this Legion policy 
which was soon submerged in the events leading up to the Second World War. 
Differences in the personality and experience of the Legion leadership made a large 
impact on the nature and success of Legion policy. In common with its relief work, 
Legion attitudes moved away from assisting all ex-service men as a matter of right to 
assisting some ex-service men on the basis of good service and worth. 
The Legion's involvement in the consultation process of the Ministry of 
Pensions ironed out many of the minor flaws in Pension legislation and contributed to 
the smooth working of the British pension system. However, on any major policy, 
such as the seven years time limit which would have required new or altered 
legislation for success, the Legion made little headway. As we have seen, this was 
due to many factors and not simply the 'self-imposed strictures' of the Legion 
leadership. Previous studies have assumed that the Legion was always exerting 
pressure on the Government when often that position was exactly the reverse. When 
misunderstandings developed over Legion motivations, the Government was quick to 
threaten powerful sanctions which neutralised Legion pressure. Although the British 
Government learnt how to cope with the ex-sP"': -~ "-'ovement, it never learned ".-
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trust fully the soldiers who had fought for it. Indeed, British politicians displayed 
great intolerance for legitimate Legion pressure. In 1938 the Minister of Pensions 
complained to the Prime Minister that he would have to reply quickly to a Legion 
letter: 'This is, of course, grossly unreasonable, but the Legion are in many ways an 
unreasonable body and it may perhaps be a good thing to forestall criticism on their 
part, however unjust it may be'.96 Time and again, politicians showed a contempt for 
the democratic process and no regard for the legitimate claims of the Legion. In this 
situation, it is unsurprising that most Legion aims for the reform of British pensions 
policy were unfulfilled. 
At the same time, the Legion leaders never understood the British political 
process. Legion leaders invariably blamed their lack of success on low Legion 
membership. At Swansea in 1922, Haig exhorted that 'We must not be content until 
we can count our actual financial membership not by hundreds of thousands but by 
millions if we are to successfully accomplish the great task in front of US'.97 Haig's 
vision was of a huge ex-service movement which by its size would be able to wield 
considerable power and demand large concessions from Government. But faced with 
politicians who consistently refused Legion demands for an equitable pensions 
system, tactical sophistication and cunning were more important than sheer numbers. 
As soldiers more used to obeying orders from politicians than extracting concessions 
from them, Legion leaders were particularly unsuited to controlling a political 
pressure group. Time after time, Legion leaders displayed a complete ignorance of 
political reality and were unable to press home their demands because they did not 
learn the proper tactics to deal with politicians. Legion leaders cannot be criticised 
for failing to mount 'a wider challenge to the legitimacy of the government in 
power'98 but they can be criticised for political naivete and an inability to negotiate 
effectively with government on issues which were important to thousands of ex-
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service men. Their political naivete had great repercussions and it meant that many 
ex-service men did not receive justice for their service and sacrifice in the Great War. 
Their naivete also had serious implications for Legion contacts with foreign ex-
service men which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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'A MIGHTY INFLUENCE FOR PEACE': 
THE LEGION'S FOREIGN POLICY 
The decision of the National Executive Council on 20 September 1941 that 
'the activities ofF.I.D.A.C. having been suspended on the outbreak of the War, from 
the point of view of the British Legion, F.I.D.A.C. no longer exists'l formed a sad 
epilogue to one of the most unusual yet important elements in Legion policy during 
the inter-war years. The Legion's membership of the 'Federation Inter-Alliee Des 
Anciens Combattants' (F.I.D.A.C.) had been one of the earliest expressions of the 
Legion's desire to support all 'direct efforts for peace' by developing contacts with 
fellow ex-service men 'throughout the Empire and our Allied countries'.2 The 
development of this policy led to Legion contact with ex-service men from different 
nations, both former Allies and former enemies. The main motivation for these 
meetings was the belief that ex-service men had a special role to play in bringing 
understanding and good will between nations. Although Legion leaders were 
determined that there should be no repetition of the Great War, and were convinced 
that ex-service men could act as a mighty influence for peace, the events of 1939 
proved that although their beliefs were sincere, ex-service men were not able to 
prevent war between nations. 
By 1941, most of Britain's former Allies had been conquered by Germany, 
and the Legion's policy on peace lay in ruins. After the Second World War, the 
Legion did not attempt to renew similar contact with ex-service men of other nations 
and instead developed pilgrimages to war cemeteries around the world.3 Contact 
with foreign ex-service men was maintained, but in a different sphere. The inter-war 
period is unique in the history of the British ex-service movement, for it was only 
1 NEe Minutes, 20 September 1941. 
2 See Appendix E. 
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time the Legion attempted to influence relations between Britain and other countries. 
Despite the huge amount of publicity which these efforts attracted during the inter-
war years, the policy has left little trace in historical research. 
This study of the Legion's foreign relations will not provide a narrative history 
of events because the Legion's contacts were too numerous and diverse to allow an 
exhaustive coverage.4 There is a thematic division of the subject because Legion 
interests in foreign policy changed significantly in 1935. From 1921 until 1935 the 
Legion's main activities were based around contact with Allied ex-service men 
through membership ofF.I.D.A.C., while from 1935 until 1939 the Legion, although 
still a member ofF.I.D.A.C., adopted a unilateral policy to develop relations with ex-
enemy ex-service men. This study analyses the more important events of the Legion's 
foreign policy in an attempt to penetrate the surface of the Legion's beliefs and 
rhetoric and thus glimpse the real motivations and attitudes of the small number of 
Legion leaders who developed and executed the Legion's foreign policy. The 
personal and private views of Colonel George Crosfield, Colonel John Brown, Major 
Francis Fetherston-Godley, General Sir Frederick Maurice and General Sir Ian 
Hamilton became translated into the public policy of the British Legion. This was the 
only area of Legion policy where a handful of men were given the scope and free rein 
to decide on all policy matters and thus the influence of these men was exaggerated 
both within the Legion and with foreign ex-service leaders. 
Before we begin to analyse the Legion's foreign relations, we must examine 
the commonly held beliefs which motivated the policy. With the benefit of hindsight, 
the Legion's contact with foreign ex-service men seems a mistaken policy which did 
not have a realistic chance of success. However, an attempt must be made to 
understand the mentality of the Legion leaders, and the British public as a whole after 
the Great War. That conflict had brought millions of ordinary men face to face with 
the realities of modern war, while almost every family had experienced the loss of a 
J "rid chronology of most Legion endeavours is provo .ed in Appendix J. 
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husband, brother, uncle or cousin. The true horrors of war, and the mind-numbing 
shock of endless casualty lists brought an immense reaction against violence and 
conflict during the inter-war years. The Great War had been called the IWar to end 
all Wars l and most people in Britain desperately wanted to believe that war could 
somehow be outlawed. The idea that ex-service men were specially marked out to 
play an important role in maintaining peace surfaced soon after the Armistice. A 
good example of this attitude can be found in C.E. Montague's book, 
'Disenchantment'. He argued that after the terrible experience of 1914 to 1918 war 
must never be allowed to happen again: 
There is only one thing for it: There must still be five or six million ex-
soldiers. They are the most determined peace party that ever existed in 
Britain. Let them clap the only darbies they have - the Covenant of the 
League of Nations - on to the wrists of all future poets, romancers, and 
sages. The future is said to be only the past entered by another door. We 
must beware in good time of those boys and fiery elderly men, piping in 
Thessaly.5 
He saw ex-service men as the most determined peace party in the nation because they 
had experienced war first hand. This was a faint echo of the belief that civilians had 
no idea what the Front had been like; only those who had seen combat knew the 
truth. In these arguments the ex-service man was still seen as set apart from the rest 
of the population with a special mission to assist the cause of peace. Instead of 
laying the blame for the Great War on the diplomats, politicians and Governments, 
the public war fever which had developed so suddenly in 1914 was considered to be 
the true cause of war. The argument ran that if ex-service men could educate public 
opinion, and particularly the next generation, in the horrors of war, then the danger of 
war fever might be avoided in the future. This belief was ably expressed in 1929 by 
Sir Ian Hamilton in a letter to Erich Maria Remarque. Hamilton felt that the British 
Legion: 
5 C.E. Monlat:ue, Disenchantment, >22, p.228. 
'A Mighty Influence for Peace' -- 195 
must strive for some high ideal, the highest being peace: for this, ex-
service men could do with far better grace than professed pacifists: 
especially they could work wonders for the cause of peace by holding out 
the hand of friendship to ex-enemy associations of soldiers. For all the 
people of the world would then say to one another: 'Surely, if these 
soldiers who threw bombs at one another can shake hands, we, who never 
struck or were stricken in our own persons can also afford to be friends'. 6 
Efforts towards peace were seen as the most admirable and highest ideal within the 
Legion credo. Although fighting for pension rights and benevolent work were 
considered important, Legion leaders constantly desired to lift Legion activity beyond 
the mundane considerations of food vouchers and clothing allowances. Their work 
for peace provided a satisfactory higher goal. 
However, a desire for peace did not alter ex-service men's distaste for 
pacifists and conscientious objectors. As Hamilton explained, ex-service men were 
'once-bitten-twice-shy men',7 who, although strongly in favour of peace, were not 
diametrically opposed to war. The Legion programme of 1921 supported 'all direct 
efforts for peace ... while taking care that the Defence of the Empire is adequately 
provided for'. 8 Enthusiasm for peace did not preclude support for Empire defence. 
And although the Legion cultivated a dislike for future conflict, this did not diminish 
its pride in the exploits of the British Army during the Great War. Unlike other peace 
groups in Britain and many French veterans' associations, the Legion still maintained 
great enthusiasm for the military trappings of standards, parades, medals and other 
martial paraphernalia. Conscientious objectors were not allowed to join the Legion 
even if they had served during the war and decided subsequently to renounce 
violence. In 1932, at the newly formed branch of Stotfold in Bedfordshire, the Rev. 
W. Smith was informed (after the matter had been taken up with the Legion's legal 
advisors) that although he had served on the Western Front, since he had become a 
conscientious objector he was no longer eligible for Legion membership.9 Legion 
6 General Sir Ian Hamilton to Erich Maria Remarque, Penguin Book of First World War Prose, p.609. 
7 Radio Times, 3 June 1927, Article by General Sir Ian Hamilton, IH2917. 
8 See Appendix E. 
9 The Times, Briti~ Legion and an Ex-Service Pacifist, 10 September 1932. 
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opinion on this matter was no doubt based on the resentment felt by soldiers during 
the war towards objectors who had 'shirked' their duty to fight but the continuance of 
these feelings into peace time contrasted with Legion belief in peace and goodwill. 
The contradictions inherent in the Legion's stance did not worry Legion leaders, 
indeed they argued that the Legion's position was of great benefit to the organisations 
which they supported, in particular the League of Nations. In 1926, Thomas Lister, 
while Chairman of the Legion, argued in a broadcast entitled 'The League and the 
Legion' that: 
Nothing but harm is done to the cause of the League by associating it with 
what are known as pacifists. The members of the Legion cannot be so 
styled. Peace is a noble objective, but it must be founded on honour and 
justice. 10 
Lister's point was that League members must, in the last resort, be willing to fight to 
prevent an aggressive war of conquest. Since pacifists would not sanction a war of 
any sort they could not be relied upon to defend the League of Nations or its 
principles. Lister's equation of Legion members as supporters of a just and 
honourable peace was at the basis of Legion support for the League of Nations. 
Although the Legion was affiliated to the League of Nations Union, many other 
supporters of that organisation saw the Legion as anathema. A good example of the 
friction between the Legion and members of the League of Nations Union was 
described by one correspondent to the Legion Journal in 1933. An ex-sapper 
recounted his experience at the Legion Parade to the Cenotaph on Whit-Sunday: 
I was accosted by a sour-faced person with a League of Nations Union 
badge, who said: 'Aren't you ashamed of yourself, a man of your years, 
swanking up militarism with those medals and trying to corrupt these 
innocent boys and girls to murder one another when they grow up?'. 11 
Just as the Legion saw pacifists as incompatible with the true objects of the League 
of Nations, many other supporters of the League of Nations saw the Legion as a 
10 BU December 1926, p.144. 
• BU February 1924, p.238. 
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militaristic organisation totally unsuited to promote the cause of peace. Thus, the 
Legion's foreign policy was essentially unilateral, stressing the role of ex-service men 
rather than providing a collective strategy incorporating all supporters of peace. 
During the twenties, the Legion set much store by the international 
organisation of ex-service men through its affiliation to F.I.D.A.C. This organisation 
of Allied ex-service men was founded in 1920 by Charles Bertrand, the President of 
the French veterans Union Nationale des Combatants (UN.C.), which the Legion 
joined in 1921. At the 1922 Legion Annual Conference Bertrand made a powerful 
impression describing the necessity for F .I.D. A. C. : 
he came to confirm the common brotherhood sealed by their blood on the 
field of battIe. Amongst comrades they must be loyal and when 
Governments disagreed it was for ex-service men to love one another all 
the better. Their French comrades would never forget the magnificent 
effort made by their British comrades in saving France. They could never 
forget the hours of suffering and glory that they had lived together. They 
could never forget the 700,000 English comrades who slept in French soil 
together with French comrades, and if they, the living, should break 
asunder the dead would rise up and curse them. 12 
Bertrand invoked a multitude of powerful images, symbols and emotions in his 
attempt to link the ex-service men of Britain and France. The most important belief 
was that all who had fought in the Great War had shared in 'The Brotherhood of the 
Trenches'. This concept connected with the Legion mentality on a number of 
different levels. It was one facet of the comradeship and fellowship said to be at the 
root of the Legion itself, and the F.I.D.A.C. version was used to invoke unity across 
the barriers of politics and language. In Bertrand's speech, the brotherhood of British 
and French ex-service men was a spiritual link which had to be maintained no matter 
what disagreements occurred between Governments. Bertrand was a practised 
speaker and his compelling rhetoric lay at the heart ofF.I.D.A.C. This Federation of 
Allied ex-service men was conceived to cement and develop the bonds created on the 
battlefield in an attempt to maintain friendship and understanding between Allied 
12 AC 1922, Speech by Charle~ Bertrand. 
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countries. This, of course, had much political significance, which was not lost on 
Bertrand, a member of the French House of Deputies. The member nations of 
F.I.D.A.C., namely France, Belgium, Britain, the United States, Rumania, 
Yugoslavia, Italy, Portugal and Czechoslovakia were to maintain contact while 
membership ofF.I.D.A.C. was 'closed for all time to any association in the countries 
which bore arms against the allied nations'.13 Thus F.I.D.A.C. ran on a parallel 
course with French foreign policy in the early 1920s, which excluded Germany and 
attempted to construct a new 'cordon sanitaire' with the Little Entente. The Legion 
viewed F.I.D.A.C. as a useful way of comparing notes on practical matters such as 
pensions, disablement and industry, while also forming 'a very strong factor towards 
ensuring peace in the world'. 14 F.lD.A.C.'s main contribution to peace, according to 
the British Legion, was through its efforts to: 
Keep alive your old-time comradeship and by presenting a solid phalanx of 
ex-service men who are no dreamers but stern realists render futile the 
aspirations of war schemers wherever they exist. 15 
This message was directed principally to former enemies like Germany, who were 
believed to harbour the desire for a war of revenge. The image of solidarity was 
utilised mainly as a defence of the Entente, but it was recognised that F.I.D.A.C. 
should also do more to further peace. 
Legion leaders felt that their organisation had a particularly important role to 
play within F.I.D.A.C. because the Legion was the only ex-service organisation in 
both the British Empire Service League, which linked all ex-service organisations in 
the Empire, and F.I.D.A.C. As Colonel Heath explained at the 1926 Summer School 
the Legion: 
forms ... the keystone of an arch which, rIsmg out of and above the 
devastation and destruction of war, is built up of the ex-service 
organisations of the Empire on the one side, and of the Allies on the other, 
and supports above it the great highway of peace, leading on to that more 
~! G.R. Crosfield, F.JDA.C., British Legion Summer School, 1926. 
BLAR, 1922, p.25. 
15 Crosfield,F.JDA.C., Summer School, 1926. 
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glorious future for which men died, to the betterment of the world and the 
prosperity and happiness of mankind. 16 
Such hyperbole illustrates the type of rhetoric constantly deployed by the Legion on 
behalf of its foreign policy. The image of the Legion, as the most important ex-
service organisation in the world, working for peace so that those who died in the 
Great War would not have died in vain was a stirring idea. Although F.I.D.A.C. had 
been conceived as an organisation to develop Allied contacts while resolutely 
shutting out ex-enemy organisations, Legion leaders realised that for any lasting 
peace in Europe, the former enemies had to be accepted back into the fold of civilised 
nations. Earl Haig, although not given to many pronouncements on this subject, did 
argue the point at the 1925 Annual Conference: 
Now, here is a question in which the Legion can exercise an enormous 
power for doing good, if we set to work to convince our Allies that the 
only way to secure the peace of the World is by agreement, by co-
operation and by mutual goodwill. And what a proud boast it will be for 
the British Legion to say that it took a leading part in putting an end for all 
time to war between civilised nations! 17 
It was believed that British ex-service men found it easier to let bygones be bygones, 
mainly because British territory had not been occupied during the war. While British 
civilians had enjoyed relative security, the same was not true for many other Allied 
nations; large areas of France and Belgium had been occupied and devastated, and 
their veterans found it much more difficult to extend the hand of friendship to 
German ex-service men. Thus the Legion saw its role as a peace maker, for not only 
could British ex-service men more readily forgive and forget, but they could persuade 
their Allied comrades to adopt this approach. 
The Annual Congress of F.I.D.A.C. was seen as the best opportunity to 
influence Allied ex-service men in favour of the Legion's views. In November 1926, 
the editorial of the Legion Journal declared that: 
16 E.C. Heath, The Position o/the Legion, Sununer School, 1926. 
17 AC 1926, Earl Haig Presidentid Address. 
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there can be little doubt that the annual meeting of such men representing 
powerful ex-service organisations in the various Allied countries, and the 
very friendly feeling which is engendered between them, is in itself a 
valuable asset to the cause of peace. IS 
Ten delegates from the member nations of France, Belgium, Britain, United States, 
Romania, Yugoslavia, Poland, Portugal, Czechoslovakia and Italy met together to 
decide on resolutions, ranging from high-minded motions concerning peace, to more 
practical matters such as pensions and disablement. The Congresses were lavish 
affairs. On their arrival at the 1923 Brussels Congress, the delegates were received 
by a Military Guard of Honour and during the visit the 'attention, courtesy and 
hospitality ... was immense'.19 There were dinners, receptions and special tours of 
Antwerp, Spa and Ypres, the cost being defrayed from a fund of 60,000 francs 
collected by the newspaper, 'Le Soir'.20 In the sumptuous atmosphere ofF.I.D.A.C. 
Congresses, it was easy to foster friendly relations between the delegates. However, 
F.I.D.A.C. representatives considered their Conferences bonded all Allied ex-service 
men, not just the 80 or so delegates present. Marcel Heraud of the French U.N.C. 
expressed this at the 1927 Annual Conference of the Legion when he said that: 
it is not only my friendship that I bring you, but rather that of six million 
comrades all united in F.I.D.A.C. It means the friendship of the 
Americans, the Belgians, the French, the Italians, the Poles, the 
Roumanians, the Czecho-slovaks and of the Jugo-slavs, all of whom will 
never forget their comradeship in arms with you, and who have authorised 
me to greet you in their name. 21 
This vision glossed over many imperfections in Allied relations both during and after 
the war, and ignored the shortcomings within F.I.D.A.C. itself. During the war, 
British military leaders like Haig had barely concealed their disdain and contempt of 
their French and Italian counterparts, and most ordinary soldiers had fought as part of 
a huge national army with very little knowledge or contact with other Allied soldiers. 
IS BU November 1926, p.12. 
19 Report of the 4th Annual Conference afthe Inter-Allied Federation of Ex-Service Men, 12 September 1923, p.l., found in 
GSCLB, 1923. 
20 ibid. 
21 AC 1927, Speech by Marcel Heraud, President ofUN.C. 
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In practice, Allied comradeship was more a theoretical than a practical link, and 
although F.I.D.A.C. leaders claimed to represent millions of ex-service men they 
could really only speak for themselves. The personal relations between eighty 
F.I.D.A.C. delegates were generally cordial but this could not ensure good relations 
between Allied ex-service men or their respective countries. 
This was clearly demonstrated by the heated discussions at the 1923 
F.I.D.A.C. Congress held in Brussels. Despite the lavish preparations, the 
Conference began in a very tense atmosphere due to the recent French occupation of 
the Ruhr and the determination of the French and Belgian delegates that the question 
of German reparations should be discussed. Colonel Crosfield explained in the 
Legion Journal that the National Executive Council had decided: 
that the place of the Legion in this momentous matter was on the side of 
the British Government, our attitude being to maintain the Entente and get 
out of Germany all that she is able to pay without ruining her, and to have 
the amount settled by the earliest possible moment so as to restore 
international trade. 22 
Legion leaders were, like the British Government, anxious that Germany should pay 
reparations, but not stripped of all her assets by the French occupation. The large 
amount of unemployment in Britain was largely blamed on the dislocation of trade 
which the Ruhr crisis had only exacerbated. This view conflicted sharply with that of 
the Belgian and French delegates who fully supported the actions of their 
Governments in occupying the Ruhr and attempting to gain the full amount of 
reparations from Germany. The discussions at the Congress were accompanied 'by a 
feeling, intense and very real, of, if not actual antagonism, at least a very acute 
suspicion and mistrust'23 and at one point it appeared that no general agreement 
would be reached. Legion delegates dilated 'on the awful problem of our 
unemployed ex-service men and the vital necessity of restoring International trade so 
22 BU October 1923, p.ll!. 
:l3 ibid. 
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far as these men were concerned',24 while the French argued that without the full sum 
of reparations, their public finances would be ruined. Eventually, a compromise 
resolution was passed, which seemed to accommodate both points of view, but did 
not resolve the underlying differences of opinion. Point One stated that the Ruhr 
dispute should not 'under any circumstances, diminish the deep friendship which 
should unite these three countries' and Point three 'protested with indignation against 
any systematic campaign designed to divide Belgium, France and England'.25 
However, the Congress had demonstrated very clearly that ex-service men 
were just as susceptible to propaganda and conflicts of national interests as any other 
section of society. The much vaunted spirit of Allied comradeship only worked in 
times of harmony and evaporated quickly when national interests were threatened. In 
common with the League of Nations, F.I.D.A.C., was dominated by the interests of 
Britain and France. The discussions of the Peace Committee had revolved entirely 
around the question of reparations leaving little or no time for discussion on matters 
which concerned the Eastern European delegates. F.I.D.A.C. attempted to represent 
Allied comradeship but the interests of Britain, France and Belgium dominated its 
debates. 
For all the lavish programmes at F.I.D.A.C. Conferences, and the great 
publicity given to them, the ordinary membership of the Legion were little affected by 
the deliberations of F.I.D.A.C. The British Legion delegates were chosen by the 
National Executive Council, who invariably picked from their own number and a few 
prominent Legionaries. Although Legion members were informed of the progress of 
F.I.D.A.C. through reports in the Legion Journal, there were very few resolutions 
concerning F.I.D.A.C. or foreign relations at the Legion's Annual Conferences, 
mainly due to a lack of information and interest in a subject which had no direct 
bearing on branch activities. The Branches and Area Councils were rarely, if ever, 
24 Report of 4th FIDAC Conference. I? ~'I)t~mber 1923. p.2. 
25 ibid. 
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consulted about decisions concerning F.I.D.A.C. and foreign policy. Colonel 
Crosfield explained the reasons for this at the 1925 Annual Conference: 
The Executive was only too anxious to keep in the closest touch with the 
Area Councils on these matters but the difficulty was often one of 
time ... The difficulty was that decisions had to be taken on inter-allied 
matters and there was often no time to refer questions back to the Area 
Councils.26 
Decisions often did have to be taken quickly on foreign matters, but the Executive 
did not seek a general endorsement of its policy at Conference, and contented itself 
each year with platitudes concerning the importance of peace. This situation left the 
Legion's foreign policy in the hands of only a few men, of whom the most important 
was Colonel Crosfield, who had interested himself in F.I.D.A.C. from its inception. 
In 1925 he became the F.I.D.A.C. President for a year, and afterwards his position as 
the Legion's 'foreign secretary' was unshakeable.27 He travelled all over Europe 
meeting with Heads of State, ex-service leaders and was bestowed with honours and 
attention particularly in Eastern Europe. His attitudes and opinions formed the basis 
of the Legion's foreign policy throughout the 1920s. 
The essentially personal nature of the Legion's foreign policy was confirmed 
by the development of contacts with ex-service men from former enemy countries. 
Major Brunei Cohen first mooted the idea of making contact with ex-enemy ex-
service men after the 1922 F.I.D.A.C. Conference in New Orleans, but it was another 
Legion leader who first gave it widespread publicity.28 General Sir Ian Hamilton 
travelled across Britain early in 1923, giving lectures to British Legion members on 
the theme 'The Friends of England'. Hamilton believed that British adherence to 
French policy and the Entente was destructive, as it involved Britain's compliance in 
events such as the Ruhr occupation. Instead, he argued that Britain should 'come 
right away from the worn-out patched-up old Entente and by organising in its place a 
26 AC 1925, Res. No. 45. 
27 OHBL, p.l?3. 
28 ibid. p.72. 
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real, instead of a sham, League of Nations of Europe'.29 Such views obviously 
influenced him in his belief that British and American ex-service men could: 
if only we realised our power - we two English speaking Legions - we 
could give the League of Nations a lead and impose immediate 
reconciliation on the human race. All we had to do was to hold out a hand 
to the 2 112 million ex-enemy war veterans.30 
These were themes which Hamilton returned to constantly. Like most Legion 
leaders, he overestimated the influence and importance of ex-service organisations. 
The American Legion was involved in F.I.D.A.C., and had not abandoned those links 
with Europe, but this did not mean that the United States Government was going to 
follow its lead and join the League of Nations. Further, the idea of 'holding out the 
hand of camaraderie to the millions of ex-enemy war veterans' was admirable but 
barbed with difficulties given French and Belgian attitudes towards Germany. 
Hamilton's views were given great publicity at the time, and provoked much 
discussion, but his position in the Legion only qualified him to speak as an individual. 
Although he was President of the Metropolitan Area, he was not a member of the 
National Executive Council and held no national post other than Vice-President, 
which was a purely honorary title. Thus he could not speak for the Legion as a 
whole, and indeed could not depend on the support of the Metropolitan Area where 
anger over his statements culminated in a demand for his resignation. The National 
Chairman was right to ignore these demands as there was nothing to prevent 
Hamilton from making his individual views known. 31 The problem was, as the 
Leyton delegate argued at the 1925 Annual Conference, that: 
statements from such a source would be accepted as the opinion of the 
Legion. His Branch considered that before statements of that character 
were made, the whole of the Legion should have the opportunity of 
29 General Sir Ian Hamilton, The Friends afEngland: Lectures ta Members afthe British Legian, Allen and Unwin, London, 
1923, p.75. 
30 OT T hmary 1923, p.161. 
!ember 1932, p.153. 
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studying the question. In other words, there should be no hole and corner 
method of settling the policy of the Legion.32 
His point was that a disclaimer should have been sent to the press, disassociating the 
Legion from Hamilton's views, and that the whole question should be debated by the 
Legion in Conference. Such views did not preclude contact with German ex-service 
men, but simply insisted that the issue must be explored and decided upon by the 
entire Legion. Colonel Crosfield, on behalf of the National Executive Council, 
replied that: 
the Council...had not thought it wise to remain in the dark as to what was 
going on in ex-service men's organisations in ex-enemy countries .. .They 
would, however, pursue their enquiries with a view to the possibility, if the 
results were satisfactory, of co-operating with ex-enemy organisations in 
the cause of peace. 33 
This followed the line which had been adopted by the Council since Cohen's speech in 
1922, but Crosfield simply assumed that this was an acceptable policy without ever 
testing it by a Conference vote. Crosfield's preoccupations, not Hamilton's, became 
the basis of Legion policy but without the benefit of any real discussion among the 
Legion as a whole. 
Many difficulties were encountered by Crosfield in pursuing the goal of 
contact with German and Austrian ex-service men which revealed the huge gap 
between Legion rhetoric and reality. Many attempts were made by Legion 
representatives to change the'!' in F.I.D.A.C. from 'Interalliee' to 'International' and 
to promote meetings between ex-service men on an international basis, but progress 
towards this goal was made only once the international situation had altered. 34 After 
the Locarno honeymoon and the Geneva protocol, relations between France and 
Germany improved sufficiently for ex-service men to begin contact. Thus at the 1926 
F.I.D.A.C. Conference a resolution, moved by the British Legion, was passed urging 
32 AC 1925, Res. No. 45. 
33 ibid. 
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that an international Conference should be held between members ofF.I.D.A.C. and 
ex-enemy organisations which were sincerely working for peace. 
Even then, negotiations did not progress smoothly because the situation had 
been complicated by the formation of the Conference Internationale des Associations 
Mutiles et Anciens Combattants (C.I.A.M.A.C.), an international organisation of ex-
service men from many countries, including the former Allies and enemies. 
F.I.D.A.C. was not impressed by this organisation, as invitations to C.I.A.M.A.C.'s 
founding meeting had been sent to all ex-service organisations within each country, 
and this included many left-wing organisations which offended the mainly right-wing 
members of F.I.D.A.C. Thus the majority of F.I.D.A.C. members refused to take 
part in the international conference organized by C.I.A.M.A.C. on 30 November 
1926 at Geneva for dialogue between the former enemies. 35 
The German and Austrian organisations when invited to a F.I.D.A.C. 
Conference not unnaturally declined, as they had only just returned from the Geneva 
Conference. Finally, after further negotiation with C.I.A.M.A.C., it was in July 1927 
that the F.I.D.A.C. Conference between ex-enemies was held in Luxembourg. There 
was a great deal of excitement and publicity in the Legion Journal about the event 
and one editorial on the Conference was particularly gushing. It portrayed a utopian 
vision of the ex-service meeting: 
And how we should, many of us, like to meet with our opposite number in 
the various battles and other incidents of the war - to talk over the effects 
of a bombardment, the incidents of a raid, the results of a patrol. By 
means such as this might we arrive at peace. For it is not the politicians 
who will bring peace on earth, nor the scientists, nor the professors! It is 
the simple soldiers -those who went through the muck and slime and the 
mud: beastliness of battle: who endured the shelling and the sniping, the 
toll and burden of the War. The hope of the world lies in the getting 
together of the men who fought, and there also, is the road to peace. And 
this is what has been attempted at Luxembourg. 36 
35 ibid, ?120. 
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It is difficult to understand how ex-service leaders could hold such views considering 
the difficulties before the Luxembourg Conference. It is yet more difficult to 
comprehend in the light of the meeting itself 
For the Luxembourg Conference of 27 July 1927 was not simply a social 
gathering of ex-service men from many countries, it was a formal meeting where 
veterans attempted to frame and pass resolutions much in the manner of the League 
of Nations. The purpose of the meeting was to discover 'the best means of 
collaboration in the interests of world peace',37 and in this sense, it was a political 
meeting where much wider issues than 'the results of a patrol' could be discussed. To 
this end, 15 delegates were permitted from each country attending, with one vote per 
nation. All decisions had to be adopted unanimously. The first disappointment 
faced by the Conference was the lack of German representation. Only four German 
organisations, including the Reichsbanner, the Young German Order and two 
Prisoner of War Associations accepted the invitation along with Austrian ex-service 
groupS.38 Thus, the meeting was not representative of German ex-service 
organisations as the Stahl helm and Officer's Association, which were among the most 
powerful ex-service groups in Germany, had refused to attend. Once the Conference 
was under way, the F.I.D.A.C. delegates framed a preliminary resolution stating that 
all ex-service associations were loyal to their own countries, were free from party 
politics, desired to work for the promotion of peace and goodwill, and 'affirmed their 
respect of existing treaties and their intention of executing all international 
agreements concluded since the war'.39 This initial resolution had been passed when 
an Alsatian delegate, who read and spoke both French and German, pointed out that 
the German translation had altered the sense of the resolution by omitting the words 
'respect for existing treaties'.40 Crosfield reported to Earl Haig that: 
37 G.R. Crosfield to S.S. for Foreign Affairs, 3 December 1926, F0371/11858. 
38 BU July 1927, p.17. 
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it was quite clear that they wanted to wriggle out of the Versailles Treaty, 
and although we pointed out that nobody had any objection to that being 
modified by constitutional methods they wriggled for six hours. 41 
This initial resolution took up all of the time allotted for the Conference. After six 
hours of argument and discussion, the German delegates were browbeaten into 
accepting the original resolution but the Conference had signally failed in its purpose 
because there had been no constructive discussion on how ex-service men could 
promote peace and goodwill. Brigadier Spears, a Legion representative at the 
meeting concluded that 'the Conference was a success after all .. .It was extraordinarily 
satisfactory to succeed when failure had appeared inevitable'42 but this could hardly 
have been further from the truth. Ex-service men were not immune to matters of 
national interest, and instead of veterans from all countries being able to discuss the 
war in a friendly manner, the Conference demonstrated the depth of mistrust, 
suspicion and grievance which was still felt between the ex-service men who had 
fought each other. 
A further International Conference, held in 1928, did little to further relations 
between F.I.D.A.C. members and the ex-enemy nations. Although seven German 
organisations were represented, they were all minor associations, and neither the 
Reichsbanner nor the Stahlhelm sent delegates. After this disappointing meeting 
there were no more formal contacts between F.I.D.A.C. and ex-enemy organisations; 
F.I.D.A.C. felt the next Conference should be organised by the Germans and 
Austrians, and not surprisingly they declined to do so. 
Legion and F.I.D.A.C. rhetoric had promised a utopian vision for 
international ex-service contacts but the reality had shown that ex-service men did 
not have a special role to play in the promotion of peace. They were as vulnerable to 
propaganda and prejudice as any other body of civilians, and could not offer any 
realistic alternatives to the work of diplomats and Governments. Nevertheless, 
41 Crosfield to Haig, 13 July 1927, Acc.31551227b. 
42 BLJ Augus' 1927, p.35. 
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Legion leaders continued to utilise the same type of rhetoric even after the 
disappointments of the 1927 and 1928 Conferences. Policy statements produced by 
the Legion still claimed that ex-service co-operation could promote peace. In the 
May 1935 policy statement, published just before greater contact with German and 
Austrian ex-service men was made, it was stated that: 
The British Legion has never lost hope that steps may be taken towards 
bringing all ex-Service men of the world together in some permahent 
organisation. It is the sincere hope of the Legion that it may be possible for 
all ex-Service men, whatever side they fought on during the Great War, to 
meet together on the same basis with the sole object of promoting a better 
understanding and increasing peace and stability in the world. 43 
This was very similar to the type of rhetoric used by the Legion in the 1920s, but 
from 1935 onwards the actions expressed in its name were different to those of the 
1920s. Legion contact with ex-service men from former enemy countries became 
spectacular but suffered from the same problems and limitations as previous attempts. 
And although the basis of Legion rhetoric remained unchanged, Legion attitudes 
underwent important alterations in the early thirties which assisted its leaders in their 
independent approach to German ex-service men in 1935. During the twenties 
Legion leaders had been convinced of the need to maintain Allied ex-service 
fellowship in order to support the Entente and Anglo-French relations. In the early 
thirties the lavish F.I.D.A.C. Conferences came to be seen as expensive luxuries by 
the Legion which was economising in the face of Britain's trade depression. Further, 
it had become clear that the F.I.D.A.C. Conferences accomplished little other than 
volumes of resolutions and hot air. A Foreign Office official at the 1932 Lisbon 
Conference ofF.I.D.A.C. commented that 'The Congress ... aroused little interest' but 
that: 
the presence of the British delegates was useful in preventing ill-advised 
resolutions from reaching maturity. The absence of a British delegation 
would ... have been undesirable. 44 
43 BL Policy Statement 1935. 
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Clearly, Legion leaders had discussed with the Foreign Office their intention to part 
company with F.I.D.A.C., which had become a possibility by 1932. British delegates 
to F.I.D.A.C. Congresses had tired of preventing ill-advised resolutions, while 
nothing of real value was discussed or implemented. 
Although the Legion's interest in F.I.D.A.C. was fading, there were few 
constructive avenues to further its programme for international ex-service co-
operation. The Legion was now willing to make an approach to German and 
Austrian ex-service men independent of F.I.D.A.C., but there were still important 
obstacles to overcome. This was due to the Legion's aversion to controversy and its 
unwillingness to become embroiled in German politics. German ex-service groups 
were violently polarised along political lines which was inimical to the Legion's 
leaders. Colonel John Brown, the Legion Chairman, explained the problem to the 
1932 Conference: 
We cannot interfere with the political views of any country in its home 
affairs .... I have been invited on a number of occasions to attend 
conferences of ex-enemy ex-service men. I should like to go, but I dare not 
go at the moment. If I went to the Steelhelms Conference, who are of the 
right, there would be an outcry from the remainder of Germany that Great 
Britain was supporting the 'Right' political party's views. If I went to the 
Reichbanner Conference there would be an outcry that the British nation 
was supporting the 'Left' views in Germany. That would be a fatal position 
to put the British Legion into.45 
Brown's solution was to urge German ex-service men to 'get closer together'46 or, in 
other words, shed their political differences and join in one unified non-political 
organisation like the British Legion. This misunderstood the nature of German 
politics and ex-service groups. Just as the British Legion supported the State, 
Crown, Community and Nation by its espousal of values which the Legion 
considered had been fought for during the Great War, so German ex-service men 
were ranged around the beliefs and values which they considered the war had been 
4~ AC 1932, Res. No.22, 
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fought over. The Reichsbanner, as a supporter of the Weimar Republic felt it had to 
fight, often literally, to defend the values of democracy, while the Stahlhelm fought 
for the restitution of German dignity and power through the comradeship of the 
Frontkampfer. Political aims such as these were incompatible with the Legion's 
approach and so the only contact with German ex-service men during the last years 
of the Weimar Republic remained 'friendly and personal negotiations' which were 
completely unofficial. When Hitler came to power in 1933, he quickly began to 
neutralise any potential source of opposition or dissent which included the myriad ex-
service organisations. While the Reichsbanner seems to have dissolved with the 
Republic, the Stahlhelm took longer to disappear and great pressure was placed on its 
leaders and members to disband. By 1935, most German ex-service men had either 
dropped out of the ex-service movement or joined national socialist organisations; a 
few traditional groups like the Kyfthauserbund were tolerated once National Socialist 
leaders were in place. All ex-service groups had to be affiliated to the national 
socialist union of ex-service men, which precluded any dissent or protest. Foreign 
Office Officials in 1935 understood the situation when Orme Sargent wrote that: 
The truth, of course, is - as the representatives of the British Legion will 
discover for themselves when they visit Germany - that there exists in 
Germany no non-political non-party organisation of ex-service men 
corresponding to the British Legion. The bodies with which the British 
Legion will have to co-operate are purely Nazi organisations with the 
usual strong political bias.47 
This appraisal of the German ex-service movement was accurate, but Legion leaders 
did not recognise that German ex-service men were still politically motivated. Legion 
leaders made the mistake of assuming that the new regime had purged the German 
ex-service movement of its political significance. It is not surprising that the Legion 
leaders made such blunders. Political activity had always been a notorious blind-spot 
for Legion leaders and it was easier to assume that the Germans had followed their 
example of developing a unified and non-political movement. More importantly, the 
47 O.S. Sargent, 17 June 1935, F0371118882. 
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political nature of German ex-service men was easily glossed over when Legion 
leaders realised that Hitler and other Nazi leaders used a similar language and 
rhetoric. 
Hitler's use of the image of the Frontkampfer was a well established part of 
his rhetoric. At the same time, the images of martial splendour and military efficiency 
were integral to the Nazi party with its mass rallies, parades and uniforms. Many of 
the leaders of the Nazi Party had fought during the Great War; Hitler and Hess had 
served as infantrymen, while Goering had taken over command of Jasta 11 on Baron 
Richthofen's death. Hess, the deputy of the Nazi Party, gave an important speech at 
Konigsberg which resulted in a measure of rapprochement between French and 
German ex-service men in 1934. This speech, which was a typical example of 
national socialist rhetoric, used many devices in an attempt to connect the Nazi 
regime with ex-service men and peace. Hess's speech began by painting the Nazi 
leaders as ordinary men with Frontkampfer qualities: 
Our German nation has the good fortune to be led at the present time ... by 
men who transfer the virtues developed in war to the guidance of the 
State ... who evolve the New Reich from the spirit animating the trenches.48 
The virtues which Hess claimed for the Nazi leaders were comradeship, plain 
speaking and a desire for peace, law and order. Such rhetoric also drew the 
distinction between the New Reich of Nazi Germany, where 'the common destiny' of 
the German people towered above the individualistic and the corrupt Weimar 
Republic. 49 Hess's use of Frontkampfer rhetoric mirrored Legion leaders' statements 
on the same subject. He argued that: 
the front line fighters are beyond all others best adapted and most 
competent to build up the links of mutual understanding and 
rapprochement uniting nation with nation ... We front line fighters do not 
wish that once again an incompetent diplomacy shall cause us to stumble 
48 Rudolf Hess, To the Front Line Fighters of the World War, speech at Konigsberg 1934, published by the Fichte Association, 
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into an abyss of destruction, in which the front line fighters are once more 
the sufferers. 50 
This suggested that the ex-service leaders of Germany were not only sincere and 
genuine in their desire for peace, but were specially suited to guide Germany and the 
world away from lincompetent diplomaci towards understanding and peace. Hess 
also used the Frontkampfer motif for a very different purpose. The image was 
stretched to include fierce patriotism for the New Germany and a warlike 
determination to defend the Fatherland: 
Let them dare to attack us! Let them dare to march into the New 
Germany! Then the world shall become acquainted with the spirit 
animating the new Germany! It would fight as scarcely any nation has ever 
fought for its freedom. s1 
Needless to say, the lenemi which wished to attack new Germany remained 
nameless: a mere rhetorical device used to emphasise the virtues of the new 
Germany. Hess1s speech showed that Frontkampfer rhetoric had strong resonances in 
Germany, and could be turned to many uses - to legitimise the new leaders of 
Germany, instill patriotism and exhort obedience, as well as sending a multitude of 
mixed and confused messages to other nations. 
The German cult of the Frontkampfer and its particular significance to Hitler 
and his colleagues helps to explain why they endeavoured to develop good relations 
with British ex-service men. Not only did this give a great deal of good publicity in 
Germany by demonstrating that the German ex-service man was respected by his 
former opponents but because the ex-service movement was very important to the 
German Government, it was assumed that the British Legion was more representative 
of the British Government than was the case. Equally, it helps to explain why Legion 
leaders, and in particular Fetherston-Godley became enthusiastic about contacts with 
German ex-service men. Here were leaders of a former enemy nation, who seemed to 
50 ibid. 
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speak the same language and displayed the same opinions and attitudes as 
themselves. 
Major Francis Fetherston-Godley, the Legion Chairman from June 1934, 
made it clear that he wanted the Legion to develop a higher national profile. He 
believed that: 
It cannot be too widely known that the Legion is not solely a benevolent 
organisation .... Benevolent work, though definitely forming part of the 
Legion's duty, is a routine obligation rather than an objective, and it is the 
desire of the movement and its Council that more attention should be 
directed towards the national aspect of the Legion's activities. 52 
Fetherston-Godley was not the type of man to be satisfied with the more mundane 
accolades which the Legion might acquire in the course of its benevolent work. He 
wanted to give the Legion a much higher profile to increase its 'prestige and dignity' 
and he believed that a highly publicised approach to German ex-service men was the 
best way of achieving that aim. 
Colonel Heath, the General Secretary of the Legion, wrote to the Foreign 
Office in June 1935, informing them of a planned visit by German ex-service men to 
Brighton, and mentioned 'that several attempts had recently been made to get into 
touch with the British Legion, one of them apparently having taken the form of a 
message direct from Herr Hitler'.53 The Foreign Office decided that the Brighton 
visit was unlikely to harbour 'any sinister propaganda purpose', and allowed it to go 
ahead, but warned Heath about the difficulties of 'indulging in this kind of political 
activity with Germany'.54 By June 1935, such warnings came too late. The German 
authorities were alive to the possibilities of using ex-service men as a means to 
improve relations between Germany and Britain, and Hess had already had some 
success with meetings between German and French ex-service associations. 55 
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Ribbentrop's invitation to the British Legion for a delegation of ex-service 
men to visit Germany in July 1935 was quickly accepted by the Legion Chairman and 
President. At the 1935 Annual Conference in June, Maurice skillfully prepared the 
delegates for the news by mentioning that he felt the time had come for the Legion to 
'go further' in developing friendly relations with ex-service men in Germany, Austria 
and Bulgaria. He continued that: 
Such a step does not commit us to the endorsement of the policy of any 
particular country, any more than membership ofF.I.D.A.C. commits us to 
the endorsement of French policy ... the army has recently resumed the pre-
war practice of the exchange of Officers with the German Army. I see no 
reason why we should not follow with these distinguished examples. 56 
Maurice was able to argue that there was some precedent for contact with German 
ex-service men while being careful to distance himself from German domestic and 
foreign policy. Resolution Number 52 was in the spirit of the proposed action, as it 
suggested inviting a 'fraternal delegate ... from ex-enemy countries to the Legion 
Annual Conference'57 and Fetherston-Godley took the opportunity of mentioning the 
proposed delegation and undertaking to invite a German representative to next year's 
Conference. The Swansea delegate who had moved the original resolution was quite 
happy to withdraw the motion and 'leave the matter entirely in your (Fetherston-
Godley's) hands'. 58 The mood of the 1935 Conference was clearly in favour of 
increased contact with German ex-service men, but there was no actual resolution 
passed endorsing the visit to Germany. It was characteristic of Legion foreign policy 
that the whole issue was dependent upon the personal action of the National 
Chairman. 
However, on the last day of the Conference, Fetherston-Godley asked the 
Patron, the Prince of Wales, to make a statement endorsing this new policy of contact 
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with German ex-service men. The Prince agreed, and his short comment on the 
subject gained the approval of the whole Conference: 
There is one point which your President, when I was speaking to him the 
other day, brought up, and which commended itself to me, and that was 
that a deputation might go or a visit be paid by representative members of 
the Legion to Germany at some future time. I feel that there could be no 
more suitable body or organisation to stretch forth the hand of friendship 
to the Germans than we ex-service men, who fought them in the Great 
War and have now forgotten about all that. 59 
This speech was the final endorsement of an unguarded and friendly approach to 
German ex-service men which General Sir Ian Hamilton had been supporting since 
1923. The Prince obviously thought that he was merely backing up what had become 
the (unofficial) policy of the Legion, and giving it a veneer of higher authority and 
respectability, because he began the speech by saying that 'after your three days 
session, I can promise you I am not going to bring up any conundrums or 
controversial matters' - but ironically, he plunged himself into a very difficult 
situation.60 His endorsement of the Legion delegation created a great deal of interest 
in Germany as the Prince received telegrams from Marshal Goering and other 
German leaders congratulating him on his speech. The speech pleased neither the 
British Government, nor his father who delivered a stinging rebuke that the Royal 
Family must not make public announcements on foreign policy.61 Although the 
Foreign Office claimed that his comments were 'spontaneous and impromptu', it is 
not surprising that German leaders gained the impression that the British Legion 
delegation had the full backing of the British Government. Consequently, the 
Legion delegation gained international publicity which transformed the visit from a 
fact-finding and exploratory mission into a full scale propaganda stunt. 
Although the Legion delegation to Germany received by far the most 
coverage, a second party visited the other ex-enemy countries of Austria and 
59 Address by Prince of Wales to the Annual Conference, 11 June 1935, IH29121. 
60 ibid. 
61 OHBL, p.ln. 
'A Mighty Influence for Peace' -- 217 
Hungary, as well as Czechoslovakia. These visits were a marked change in the 
emphasis of Legion policy. For the first time, British ex-service men were going to 
meet their ex-enemies on a formal basis, independent of F.I.D.A.C.. Fetherston-
Godley's statement to the Press before he left for Berlin gave his hopes and intentions 
for the visit. He believed that: 
There is only one thing in common internationally which has borne the test 
of time and human nature and that is the link of the brotherhood of 
arms .. .It is this link that the British Legion intends to use in their attempt 
to set up some genuine basis of friendship between all nations ... The visits 
of the Legion to ex-enemy countries is intended solely to try to consolidate 
the unstable sand and form a foundation for international diplomacy. If by 
such action we can achieve a firm foundation of mutual good will and 
amity for the future we shall have achieved our object.62 
Fetherston-Godley's ambitions for the Legion were clear - in years to come the 
Legion would be seen as the peacemaker, the organisation which had made normal 
relations with Britain's former enemies possible and brought stability to Europe. 
Fetherston-Godley was arguing that the Legion initiative could supplant diplomacy, 
since Government endeavours were unable to deliver the basic necessity of goodwill. 
Although the delegation 'emphasised the fact that we in no sense represented the 
British Nation but were there with a view to establishing friendly contact between ex-
Service men of our respective Nations',63 it was not possible to prevent the Germans 
from drawing the wider conclusion that the Legion delegation did represent the 
British Government. The national nature of the Legion, the speech of the Prince of 
Wales and the fact that the Anglo-German naval agreement had just been signed, was 
bound to give the Germans the impression that the delegation did represent the 
British Government's desire to improve relations. 
The Legion's visit to Germany accumulated a great deal of publicity in every 
European country. The delegation, consisting of Major Fetherston-Godley, Colonel 
Crosfield, Colonel Murray, Captain Hawkes R.N., and Mr Clive, arrived in Germany 
62 BU August 1935, p.49. 
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on 14 July 1935.64 They were met by a number of representatives representing the 
National Socialist War Victim's Association, the Stahlhelm, and the Kyffhauserbund. 
The visit, which lasted for a week, was packed with engagements, functions and 
speeches. In the course of this flying visit, the delegation met Hitler, Hess and 
Goering, laid wreaths on a number of Memorials to British Prisoners of War who had 
died in Germany, and met many of the leaders of German ex-service associations. A 
very full report was given to the Foreign Office after the visit, while a concise 
version, containing only favourable information, was published for Legion 
consumption. The delegation claimed that: 
One of our greatest difficulties was to avoid political propaganda being 
given to us disguised under ex-service matters and undoubtedly this was 
attempted, though we hope, and believe, it was detected by us wherever it 
occurred.65 
In fact, the whole visit was so short and packed with events and meetings that it 
would have been impossible to avoid all such propaganda. A Foreign Office official 
warned before the visit that Nazi propaganda was 'deliberate and carefully thought 
out' and Just as insidious and, in some ways more dangerous than any communist 
propaganda'.66 For although the Legion delegation did detect, and avoid, such 
blatant coups as placing a wreath on the Party Memorial, the entire visit was 
important and valuable political propaganda for the German authorities. 
The deputation had been much impressed by Hitler's Germany, an effect 
which the authorities had been anxious to achieve. Hitler, in his welcome to the 
deputation at the Chancellory, said he hoped that they would get 'a first hand 
personal and un-biased impression of the New Germany',67 by which he meant that 
they should receive and accept the image of Germany which had been prepared for 
them. Their whirlwind tour took them to many notable centres, such as the disabled 
men's settlement at Britz, Dr Gebhardt's training establishment for men with 
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amputated limbs, where the men were 'brown as a berry and bursting with rude health 
and muscular activity',68 notwithstanding their amputations. The party also visited 
Dachau, a concentration camp. They left the 'camp with a feeling of depression, 
caused in part by the thought of the full meaning of solitary confinement in a dark 
cell, but perhaps more by the glimpse into the low types of humanity which an 
inspection of the inmates afforded'.69 Ironically, the prisoners were S.S. Guards in 
disguise.1° However, Crosfield, who wrote this section of the Foreign Office report, 
felt that in considering the conditions it was important to remember that: 
the subversive forces are by no means quiescent, also that those who are 
now in charge of these camps are well aware from bitter personal 
experience of the conditions obtaining in the days before the Party came to 
power.71 
Crosfield's account reveals an uncritical admiration for recent developments in 
Germany, and approval for the strong methods of law and order which he thought 
were being undertaken in Germany. 
Although the Legion delegation may have been anxious to avoid direct 
propaganda, the British Ambassador in Berlin was correct to state that 'The visit 
seems, from the German point of view, to have been a distinct success'.n The 
propaganda effect of the visit was just as important within Germany as on the 
delegation itself. This was the first official visit of British ex-service men to 
Germany, with the blessing of the Prince of Wales, and it was easy for German 
leaders and newspapers to argue that the visit demonstrated the honour the New 
Germany had won abroad, while also proving that the German Frontkampfer were 
respected even by their former enemies. 
The report of Colonel Ashwanden, the Vice-Chairman, and Major Brunei 
Cohen, the Honorary Treasurer, on their visit to Czechoslovakia, Austria and 
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Hungary, reveals much about their attitude to these countries. The visit to 
Czechoslovakia was of a different nature to the other two countries, as the Czech 
Legion had insisted that the Legion delegation visit Prague during the celebrations to 
mark the 20th anniversary of the Czechoslovakian Republic.73 Although there was a 
mass demonstration of 30,000 Czech ex-service men, Ashwanden and Cohen seem 
not to have been impressed. Instead, they remarked that the huge body of veterans 
were: 
all in the uniforms of the various countries with whom they served - or 
rather to whom they deserted - during the War. The vast majority wore 
Russian and Italian uniforms. 74 
Although a cursory comment, the meaning and attitudes contained in this statement 
were very serious. Instead of looking upon the Czech veterans as Allied comrades in 
arms who were members of F.I.D.A.C., Ashwanden and Cohen saw them as 
deserters from the Austro-Hungarian Army. Clearly, Ashwanden and Cohen did not 
have much sympathy with the Czech ex-service men or the Czech Republic. 
Their perception of Hungarian veterans was altogether different as the two 
leaders recorded that 'Hungary was much more vociferous and enthusiastic in their 
welcome'.75 Their entire trip, including 'taxes and odd meals' was paid for by the 
Hungarian War Veterans Union. However, what really impressed the Legion visitors 
was not the generosity of the Hungarians, but their ex-service organisation. They 
commented that the War Veterans Union was 'not a political one, and indeed ... not 
very different from the Legion'.76 They appear to have been glad to find a like-
minded ex-service organisation but they were particularly complimentary about the 
bearing of the Hungarian veterans who always wore: 
uniform and they are exceedingly well drilled and well disciplined in the old 
German way. Saluting, etc., is carried out as punctiliously as in any crack 
73 GSCLB, September 1935, Report of the visit of Col. Ashwanden and Maj. Brunei Cohen to Czechoslovakia, Austria and 
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regiment. It is really an army and could be used as such without much 
training provided arms were available.77 
As ex-officers, Ashwanden and Cohen were likely to be receptive to this type of 
organization, but their favourable response also reveals that they were susceptible, 
like most Legion leaders, to image rather than substance, to propaganda not facts. 
So impressed were the Legion visitors that they accepted the Hungarians' biased 
version of Eastern European politics. In their report Ashwanden and Cohen 
supported the Hungarians' patriotism and desire for a revision of the Treaty of 
Trianon because the Hungarians: 
feel severely the fact that many of their people are living under the rule of 
peoples whom they consider vastly inferior to themselves, especially 
Roumanians and Serbs. They regard the Czechs as traitors and do not 
attempt to conceal their hatred and contempt ofthem.78 
It could well be that the Hungarians influenced Ashwanden and Cohen's view of the 
Czechs and it is ironic that they could describe the War Veterans Union as non-
political when it sponsored views such as these. Just as the German visit had 
demonstrated, Ashwanden and Cohen's visit to Hungary showed that Legion leaders 
were not prepared for such propaganda, but worse, could not recognise when a 
biased version of events was foisted upon them. 
The first visit of German ex-service men to Britain in June 1935, just before 
the Legion delegation left for Germany, gave another clear example of how British 
ex-service men were, often unwittingly, used as a propaganda tool by the German 
authorities. The visit of the German ex-Prisoners of War Association to Brighton was 
the result of a long and cordial correspondence between a German, whose son had 
died as a prisoner of war, and the Brighton Branch secretary,79 A German party 
came over to pay their respects and to thank the Brighton Branch for tending the 
graves. This visit and the small ceremonies attached to it, should have been a simple 
demonstration of gratitude and friendship between former enemies. The Legion 
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believed, as Captain S.T. McCabe of the Sussex Council of the Legion remarked, that 
'daily during their stay the friendship which we and they had anticipated grew 
stronger. They left with genuinely heartfelt appreciation of our welcome and 
entertainment'. 80 Former enemies meeting in friendship and good will was exactly 
what the Legion wanted to achieve in its contacts with German ex-service men and 
the Brighton branch was given an enthusiastic welcome on its return visit to Germany 
in 1936. However, the German propaganda machine produced a version of events 
completely at variance to the purpose of the visit and the report published in the 
Volkischer Beobachter of 22 June displayed the ugly side of the new German regime. 
It was reported that: 
the decision of the Jewish members of the British Legion to absent 
themselves from all meetings at which the Germans were present 
was ... heartily welcomed .. .In England the company of Jews is almost as 
little valued as in Germany ... But this Jewish hate was typically foolish for 
the English had seen that the Jews were not "fair", with the result that still 
greater sympathy had been aroused for the German ex-service men. 81 
It is not known whether this reflected the views of the German ex-service men 
actually on the trip but the association to which they belonged was the official 
National Socialist organisation; they used the Nazi salute in the ceremony at the 
graves of their comrades.82 
Although it is doubtful that Legion leaders ever read the Volkischer 
Beobachter version of the Brighton visit, they did come under increasing criticism 
within Britain over their contact with German ex-service men. The German 
authorities persecution of the Jewish community lead to an interesting controversy 
within the Legion. Major Cohen visited Austria and Hungary in 1935, but as the 
Legion's Treasurer, he had been invited to visit Germany. Cohen later explained that 
the idea of visiting Germany 'stuck in my gizzard and after much thought I decided 
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that it was impossible for me to shake Hitler by the hand'.83 However, as a leading 
member of Britain's Jewish community, he was greatly criticized for his endorsement 
of the Legion's foreign policy. He answered the calls from Jewish newspapers for his 
resignation from the British Legion with a long statement which included the 
following: 
My reason for not doing so is this: the object that I keep before me as 
being the most vital in the world today is that there should be no war 
between nations. Persecution of a minority may bring great troubles in its 
train for that minority, but a universal war would not help it; it would 
merely mean the useless sacrifice of millions of lives. 84 
Although Cohen did express reservations about the relations with German ex-service 
men because he recognised that they were 'so much more representative of their 
Government than we are of ours',85 his justification mirrored the official line of other 
Legion leaders and the National Executive Council. At its root this was the age old 
argument that the end justifies the means. The Jewish community in Britain wished 
the British Legion to break off relations with German ex-service men in protest for 
the persecution of German Jews and other minorities. For Legion leaders, to cease 
contact with German ex-service men was to admit defeat. Defeat meant worsening 
relations between Britain and Germany which would ultimately lead to a terrifying 
and destructive war. Thus, the pursuit of peace through better relations with German 
ex-service men was too important to be shelved, no matter how offensive German 
domestic policies were to the British public. In the 1938 Legion Annual Report it 
was stated that: 
the Legion cannot either approve or condone the practices of brutality and 
use of force that are unfortunately so prevalent in certain quarters of the 
World to-day. The Legion's link is with the ex-service men, and beyond 
that it cannot, and will not gO.86 
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This was simply a translation of the traditional nostrum that the Legion must not 
involve itself in politics. Just as the Legion refused to involve itself in British party 
politics, claiming that its loyalty to the crown and the state took 'precedence over 
every other consideration',87 so the Legion could claim that its involvement with 
German ex-service men did not commit the Legion to an endorsement of German 
domestic policies. This argument was not helpful or realistic because cordial 
relations with German ex-service men did commit the Legion to the support of the 
National Socialist regime, if only because German veterans were representative of 
their Government. Although the Legion leaders might consciously distance 
themselves from the unpleasant side of Germany in their efforts to build better 
relations, the public and the press could not make such a convenient distinction. 
Legion leaders argued that they could not concern themselves with German 
domestic policy but Fetherston-Godley did make an attempt in 1935 to influence the 
German authorities. On 18 August 1935, just a month after the deputation's visit to 
Germany, he wrote a letter to Ribbentrop which stated that while there was still a real 
desire among British ex-service men to foster amicable relations, 'these religious 
matters' were 'giving your antagonists in this country the only handle which they can 
really use to your disadvantage'.88 The tone of the letter was apologist for the 'deep 
rooted feeling of sentimentalism' in the 'psychology ofEngland'89 and was not directly 
critical of German domestic policy. However, he went on to warn that: 
if events in Germany do not very soon become more tranquil as regards 
the Protestants, the Catholics and the Jews, I am certain that the move for 
mutual friendship, which started so auspiciously, is doomed to failure, and 
the Legion will have to make a public statement that it is impossible to 
carry on with the negotiations. 90 
whic,\) 
This was an important threat, 'f'lf carried out, would have ruined all the propaganda 
advantage gained by Germany. At the same time, Fetherston-Godley had made it 
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clear that this threat was not his personal opinion but had been forced upon him by 
Legion members who were becoming aware of the persecution in Germany. 
Significantly, a special emissary was sent by Ribbentrop to discuss any 
suggestions which the Legion might make 'to allay the feelings of resentment in this 
Country',9l (meaning Britain) because 'Herr Hitler and those around him ... would do 
all that they could to prevent any breaking off of the negotiations which have so 
auspiciously started'.92 This shows the importance which Hitler attached to ex-
service relations. The emissary did not come to Britain to discuss any changes in 
German policy, but to find means of allaying British objections and suspicion. The 
Legion leaders, instead of breaking off contact, accepted the offer of the emissary to 
attend the next Party Congress on 16 September when Hitler would 'deal freely with 
the religious question'.93No~ of this answered Legion objections to the persecution of 
German minorities, but simply enmeshed the Legion further in its relations with 
national socialist Germany. Fetherston-Godley later remarked that: 
To signify our disapproval of Germany's domestic policy we could ignore 
Germany, but in that case what could the Legion or anybody else do that 
would be effective. We could threaten (although it is not within our 
province) but Germany would know, as we know, that we could not carry 
out our threats. 94 
In fact, his actions demonstrated that the Legion could not even threaten Germany to 
c~ase the persecution of the Jews. Having begun the relationship with Germany in 
such a fanfare of publicity, it would have been extremely damaging and embarrassing 
for the Legion to break off contact with German ex-service men. Legion leaders had 
been flattered by the attention paid to them by the German authorities, dazzled by the 
display of Nazi pomp and circumstance; to break off relations may not have meant 
war, but it certainly would have resulted in the destruction of the authority and 
prestige of the Legion leaders. Maintaining contact with German ex-service men was 
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much more appealing to them than dropping what had become the flagship of Legion 
policy. 
As such, the foreign policy was extended considerably during the next few 
years. At the 1936 Annual Conference, a resolution was passed endorsing the Legion 
policy on ex-enemy countries, thus finally making the policy collective and not solely 
the property of a few Legion leaders.9s Indicative of this change was the greatly 
increased participation by branches in the Legion's foreign policy. Thatcham and 
Swansea branches entertained German visitors while members of the Heybridge 
Branch visited Frankfurt and toured the Rhine area.96 In June 1936, the Earl of 
Harrowby entertained a large number of foreign ex-service leaders from Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania and the United States to a 'Great War Adversaries House Party' at his 
country House in Staffordshire.97 This cosmopolitan flavour was continued at the 
Annual Conference at Buxton when representatives from six nations addressed the 
delegates. 98 
The Legion's foreign policy gained momentum in 1937 when 1,700 
excursions were made by Legion representatives all over Europe. 99 However, it was 
during 1938 that the Legion's foreign policy reached a dramatic climax, when the 
Legion played a minor part in the negotiations during the Munich crisis. The crisis 
concerning Czechoslovakia developed after German troops annexed Austria in March 
1938. Hitler then turned his attention to Czechoslovakia and its three million 
Sudeten Germans living on the border with Germany. With Austria annexed, 
Czechoslovakia was surrounded by Germany on three sides which left it in a very 
dangerous strategic position. It was this situation which Hitler chose to exploit in his 
demands that the territory occupied by the Sudeten Germans should be transferred to 
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Germany. As might be expected these developments elicited no response or change 
of direction from the Legion which argued that such matters were outside of its 
province or relations with German ex-service men. However, the Legion did become 
involved in the tension leading up to the Munich crisis because in August 1938 a 
Metropolitan Area party of Legionaries, led by General Sir Ian Hamilton, visited 
Germany. 
The correspondence between Hamilton and Fetherston-Godley before the 
departure of the party is particularly revealing in understanding the subsequent 
actions of the Legion leaders. In July, Fetherston-Godley was called in for a 'long 
and disturbing' interview at the Foreign Office. Fetherston-Godley was told that the 
Germans 'intend to partition Czechoslovakia and as the Czechs will fight, it would 
mean universal conflagration'. The Foreign Office instructed Fetherston-Godley to 
ensure that the Metropolitan party did not say anything 'Iikely to encourage the 
Germans in the view that they could do as they liked, as it might have disastrous 
repercussion at the moment l . 100 It is clear that the Foreign Office had given 
Fetherston-Godley such a full briefing because they felt the Metropolitan area visit 
could have a serious influence on the situation. Since German leaders had put so 
much emphasis on ex-service contacts and obviously believed the Legion to be more 
representative of the British Government than was actually the case, it was important 
not to allow the trip to be manipulated by German propaganda, or for any 
encouragement to be given to the German regime. Fetherston-Godley thought that 
Hamilton 'could do so much good if you told them that while we are out for peace, 
, 
we are not yet a decadent nation, and will not stand for aggression at any pricel . 101 In 
his reply to Fetherston-Godley, Hamilton played down the danger and gave no 
indication that he was prepared to take the Foreign Office's advice. 102 Such attitudes 
were not surprising for an officer who had a great regard for Germany, and who had 
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cultivated good relations with many German leaders, but Fetherston-Godley's reply to 
Hamilton was astonishing. 
Although he wrote that the 'F.O. are right this time; Crosfield has just 
returned from Prague and corroborates the danger of the situation', he went on to 
reveal that: 
I agree with you and always have about the Germans. Our Foreign Policy 
always fills me with amazement, and one would think that being 
conspicuous for failure, some change would be made. My own view is 
that I cannot see for the life of me what we have to do with the Czechs at 
all; but I suppose we must back up the powers-that-be unless worse befalls 
US. 103 
This letter is crucial to understanding the Legion's foreign policy after 1935, which 
had been developed and promoted by Fetherston-Godley. In many respects this letter 
explains why Fetherston-Godley had persisted in developing relations with German 
ex-service men, and had been willing to deflect or ignore criticism directed at the 
Legion's foreign policy. Like Hamilton, he believed in developing cordial relations 
with Germany, if necessary at the expense of German minorities or the weaker 
Eastern European countries. He obviously had reservations about the Foreign Office, 
and considered British diplomacy to be a failure. In this context, his development of 
the Legion's foreign policy, with the aim of developing better relations between 
Britain and Germany, which would 'form a foundation for international diplomacy'104 
can be seen not as a support for existing British foreign policy but as an attempt to 
direct it into different channels. His reluctant attitude of support for the official 
policy in a time of crisis .vas dangerous in the tense period before Munich. 
When the Metropolitan Area party actually visited Germany, the German 
authorities pulled out all the stops on their propaganda machine. Although this was 
an informal holiday trip, and not an official Legion delegation, it received more 
103 Fetherston-Godley to Hamilton, 26 July 1938, 1H29124. 
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attention than any previous Legion visit. The leader of the party, Mr Kelley, Vice-
Chairman of the Metropolitan Area, who had served as a private during the war, said: 
The friendliness and generosity we received the whole time we were in 
Germany surpassed all our expectations. Officials, the military, and 
German leaders, laid themselves out to do us every possible honour, 
particularly myself as leader of the party. On many occasions and at 
various ceremonies, I was given privileges and paid honours which are 
usually only accorded to German people of the highest rank. 105 
Customs officers waved the party through barriers, lavish meals were laid on for the 
party at every opportunity, and enthusiastic crowds met the Legionaries wherever 
they went. One of the more important honours was a salute given to the party at 
Godesberg. As the ship containing the Legion party sailed down the Rhine, the 
German flag was hauled down and a 21 gun salute was fired in their honour.106 But 
these compliments were not spontaneous gestures in honour of the British ex-service 
men. Although the Legion Journal claimed that the reception of the party was a 
'demonstration of Germany's respect and regard for Britain's ex-service men'107 the 
real reason was to emit 'sentimental smoke clouds'108 to cover German intentions 
over Czechoslovakia. A clue lay in General Sir Ian Hamilton's message of 
encouragement for Metropolitan Area members to participate in the trip. He said: 
For a statesman, a Diplomat, a Pressman, or indeed any civilian, a sail up 
the Rhine and walk down the Unter den Linden would just be an ordinary 
jaunt; for US it becomes an historic occasion. 109 
By giving ordinary ex-service men the welcome and honours only normally paid to 
statesmen, the German authorities overwhelmed the Metropolitan party, which went 
back to Britain with glowing reports about Germany, its friendliness and desire for 
peace. While a statesman or diplomat might have been unmoved by what were 
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artificial demonstrations, ordinary ex-service men were bound to be affected and 
carry back an artificial impression of Germany and its intentions. 
The presence of General Sir Ian Hamilton gave the visit more prestige but his 
behaviour on the visit did not give the Germans the impression desired by the Foreign 
Office. In Berlin the Legionaries laid wreaths on the memorial for the German war 
dead, a ceremony attended by many prominent German leaders and a strong party of 
the Reichkriegerbund. Hamilton remarked that: 
it was a strange sight. .. to see our little party drawn up facing a really 
magnificent Guard of two companies of Reinhard's ex-service men in 
uniform and with the Guards band on their flank. Our men, many of them 
disabled, looked smaller. After inspecting the German guard I asked 
permission to say a few words when I said I was specially enthused by 
their splendid bearing when I reflected that they had come as friends of 
England. 110 
The image of a small number of British ex-service men, in civilian clothes with empty 
sleeves, ranged against the martial splendour of a large body of uniformed German 
ex-service men is compelling. Hamilton's enthusiasm for the German guard because 
they were 'friends of England' was exactly the message which the German authorities 
wished the German crowd to receive. It was a message of image, not substance, of 
symbolism comparing Britain and Germany. The British ex-service men seemed 
weaker, smaller, not willing or able to defend themselves against the might of 
Germany and only wishing peace. The symbolism would not be lost on the German 
audience as it suggested that Britain was decadent, and willing to keep quiet over 
German aggression in Czechoslovakia. At the end of the tour Hamilton was whisked 
away to Berchtesgarden for a four hour interview with Hitler who clearly thought he 
was dealing with the Legion National President. After staying overnight in the 
mountain hideaway, Hamilton returned to Britain, in Hitler's personal plane, where he 
told reporters that Hitler is strongly for peace. It is up to the rest of Europe to give 
up its pinpricks against Germany'. III The visit of the Metropolitan party and General 
110 Hamilton to Fetherston-Godley. Q & .. ",.<t 1938, 1H29/24. 
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Sir Ian Hamilton to Germany in August 1938 had exactly the opposite effect to that 
desired by the British Foreign Office and may have given the German authorities and 
people a dangerous impression about British intentions during a critical period of 
tension. 
While it would be wrong to assume that this visit had any great influence on 
the wider issues and events of the Czechoslovakian crisis, it is the best example of the 
harm which could be done by Legion contacts with Germany. Legion leaders did not 
have the correct experience or outlook to recognise propaganda and prevent 
manipulation and during the Munich crisis, the British Legion became a willing pawn 
in the diplomatic manoeuvrings between the British and German Governments. 
Legion leaders were aware of the serious international tension concerning 
Czechoslovakia which led to the Munich crisis of September 1938. They were 
informed of most of the diplomatic developments by the Foreign Office, even if, like 
Fetherston-Godley, they were doubtful about the direction of British Foreign policy. 
Thus, the decisions which led to the development of the British Legion Volunteer 
Police Force for Czechoslovakia were not made in a vacuum. The intervention of the 
Legion President, General Sir Frederick Maurice, at the height of the crisis on 26 
September when he flew to Berlin to offer Hitler the services of 10,000 British 
Legion volunteers to supervise the transfer of territory from Czechoslovakia to 
Germany was based on an idea which had taken time to develop. 
The genesis of the Legion Police Force can be traced back to early September 
1938, when Maurice wrote to the Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, pledging the 
Legion's support in any national emergency: 
The present international tension is causing every member of the British 
Legion great anxiety. In these circumstances, in the event of a National 
Emergency arising, which God forbid, the Legion would place the whole 
of its resources, energies and influence unreservedly at the disposal of His 
Majesty's Government, as representing the State, in such way as its 
activities could be most usefully employed. 112 
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The Legion was always anxious to be seen to be supporting the State, and ideas for a 
Legion Defence Force and utilising the Legion as a unit for the purposes of National 
Defence had already been mooted. The letter was indicative of the attitude of the 
Legion President and Chairman; as ex-service men and as officers, they felt the need 
to affirm their loyalty to the state and, in effect, to re-enlist in whatever capacity was 
required. The Prime Minister's reply was also indicative of a state of mind: 
It is my earnest hope that such an emergency will not arise but, if it should, 
I know that the country can rely on the members of the British Legion to 
play their part as they played it in the critical years of 1914 to 1918.113 
Chamberlain was aware, and annoyed by the fact, that the Legion was eager to 
publish the letters, which is probably why he fell back on a stock platitude about ex-
service men and their part in the Great War.1I4 Although he had to appear 
sympathetic, the Prime Minister had no intention of using the British Legion for 
national defence or any other purpose. But although this was just a form of 
acceptable words for Chamberlain it formed a central part of the Legion's belief. 
Legion leaders loved such publicity because they believed that the Legion should be 
given a major role in any national crisis. Sir Frederick's wish for the Legion to play 
an important part in a national emergency became father to the thought of a British 
Legion police force in Czechoslovakia. 
The wider diplomatic situation is too complex to give in any detail here, but it 
is important to trace some of the developments which led to the Legion's involvement 
in the crisis. In August 1938, while the Metropolitan party was in Germany, Lord 
Runciman was despatched by the British Government to Prague with instructions to 
act as an independent mediator between the German and Czechoslovakian 
Governments. liS He recommended, in his report to the Cabinet of 16 September, 
that the Sudeten Germans should be given the right of self-determination in areas 
where they were in the majority. This meant holding a plebiscite with an international 
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force keeping order during the voting and the transfer of territory. On 21 September, 
a memorandum by the British General Staff estimated that up to nine infantry 
brigades or three divisions would be required, but the whole operation would be 
'dependent on the goodwill and co-operation of the German and Czechoslovakian 
Governments'. 116 At best Britain could find one infantry division, and contingents 
would have to be found from other, neutral, countries. 117 
Given this situation, it is not surprising that the Anglo-French proposals of 19 
September dispensed with the idea of a plebiscite and 'suggested' the cession of a 
larger area of territory to Germany - all areas with over fifty per cent German 
inhabitants,l18 The British and French Governments forced these proposals on the 
Czech Government by warning that if they were refused, Czechoslovakia would be 
left to fight alone. Chamberlain took these terms to Hitler at Godesberg (where one 
month before the British Legion party had been so flattered by the 21 gun salute) but 
was shocked to find that Hitler's demands had been raised to all those areas occupied 
primarily by Germans - and all Czechs had to be evacuated by 28 September.119 
Hitler also suggested a plebiscite held by an international commission in certain 
disputed areas. It was after Chamberlain flew back from Germany on the 24 of 
September that the British Legion became involved in the chain of events. 
The version given by Sir Frederick Maurice, to the assembled Police Force on 
8 October 1938, is that Fetherston-Godley was approached by the Foreign Office on 
24 September for 5,000 men 'at very short notice, to be followed by a further 5,000' 
for service as 'neutral observers on the frontier of Czechoslovakia'. This was to 
'prevent collisions' and ensure that 'any plans agreed upon by the respective 
Governments were carried out with a minimum of friction'. 120 It now seems clear 
that the plan was General Sir Frederick Maurice's own, and had been formulated with 
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little or no prompting from the Foreign Office. He approached the Foreign Office on 
the 24 or 25 of September, offering the Government the services of ten or twenty 
thousand Legion members to ensure that the transfer of territory suggested in the 
Anglo-French proposals would be supervised and carried out peacefully. That it was 
Maurice's own idea is mentioned variously by Halifax, Chamberlain and Hitler,121 and 
confirmed by a message from Lord Halifax to Mr Hadow, an official at the Foreign 
Office, at 10.55 am on 25 September: 
The PM is quite willing that Mr Hadow should tell the head of the British 
Legion that the approach, of which Mr Hadow spoke to Lord Halifax this 
morning, might be made at once to Hitler and the PM would welcome it if 
Hitler was also willing to accept it. 122 
This note proves that the idea originated with General Sir Frederick Maurice. He had 
contacted the Foreign Office with the proposal through Mr Hadow who had 
informed Lord Halifax, and eventually the Prime Minister. In a very short space of 
time, both had given their assent to the plan. 
In examining the scheme, it becomes clear that Maurice's original intention 
was to facilitate the smooth operation of the British and French proposals of 19 
September. The Legion plan mentions that: 
these disciplined ex-service men would be distributed throughout the area 
proposed by the British and French Governments .... they will be able above 
all to play an important part in countering untrue propaganda and 
protecting the population during the period preceeding the transfer of the 
above territories. 123 
The importance of the idea, and the reason for its attractiveness to the British 
Government was that the large areas to be transferred from Czechoslovakia to 
Germany would be in the hands of British neutral observers, and not given 
immediately to German troops. More importantly, it would take time to place the 
Legion Police Force in Czechoslovakia, and with the British Government desperately 
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trying to avert war, any delay might give a valuable breathing space for diplomatic 
negotiations. The plan was considered and adopted very quickly, probably in a 
matter of hours during 25 September, and thus the suitability of the Legion for such 
an important endeavour, or the real implications of the plan were given scant 
attention. 
But for Maurice and other Legion leaders, the Legion plan for a Volunteer 
Police Force in Czechoslovakia was the glorious culmination of the Legion's foreign 
policy. The last paragraph of the details handed to Hitler reveals the Legion's 
motivations in the matter: 
As ex-soldiers ourselves, we address ourselves to you, Herr Fuhrer, 
principally as head of the ex-service men of Germany, and request your 
agreement to what would alone enable us to put before the World a 
matchless example of co-operation between the ex-service men of both 
countries in the promotion of peace and important plans based thereon. 124 
Maurice was attempting to draw on the fund of goodwill which he believed had been 
built up by contact with German ex-service men. It is also significant that the plan 
addressed Hitler as an ex-service man, not as a statesman or diplomat. The whole 
idea fitted perfectly into the Legion's rhetoric and belief. Here was a chance for the 
plain speaking, goodwill and comradeship of the ex-service man or Frontkampfer to 
bring about peace and understanding. This example of ex-service men co-operation 
in a practical and important project would be broadcast to the world finally proving 
the worth of ex-service men in their efforts for peace. It would raise the name of the 
British Legion to new heights, while giving a chance for the Legion to play an 
important national role by loyally serving the British Government in its hour of need. 
On the same day that the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary had approved 
the scheme, General Sir Frederick Maurice made arrangements to fly to Berlin that 
night to present the plan to Hitler in person. It was important that the plan was seen 
as a personal initiative by Maurice, and not connected with the British Government, 
124 ibid. 
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so that it did not become entangled in the diplomatic negotiations. On his arrival in 
Berlin at 10.45 pm, Maurice met an Attache on behalf of Herr Ribbentrop who 'told 
him it would be quite impossible for him to see the Fuhrer' the next day.125 Maurice 
replied that if he could not see Hitler he would return to London on the next plane. 
It was only because the plan was presented to the German authorities as solely from 
the British Legion that Maurice was able to see Hitler. 
The next day at the interview, Hitler was in a very difficult mood, as he 
evidently thought that the plan was a 'try-on of the Prime Minister's to cause delay'. 126 
It was only when Maurice reiterated that he: 
had no mission at all from the Prime Minister and was not discussing the 
negotiations in any way. He had come only on behalf of his proposition to 
use German and British Legion men for policing during the plebiscite. 127 
This is the final proof that the plan was Sir Frederick Maurice's, and also that had the 
British Government been involved, or sent the plan through normal diplomatic 
channels it would have been ignored. However, the diplomatic advantage which the 
British Government may have gained through use of the plan was scotched during the 
interview. Hitler insisted that: 
he welcomed the proposals in principle, but was determined that the whole 
of the organs of government in the Sudeten area up to the Green line must 
be in his hands by October 1 st, and said that there would be no time to 
give effect to the Legion plan in the area up to the Green line up to that 
date. 128 
Thus the basic intention of the Legion plan, which was to provide neutral observers 
in the area to be transferred under the Anglo-French proposals was refused by Hitler; 
these areas would be occupied by German troops immediately. Hitler quickly swung 
the balance of advantage round to his side by stating that: 
He cordially welcomed the proposal that the British Legion should provide 
an adequate body of neutral observers in the areas proposed by Plebiscite, 
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whose tasks it would be to ensure that the Plebiscite was carried out fairly 
and without any military pressure from Germany. 129 
Yet it was this element of the plan which must have been quickly sketched in on 25 
September so that the Legion plan accommodated the Godesberg memorandum and 
its proposals for a plebiscite. It was also this element of the plan which the British 
Legion was not capable of carrying out effectively. The British General Staff may 
have over-estimated the number of troops required and the difficulties involved in a 
plebiscite, but it is clear that the British Legion would have been hard stretched to be 
equal to the task. This was the disadvantage of Maurice's personal interview with 
Hitler; he could not negotiate, he could not bargain, all he could do was agree with 
whatever version of the plan Hitler decided to accept. 
Although the plan had been deflected from its original purpose, it was this 
modified scheme which went ahead. Hitler made his acceptance public in a speech at 
the Sports Palace Berlin on 27 September: 
I was prepared to withdraw the troops during the plebiscite and have to-
day declared my readiness to invite the British Legion to enter these areas 
during this period to maintain law and order.l3O 
Almost immediately Maurice returned from Germany, Legion headquarters began to 
organise the force. There was a frenzy of activity to work out the details of 
uniforms, transport arrangements, billeting and organisation. Whatever the merits or 
demerits of the plan, the response from ordinary Legion members was astonishing -
over 17,000 members volunteered. As Maurice described: 
Mind you, not one of those men who volunteered had the faintest idea of 
the terms on which they were going to serve. They rushed to volunteer 
first, and were content to find out afterwards what the conditions were. 131 
This was, for the Legion leaders, the embodiment of Legion spirit - men volunteering, 
as they might have done in 1914, for hazardous service overseas. It also shows the 
great desire among British Legion members, and the general population, for peace. 
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While the British Legion was confident of its usefulness and convinced that it 
would and could carry out any mission required of it, the same confidence was not 
held by the British Government, its envoys in Germany and Czechoslovakia, or the 
officials of the Foreign Office. Reservations about the plan began almost as soon as 
Hitler had announced his acceptance of the Legion's offer. A telegram on 29 
September, from the Foreign Office to the British delegation in Munich, expressed 
real doubts about the role of the Legion force. The ministers at the Foreign Office 
asked for the delegation's views on how the Legion force could be used while they 
also mentioned the change in the plan that had occurred after Maurice had seen 
Hitler: 
You will recollect that Hitler's suggestion in his speech of 27th September 
was that the Legion should occupy plebiscite areas during plebiscite period 
to maintain law and order, whereas proposal in our plan is that the Legion 
should at once proceed to territory to be ceded to stay there until it is 
transferred to Germany, but Legion certainly could not undertake 
obligation to maintain law and order .... it is difficult to see how the 
Legionaries are going to make themselves useful. Indeed they might, 
owing to the indefinite nature of their functions and their uncertain 
discipline, easily involve themselves and us in local incidents.132 
The British Government was left in the very difficult position of having had the 
Legion's offer accepted by Hitler, which meant that the plan could not be ignored or 
shelved. At the same time, the role of the Force was undefined and it was unlikely 
that the Legion could maintain law and order in areas restive and angry at the 
settlement. Both Duff Cooper, the Secretary of State for War, and Halifax 
expressed reservations about the plan, while Mr Newton, the British Ambassador in 
Prague, pleaded that the Force should either be armed or disbanded. 133 Even 
Fetherston-Godley announced that the original plan had 'grave disadvantages' mainly 
because 'there are certain to be at least a few unsuitable elements in such a force'. 134 
But he was adamant that the Legion must be allowed to go to Czechoslovakia: 
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If other nations send bodies of ex-service men, it is essential that the 
Legion takes part, or we lose both nationally and in the ex-service 
community all the prestige and leadership we have gained by the work of 
the last few years. 135 
Fetherston-Godley's motivations are clear. The British Legion Police Force was the 
culmination of the Foreign policy, and would give the Legion great publicity and a 
position of leadership among the international ex-service community, but it would be 
disastrous if the Legion's plan should end in failure. Fetherston-Godley was more 
interested in the Legion's prestige and standing than he was in the practicality, or 
danger of the mission to be accomplished. 
On 6 October, O.S. Sargent at the Foreign Office showed that he was very 
concerned about these problems. He suggested 'even at the eleventh hour' that 
Legion involvement in Czechoslovakia should be prevented. He felt that 'from the 
outset we have been rushed into accepting this idea without ever thinking out its 
dangerous implications'. 136 The plan had been conceived and accepted very quickly 
and this had not given time to consider the difficulties inherent in sending unarmed 
ex-service men into a very difficult and dangerous situation. He continued: 
I feel we are playing with fire in sending out these unarmed and 
undisciplined men to a district where feelings are likely to become more 
and more strained and embittered as the date of the plebiscite approaches. 
If plebiscites have to take place it is surely in our interest to take 
every possible measure in our power to see that law and order is 
maintained, and our experience of plebiscites shows that this can only be 
done by regular troops in large numbers. On the other hand, it is in Hitler's 
interest that law and order should not be maintained, so that he may have a 
pretext for sending German troops into the plebiscite areas before the 
plebiscite and keeping them there indefinitely. It would be intolerable if 
attacks on isolated members of the British Legion enabled Hitler to claim 
that he had to send German troops in order to rescue the British Legion 
from Czech 'atrocities'. 137 
Under the original plan to supervise the transfer of territory in the Anglo-French 
proposals of 19 September, the Legion volunteers might have served a useful 
135 ibid. 
136 O.S. Sargent, Suggestion to Cancel Despatch of British Legion to Czechoslovak:, h (ktober, F0371121783. 
137 ibid. 
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purpose. But after the plan was changed through Hitler's intervention, the dangers 
outweighed the advantages of the scheme. The Saar plebiscite had passed off 
peacefully in 1935, but there had been a large number of armed and disciplined troops 
present and had the Legion force gone to Czechoslovakia they might have found 
conditions much more difficult. The plebiscite would have been hurriedly organized 
and although the Legion volunteers would no doubt have acted in a disciplined 
manner, they did not have the training or experience to deal with disturbances. It is 
quite likely that had they been sent, German forces would have organised 'partisan' 
activity in order to give Hitler a pretext to send German troops to 'save' the British 
Legion Volunteers. Sargent had divined Hitler's true purpose and it is not surprising 
that from 2nd October, the British delegation at Munich argued against the use of 
plebiscites in Czechoslovakia.138 Hitler's insistence that the only forces to be used to 
police the plebiscites should be 'international bodies', meaning ex-service men,139 
made his intentions plain; he hoped to use plebiscites to increase the amount of 
territory transferred to Germany by both fair means and foul. Eventually, Hitler's 
desire to use plebiscites in this manner became apparent to Neville Henderson, the 
British Ambassador, on 11 October, who insisted to the German representative that: 
'I personally would never agree to plebiscites being held for such a purpose and 
would if it were suggested withdraw from the International Commission pending 
instructions from my Government'. 140 This finally sealed the fate of any plebiscites in 
Czechoslovakia. 
Meanwhile, the British Legion had hurriedly organised a force of 1,200 in 
little over 55 hourS. 141 Uniforms and ash sticks were provided for all members 
who assembled at Olympia on 8 October. It was kept in readiness due to uncertainty 
and the long negotiations taking place at the International Commission held in 
Munich, and although the force embarked on two ships, the SS Naldera and Dunera, 
138 Foreign Office to Sir Neville Henderson, 2 October 1938; Henderson to Foreign Office, 6 October 1938; F0371121783. 
139 W.1. Mallet to GS, BL, 4 October 1938, F0371121783. 
140 Henderson to Foreign Office, II October 1938, F0371121783 
141 BU I\'ovember 1938, p.156. 
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at Tilbury Docks on 12 October, it did not sail further than Southend. 142 They were 
moored there until on 14 October the Force was informed that they would not be 
required in Czechoslovakia. On 15 October, the force was quickly dispersed. 143 
Although the Force was not used, the Legion leaders hailed the event as a 
great triumph. Fetherston-Godley remarked at the 1939 Conference that: 
The whole Press, with one exception, supported the formation of the 
Force, and they had got an advertisement for the Legion which could not 
be bought for £100,000. That was all he need say about a Force which 
had a very long name and a very short life. 144 
The Legion had gained kudos and prestige out of the event but use of the Legion 
force may have had serious repercussions. The Legion leaders had forced the pace, 
taken all the decisions, and finally might have placed Legion members in a very 
difficult and dangerous situation. The idea of a Legion Police Force in 
Czechoslovakia began as a plan to give a minor advantage to the British Government 
in difficult negotiations but quickly became a pawn manipulated by Hitler which 
caused embarrassment and anxiety for the British Government. The leadership of 
General Sir Frederick Maurice and Major Fetherston-Godley took the Legion into 
water well beyond its depth. While the police plan sought a practical role for ex-
service men in the international crisis and demonstrated a sincere desire for peace, it 
also showed that the Legion leaders were prepared to go to almost any lengths to 
build Legion prestige through publicity. No one in the Legion seems to have 
considered the dangers and problems which the Police Force might have faced nor 
the irony of actively assisting in the dismemberment of a former Allied nation, whose 
ex-service men were members ofF.I.D.A.C. and the brotherhood of Allied ex-service 
men. However, almost as soon as the Force had dispersed, Fetherston-Godley 
despatched a letter to Area, County and Branch Chairmen, in which he justified his 
142 Board of Trade to Foreign Office, 11 October 1938; Foreign Office to Board of Trade, 13 October 1938, F0371121783. 
143 Foreign Office to OS, BL, 14 October 1939 1O'''''~71/21783. 
144 AC 1939, Res. No.2. 
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actions concerning the Czechoslovakian cnsls but also announced an important 
change in the Legion's foreign policy. Fetherston-Godley now felt that: 
the time has arrived for complete National Unity, and, with the 
considerable interest and influence at our disposal, to show Great Britain 
and the World that the British Legion stands for 'Moral re-armament' and 
for the attainment of world-peace, security and liberty. 145 
This changed the Legion's focus from the ideal of peace to the service of the state. 
He further explained that this had 'always been one of our major principles ... the 
welfare of the state is our objective'. 146 With war clouds gathering in the aftermath of 
the Munich crisis, this meant channelling Legion efforts into National Defence, not 
visits to foreign countries. This was a very fast change in policy and outlook, but it 
was remarkably easy for Legion leaders to justify to the membership. Maurice, at the 
1939 Conference, stated that: 
We have done our honest best to promote peace. We were the first to 
hold out the hand of friendship to the German ex-service men and, in spite 
of the present situation, I do not believe those efforts of ours have been in 
vain. 147 
The leadership could argue that the Legion had made every effort to develop peace 
and friendship and could not be blamed for the failure of those efforts. Attention 
could then be turned away from foreign policy towards the Legion's role in national 
defence plans. Apart from a high profile visit to Paris in August 1939 in an attempt 
to mend some fences between French and British ex-service men, the Legion's 
foreign policy had effectively ended with Fetherston-Godley's letter in October 1938. 
When we consider the Legion's foreign policy one striking fact which emerges 
is the power and influence of the Legion leadership. In the twenties, Legion interest 
in foreign affairs had been nursed along principally by Colonel Crosfield and in 1935, 
the Legion President and Chairman pulled the Legion's attention away from the issues 
of employment and pensions towards contact with foreign ex-service men. With the 
145 GSCLB, October 1938, Fetherston-Godley to Chairmen of Areas, Counties, Districts and Branches. 
146 ibid. 
147 AC 1939, Maurice's P. .dress. 
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exception of one issue (prematurely aged ex-service men) every other concern and 
policy of the Legion was flung into shadow by the flurry of activity and glare of 
publicity surrounding the Legion's foreign policy. Yet, after the drama of the Munich 
crisis, the foreign policy lost its prominence just as quickly. This was due to the 
dominance of the Legion leadership who had sole control over foreign policy. While 
other Legion policies allowed discussion and debate from every section of the 
membership, the foreign policy emphasised the problems with Legion democracy. 
The responsibility for Legion policy lay not with the membership, but with the 
national officers and National Executive Council who often implemented policies 
without testing the opinion of the members. 
The influence of Legion leaders gave them the power to change emphasis, to 
construct high ideals for the Legion at will, and to change the focus and rhetoric for 
those ideals extremely quickly. Initially, the Legion boasted of its contacts with 
Allied ex-service men through F.I.D.A.C., and when that interest waned it was 
replaced by a focus on the Disarmament Conferences which was in turn supplanted 
by contact with ex-enemy ex-service men. The ultimate change in direction was 
away from foreign contacts and towards national defence. This might be seen as an 
accommodation to the foreign policy of the Government of the day with Legion 
foreign policy matching at every stage the policy adopted by government. 148 In fact 
the agenda for the Legion's foreign relations went far beyond the service of the state. 
Under Fetherston-Godley's leadership Legion foreign policy can be seen as an 
attempt to push British foreign policy into a new direction, and not simply as a 
support for the existing beliefs. Far from the Legion's foreign policy simply 
representing a desire to support Government policy, it was an attempt to inflate 
Legion prestige and standing. Legion leaders did not see their independent approach 
to German ex-service men as an admission of weakness but rather as an example of 
respect for British influence and power. However, so great was the gap between 
148 Woo. tics o[fnjluence, p.119. 
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Legion rhetoric and reality that Legion leaders were not making decisions in a fully 
informed atmosphere. We cannot doubt the sincerity of the Legion leader s desire 
and efforts for peace, but they proved themselves to be more concerned with image 
than with substance. Their desire for publicity, and their susceptibility to right wing 
images in Germany which alternately flattered and impressed them made them easy 
prey for German propaganda. 
The Legion claimed to be able to develop understanding between nations. 
This unique attempt to bring 'peace in our time' demonstrated the power of the 
Legion leadership upon the organisation but also the difficulties inherent in such an 
approach. Legion leaders did develop cordial relations with other ex-service leaders 
over cups of tea and glasses of beer, but this had no wider influence on diplomacy or 
Government action. The Legion leadership could not deliver what they promised to 
the membership. The dominance of Legion leaders could only be justified if the 
power and influence of leadership was exercised responsibly. In reality, the 
leadership's pursuit of a misguided foreign policy did not bring about peace and 
understanding but it did fatally compromise the democracy and integrity of the 
movement. 
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CONCLUSION 
Through an analysis of the main aims of the Legion, and the way those 
objects were translated into practice by the leadership of the organisation, this study 
has revealed the main characteristics of the British Legion. The Legion was a 
collection of many individual branches, each with their own fiercely local outlook, 
which were cemented together by a powerful administrative structure culminating in 
the National Executive Council. It was defined by its conservative ideology but also 
by class, military rank and service, and by geography. Legion beliefs were an 
admixture of reactionary and progressive attitudes which reflected the prevailing 
values of the early post-war period. The Legion was composed mainly of men who 
had great pride in their service during the Great War and who believed in 
comradeship, and collective action as the solution to the problems of ex-service men. 
Its membership was predominantly working class and concentrated in the South of 
the country. Both the conservative ideals which the Legion espoused and practical 
factors such as unemployment and urban problems contributed to the low percentage 
of ex-service membership contained within the organisation. However, the Legion 
did continue to grow during the interwar period, which proved that it was'~vigorous 
movement. These elements determined the character of the Legion, and had far-
reaching effects on the capabilities and power of the organisation. Local rivalries, 
class and gender based distinctions meant that full unity was never achieved in the 
British ex-service movement, and poor negotiation skills, tradition, and national pride 
ensured that there was a similar, but independent Legion in Scotland. These 
divisions did contribute to a lack of cohesion with consequences that were all too 
clearly displayed in the Legion campaign over prematurely aged ex-service men in 
1938. 
All of these factors affected the character of the Legion, but the impact of the 
officer-dominated leadership was yet greater. The position of the National Executive 
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Council was unassailable, and much of Legion policy was shaped by the few national 
officers. The motivations, attitudes and values of the leadership were differeltt to 
those of the membership and often incompatible with the demands of a mass, 
democratic movement. Their prime motivations were power, prestige and publicity 
which conflicted with the collective and more direct methods of the membership. 
Legion leaders were also preoccupied with the need to control extremists within the 
movement - without realising that, although there were unruly ex-service men within 
the Legion who demanded greater action on the part of the N.E.C., the Legion did 
not contain left wing political activists or any other type of extremists. These 
conflicting aims and preoccupations often hampered the Legion in its benevolent and 
political aims. 
The Legion leaders main aim was to found an organisation based around 
comradeship which endeavoured to assist its members and fellow ex-service men in 
distress, and this was achieved. But the Legion's aims went much further than the 
mundane considerations of everyday social life and practical help. Legion leaders 
looked beyond these objects to political influence, national reconstruction, and most 
controversially, relations with foreign ex-service men. It was also in these areas that 
the Legion found itself out of its depth and unable to achieve its high-minded aims. 
In attempting to create a 'Brighter Britain' through collective action, the Legion was 
struggling with huge problems which ex-service men alone could not hope to solve. 
Trade depression, unemployment, poverty and deprivation defeated the efforts of 
every interwar government, and in this context it is unsurprising that the Legion 
attempts fell far short of bringing prosperity to all ex-service men. At the same time, 
Legion relief work gave practical assistance to many ex-service men, and, whatever 
else the Legion failed to achieve, Poppy Day stamped the needs of ex-service men 
firmly onto the British public's consciousness. But the Legion's achievements 
concerning practical work remained fixed in the tradition of local voluntary societies 
and Let;,.. ... "ttitudes developed to match th;o;: trend. 
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Legion leaders promised that their strong and influential organisation could 
gain large political concessions. In reality, Legion leaders were revealed as painted 
laths, not iron rods. l Poor negotiating skills and political innocence let the movement 
down time after time. The leaders, military men trained to obey orders 
unquestioningly, were easily confused, frightened and manipulated by politicians. 
Indeed the whole movement was politically naive and unable to deal with Parliament 
effectively. The greatest achievements of the Legion in political negotiation were 
defensive when public indignation could be effectively harnessed. Progressive action, 
which might have gained greater justice for ex-service men, was ruled out by the 
character of the Legion but also by the nature of the British political system. 
Although this was the era of mass franchise, the institutions of government displayed 
a grim tenacity in maintaining their traditional privileges and power. 
Foreign policy was a mistaken avenue for Legion activities. This is not to say 
that ex-service men from many nations meeting together in goodwill and fellowship 
was wrong, but in attempting to supplement, or even supplant, the work of 
diplomats, Legion leaders were playing with fire. The events of 1935-1939 reveal 
that ex-service men did not have a special role to play in bringing peace and that they 
were naive to think so. Again, the Legion was struggling with events and forces well 
beyond its scope. The Legion's foreign policy also shows the less attractive side of 
Legion leadership; their hunger for publicity and recognition was given priority over 
more sensible policies. Their lightning ability to change their views on the subject 
only revealed the contradictions and confusion inherent in their policy. At the same 
time, the willingness of the Legion membership to support their leaders in this policy 
confirms our conclusions about the veterans who joined the movement. They were 
men who were accustomed to following strong leaders without question and lack of 
dissent or discussion on the Legion's foreign policy meant that unwise decisions were 
made in a vacuum. 
1 AC 1927, Res.No. 84, See Chapler Five. 
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None of these policies, or their consequences, moved the Legion away from 
its roots. In fact, the Legion's conduct of its practical work, political negotiation and 
foreign relations conclusively proves that the movement was composed of veterans 
from the generation of the Great War whose attitudes continued to reflect the values 
and concerns of the early twenties. The basic objects, ideals and principles of the 
Legion were fixed in the aftermath of the Great War, and they were supported by 
men who developed their consciousness during that era. Ultimately, the Legion did 
not question its role as a charitable organisation, nor did it seek to alter radically the 
British political system or society. Although its foreign policy was an attempt to 
influence events and support the cause of peace, when war clouds gathered once 
again, Legion members firmly declared their patriotism, loyalty and duty to the State 
and Crown, just as they had done during the Great War. 
The Legion's 'spirit' was an internal dynamic which was constantly rehearsed 
through speeches, committee meetings, Parades, Remembrance services and social 
functions. Legion members were always reminded what the Legion stood for, what 
its members should believe and what kind of an example they should set to other ex-
service men. The Legion's 'spirit' reflected both the strengths and weaknesses of the 
British army and the British military system. Rivalry and competition can lead to 
destructive and wasteful bickering, but can also lead to enthusiasm and increased 
effort for the cause. Comradeship can lead to exclusiveness but also brings 
fellowship, and concern for others. Loyalty can bring blind obedience but can also 
produce solidarity and strength. Given the constant rehearsal of Legion beliefs and 
ideals it is unsurprising that the Legion developed its own internal dynamic, but also 
that it became increasingly out of date. Legion attitudes remained firmly in place, but 
while they were a mixture of reactionary and progressive ideals in the early twenties, 
by the late thirties, they had become archaic. The Legion remained fixed while 
society'S values and attitudes progressed. 
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Much of this dissertation appears to be a study of failure. The organisation 
did not live up to the claims made by its leaders in their speeches. The British Legion 
did not develop into a mass movement of millions of ex-service men as its founders 
had wished. The Legion was not able to deal with the problems of mass 
unemployment or assist every ex-service man in distress. Nor was the Legion ever 
able to extract major concessions from the Government on important pension issues. 
Most spectacularly, Legion contacts with German National Socialist veterans did not 
bring about peace and instead proved an embarrassment for the British Government. 
However, this is to compare reality with the highly inflated, hypothetical aims of 
Legion leaders and it is unlikely that any body would ever have been able to achieve 
these goals. On a more modest scale, the Legion achieved a great deal during the 
inter-war years. The ritual of Poppy Day did raise public consciousness about ex-
service men's needs, albeit in a traditional way. The Legion also provided a sense of 
purpose and fellowship for thousands of its members, as well as entertainment and a 
social focus for many communities. Legion relief work did not provide a solution to 
Britain's economic depression, but did assist some of its casualties. Public pressure 
on government did not give ex-service men justice from the government, but Legion 
work in committees did modify pensions procedure and removed the worst injustices. 
When the Legion remained true to its roots as a voluntary society in the mold of 
Victorian and Edwardian friendly societies, it achieved more than in areas which 
were out of this scope and depth. 
Given the failures and disappointments in many of the Legion's policies it 
might seem remarkable that the British Legion continued to grow and attract new 
members. However, the policies which the ex-officer leadership pursued were not 
essential to the core beliefs of the Legion members. The ex-officer leadership did not 
create the Legion, nor did they form its membership. The Legion survived and grew 
because thousands of ex-service men believed in its principle ideal of comradeship. 
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The most important strength of the Legion proved to be its ability to accept the 
veterans of another war into its ranks. 
Debates concerning the future of the Legion and the passing of its ideals onto 
a younger generation had begun almost as soon as the Legion was founded. In 1939, 
the Legion and its members recognised that a new generation of ex-service men 
would eventually supplant the Great War veterans. Captain C. H. Madden, Chairman 
of the Sussex County Council, recognised the important issues: 
This period of war will make or kill the British Legion ... If our 
membership is going to fade away, and if those who have done so much in 
the past are going to hold back now, if, in short, we are going to rest on 
our laurels and leave it to the few to try and uphold the fame of the Legion 
- then with the coming of the new generation of ex-Service men will come 
a new organisation to care for them and theirs ... And the Legion will be 
passed by, as a body of old fogies, a body obsessed with the cares of 
themselves and their own generation, and with none of the breadth of view 
and of purpose which the new age will demand.2 
By 1939, Legion members recognised that they were old and that their attitudes and 
views - but not their ideals - were out of date. At the same time, they were 
determined that the Legion should continue. In 1939, the Poppy Day collection was 
made on behalf of all ex-service men of all wars for the first time,3 and important 
decisions about the future shape of the Legion were postponed until Second World 
War veterans could have their say. During the war, Legion work continued and 
managed to secure greater pensions successes than at any time during the previous 
twenty years.4 Legion membership reached an all time high of 1,234,835 in 1948.5 
The Legion could not offer a new world, and could not fulfill all of its high aims and 
ideals, but it did eventually bridge the gap between old and new and thus ensured that 
its central ideal of comradeship would continue. 
2 Sussex Daily News, 27 September 1939, found in GSCLB September 1939. 
3 OHBL p.257. 
4 OHBL p.262. The 1939 Pensions Warrant was actually worse than the 1919 and 1921 Warrants, with lower rates of 
compensation and many other flaws. Legion pressure did, this time, gain justice by righting such anomalies. 
5 OHBL p.305. 
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Table 1 Officers of the British Legion 1921-1939 
Patrons: 
H.R.H. Prince of Wales 1921-1937 
H.R.H. King George VI 1937-1952 
Presidents: 
Field Marshal Earl Haig 1921-1928 
Admiral Earl Jellicoe 1928-1932 
Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice 1932-1946 
Chairmen: 
Mr Thomas F. Lister 1921-1927 
Lt-Col. George Crosfield 1927-1930 
Col. John Brown 1930-1934 
Major Francis W. C. Fetherston-Godley 1934-1940 
Treasurer: 
Major J.B. BruneI Cohen 1921-1940 
Secretary: 
Col. Edward C. Heath 1921-1940 
Assistant Secretary: 
Mr John R. Griffin 1921-1940 
Table 2 Geographical Extent of the Legion Areas: 
East Anglia 
East Midlands 
West Midlands 
Home Counties 
Metropolitan 
South Eastern 
South Western 
North Eastern 
North Western 
Wales 
Yorkshire 
Southern Ireland 
Northern Ireland 
Overseas 
Cambridge, Norfolk, Suffolk, Essex 
Lincoln, Rutland, Northampton, Nottingham, Leicester, Derby 
Stafford, Warwick, Shropshire, Worcester, Hereford, 
Gloucester. 
Bedford, Hertford, Middlesex, Buckingham, Oxford, 
Huntingdon 
15 Mile Radius from Charing Cross. 
Kent, Sussex, Isle of Wight, Surrey, Hampshire, Berkshire 
Devon, Cornwall, Somerset, Dorset, Wiltshire 
Northumberland, Durham 
Cheshire, Cumberland, Isle of Man, Westmorland, Lancashire 
Wales including Monmouth. 
Yorkshire 
Ireland 
Northern Ireland 
Paris, Rhineland, Hong Kong, Brazil, Gibraltar, New York etc. 
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Table 7 Annual Conference Representation 1921-1939 
Year Location Area Branch Registered Percentage 
Delegates Delegates Branches ReQresentation 
1921 London 718 1478 48.6 
1922 London 11 340 1728 19.7 
1923 London 9 656 2488 26.4 
1924 London 10 428 2703 15.8 
1925 London 13 505 2662 19.0 
1926 London 13 572 2774 20.6 
1927 London 13 605 2940 20.6 
1928 Scarborough 13 584 3109 18.8 
1929 London 13 759 3330 22.8 
1930 Cardiff 34 626 3532 17.7 
1931 London 45 820 3715 22.1 
1932 Portsmouth 44 801 3865 20.7 
1933 London 13 922 3994 23.1 
1934 Weston-S-Mare 55 1206 4075 29.6 
1935 London 45 929 4130 22.5 
1936 Buxton 805 4207 19.1 
1937 London 40 874 4305 20.3 
1938 Newcastle 45 838 4367 19.2 
1939 London 51 911 4412 20.6 
Table 8 Membership and Poppy Day Comparison for 1927-1928. 
AREA Member- % %of Member- %of 
ship in Collection Member- Collect ship in Collection % Member- Collect 
1927 in 1927 (L) shil11927 in 1927 1928 in 1928 (L) shil11928 in 1928 
E. Anglia 14969 24657 7.4 6.8 17205 29338 7.9 7.3 
E. Midlands 15494 18890 7.6 5.2 16633 21779 7.6 5.4 
H. Counties 10700 15741 5.3 4.3 11884 17675 5.4 4.4 
Metropolitan 18134 75165 8.9 20.6 20796 85441 9.5 21.2 
N. East 8418 8308 4.2 2.3 9068 9549 4.1 2.4 
N. West 19428 45644 9.6 12.5 20693 50985 9.4 12.6 
s. East 33378 59339 16.5 16.3 34833 64821 15.9 16.1 
S. West 24012 23215 11.8 6.4 24050 23816 11.0 5.9 
Wales 15028 12594 7.4 3.5 17726 12812 8.1 3.2 
W.Midlands 15671 38557 7.7 10.6 17344 43803 7.9 10.9 
Yorkshire 17725 26962 8.7 7.4 19270 29757 8.8 7.4 
N.Ireland 3296 6692 1.6 1.8 3177 5005 1.5 1.2 
s. Ireland 4047 8641 2.0 2.4 3906 8685 1.8 2.2 
Overseas 2535 1.2 2512 1.1 
TOTAL 202834 364405 100 100 219097 403466 100 
Figures Calculated from Affiliation Fee Receipts found in British Legion Annual Accounts, and 
from 1927-1928 Interim Poppy Day Reports, found in IH29/8. 
Table 9 Comparison Between British Legion Members and the Number of 
Unemployed Ex-Service Men in the Regions During April 1936. 
Area B.L. Unemuloyed 
Members in Ex-Service 
1936 men in 1936 
Eastern 55637 
Metropolitan 26386 
Yorkshire 26095 
South East 57561 65142 
South West 41803 28721 
Midlands 73297 42984 
North East 18876 89875 
North West 29392 88100 
Wales 32983 38782 
Total 375642 410689 
Alternatively Expressed: 
Areas B.L. Unemilloyed 
Members in Ex-Service 
1936 men in 1936 
South 181387 93863 
Midlands 73297 42984 
North 74363 177975 
Wales 32983 38782 
Total 375642 410689 
South = S.E., S.W., Met., Eastern Areas. 
North = N.E., N.W., Yorks Areas. 
Ratio: 
members! 
unemuloyed 
l.932 
l.705 
0.417 
0.850 
0.914 
256 
British Legion figures taken from the Affiliation fee receipts, found in the 
Annual Accounts, 1936. 
Unemployment figures for April 1936, found in PINI5/722. 
Table 10 Poppy Day Receipts (Gross) 1921-1939 
1921 £106,000 1931 £501,082 
1922 £158,307 1932 £483,298 
1923 £203,364 1933 £511,853 
1924 £272,426 1934 £505,628 
1925 £338,560 1935 £527,302 
1926 £360,256 1936 £544,301 
1927 £442,326 1937 £553,103 
1928 £503,348 1938 £578,188 
1929 £518,489 1939 £595,887 
1930 £524,650 
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Appendix A: British Legion Principles and Policy 
(A) The Legion shall be democratic non-sectarian and not affiliated to or connected 
directly with any political party or political organisations. 
(B) The Legion shall be created to inaugurate and maintain in a strong stimulating 
united and democratic comradeship all those who have served in His Majesty's Navy 
Army Air Force or any Auxiliary Forces so that neither their efforts nor their interests 
shall be forgotten that their welfare and that of the dependants of the fallen shall be 
secured to them in respect of the difficulties caused in their lives as a result of their 
servtces. 
(C) The Legion shall exist to perpetuate in civil life of the Empire and the World the 
principles for which the Nation stands to inculcate a sense of loyalty to the Crown 
Community and Nation to promote unity amongst all classes to make right the master 
of might to secure peace and goodwill on earth to safeguard and transmit to posterity 
the principles of justice freedom and democracy and to consecrate our comradeship 
by our devotion to mutual service and helpfulness. 
(D) There shall be nothing to prevent the Legion from adopting a definite policy on 
any question directly or indirectly affecting ex-service men and women nor from 
taking any constitutional action considered necessary in pursuance of such policy 
provided that the policy and proposed action have been considered and endorsed by a 
majority of the Area Conferences after due notice to the branches of the Legion and 
also providing that such policy or action is strictly in accordance with the principles 
laid down above and with the objects of the Legion as set out in the Charter of the 
Legion. Nothing in this Rule shall prevent Branches from exercising full local 
autonomy or from adopting and declaring a definite policy or taking any action 
considered necessary in pursuance of it upon local matters always providing that such 
action is constitutional and in accordance with the aims, objects and programme of 
the Legion. The decision as to what are or are not local matters shall rest with the 
National Executive Council. 
Appendix B: The Constitution of the American Legion: 
1 To uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States of America. 
2 To maintain law and order 
3 To foster and perpetuate a 100 per cent Americanism. 
4 To preserve the memories and incidents of our association in the Great War. 
S To inculcate a sense of individual obligation to the community, state and nation. 
6 To combat the autocracy of both the classes and the masses. 
7 To make right the master of might. 
8 To promote peace and good will on earth. 
9 To safeguard and transmit to posterity the principles of justice, freedom, and 
democracy. 
10 To consecrate and sanctify our comradeship by our devotion to mutual 
helpfulness. 
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Appendix C: Objects of the Empire Services League: 
(A) To foster the spirit of Comradeship and mutual help among ALL who have 
served or are serving. 
(B) To watch over and safeguard their interests. 
(C) To work in close conjunction with the various Government departments on all 
matters cognate to, but outside the sphere of state action. 
(D) To establish local information and advisory Agencies dealing with employment, 
assistance and other benefits. 
(E) To co-ordinate the work of all voluntary and un-official bodies both inside the 
Services and outside of them which are working on behalf of those who have served. 
(F) To establish for the benefit of subscribing members self- supporting clubs for 
social and recreative purposes. 
(G) To ensure the Non-Political, Non-Sectarian, and democratic nature of the 
League. 
Appendix D: The Constitution of the Comrades of the Great War: 
The Organisation shall be created to inaugurate and maintain in a strong, stimulating, 
united and democratic comradeship all those who have served in any capacity in the 
Sea, Land and Air Forces during the Great War, so that neither their efforts nor their 
interests shall be forgotten or neglected. 
The movement shall be wholly non-Party in character, aims and administration, and 
shall concern itself only with the welfare of Comrades and their dependents, and the 
dependents of those who have fallen. 
1 To perpetuate the memory and story of the gallant men and women who died for 
their country. 
2 To perpetuate the spirit of comradeship, patriotism, and devotion which has 
characterised the Naval and Military Forces of the Empire, and to foster these 
qualities in the rising generation. 
3 To watch and safeguard the interests of the Forces and to take such steps as are 
necessary to protect them now and after demobilisation. 
4 To press the claims of discharged sailors and soldiers to State and public 
employment; to enlist the co-operation of employers for the same object; and to 
support undertakings for the suitable training and employment of disabled men. 
S To secure adequate pensions for discharged sailors and soldiers. 
6 To impress upon Parliament the need for an appropriate scale of pensions for men 
discharged on account of ill-health or from incapacity arising from service. 
7 To help discharged men to prepare their necessary papers, and to see that their 
pensions and allowances are in order. 
8 To promote the welfare of the women and children left by those who have fallen. 
9 To see that all monies raised and contributed from any source for the welfare of 
sailors and soldiers are utilised for that purpose and not diverted to other objects. 
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Appendix E: NATIONAL CONSTRUCTIVE PROGRAMME 1921 
Imperial Objects 
l. To institute throughout the Empire a National Day of Commemoration for those 
who fell in the Great War, and to press upon the Governments concerned the 
desirability of instituting such a day as a General Holiday. 
2. To co-operate and federate with ex-service organisations of a character similar to 
the British Legion throughout the Empire and our Allied Countries, and to encourage 
the interchange of visits and ideas between the members of the British Legion and 
such organisations. 
3. To support actively all direct efforts for peace, primarily the League of Nations, 
while taking care that the defence of the Empire is adequately provided for. 
National Objects 
1 To secure that the Government, Municipal, and Local Authorities, and other 
employers of labour shall give a preference in employment to ex-service men and 
women seeking employment and, in particular, that women who replaced men in 
employment, owing to war pressure and are not dependants of ex-service men or 
actual breadwinners, shall be replaced in such employment by ex-service men or ex-
service women. 
2. To take active steps to obtain the co-operation of the Government, public and 
private employers, and of the Trade Unions in securing the fullest possible facilities 
for the training of ex-service men and women, and, when trained, their admission to 
the different organisations of skilled labour. 
3. To support and encourage by financial and other means suitable undertakings by 
ex-service men and women conducted on business lines and for that purpose, and 
generally in order to help to re-establish ex-service men and women in civilian 
occupations, to secure Government assistance and voluntary aid, and to extend the 
principle of co-partnership in all such undertakings, and further to take action to 
prevent the exploitation of the employment of ex-service men in firms which have for 
their apparent object the benefit only of ex-service men 
4. To urge upon the Government and the community the necessity of providing for 
ex-service men and women, genuinely anxious and unable to obtain employment, 
reasonable maintenance until such time as they are absorbed into industry. 
5. To emphasise the importance of the King's Roll, and to insist that, in the allotment 
of contracts by the Government and Local Authorities, preference may be given to 
firms whose names are on the Roll. To undertake a Publicity Campaign to compel all 
private employers and public companies who should be on the King's Roll, but are 
not, to take immediate steps to qualify for admission to that Roll. 
6. To secure the removal of the severely incapacitated or disabled ex-service men or 
women from the ordinary competitive market by the scientific and compulsory 
distribution of the severely incapacitated or disabled ex-service men and women 
amongst the industries of the country. 
7. To obtain special preference for all seriously disabled ex-service men and women 
as regards travelling and admission to places of recreation and entertainment. 
8. To guard jealously the right to Pension of disabled and incapacitated ex-service 
men, and of the widows and dependants of ex-service men; to endeavour to remedy 
injustices and abolish anomalies. 
Domestic Objects 
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1. To make the British Legion truly National by drawing into or affiliating with it all 
existing ex-service men's and ex-service women's associations, benevolent funds, 
clubs, etc. 
2. In co-operation with the United Services' Fund to provide in convenient centres 
for all Branches, facilities for social intercourse, recreation, and recreational 
education, acquiring, where not already in existence, permanent halls, clubs premises, 
or meeting rooms for the use of members. 
3. To make the existence of the British Legion more widely known, by arranging for 
periodical groups rallies of members of all Branches of the British Legion in 
convenient centres. 
Appendix F: THE BRITISH LEGION - WHAT IT HAS DONE 
1 Advocated and obtained in innumerable instances preference of employment for 
ex-service men. 
2 Procured the concession that on Relief Schemes financed by the Government 
Unemployment Grants Committee at least 75% of the men employed shall be ex-
service men. 
3 Obtained employment for no fewer than 10,000 men. 
4 By financing its employment schemes has found employment for a further 3,500 
men. 
5 Assisted 400,000 ex-service men, widows and dependents with pension 
difficulties. 
6 Registered 65% successes in pensions cases taken before the Appeals Tribunal. 
7 Assisted 720,000 ex-service men of all ranks through it Relief Fund. 
8 Established 3,500 ex-service men in their own businesses. 
9 Obtained representation on all Government Committees dealing with questions 
affecting ex-service men. 
10 Obtained many concessions from the Pensions Ministry to the advantage of the 
1,900,000 beneficiaries. 
ORGANISE! ORGANISE! 
JOIN THE LEGION TO-DAY 
and so help all those who 
are less fortunate than yourself. 
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Appendix G: Questions to Parliamentary Candidates 26 October 1922 
1 Would you support the policy of the Legion that in Government and Municipal 
employment and in all schemes for employment financed or controlled by the 
National or Local Authorities, ex- service men should be given preference? 
2 Are you prepared to support the finding of the Select Committee of the House of 
Commons that, if the voluntary scheme to secure employment for disabled men does 
not succeed by May 1923, legislation introducing a compulsory scheme for the 
allocation of disabled men to industry should be passed? 
3 Are you in favour of the rates of pensions being permanently fixed, and will you 
strenuously oppose any attempt to reduce the present standard rate of pensions? 
4 Would you support the claim of the Legion that all ex-service men and women 
whose disability as a result of service is certified as rendering them unable to obtain 
employment in the open market shall be entitled to and receive the full disability 
pension? 
5 Will you support the claim of the Legion that upon all Committees set up to deal 
with questions affecting the direct welfare of ex-service men, ego pensions, 
employment, emigration or resettlement, the Legion shall have the right of direct 
representation? 
6 Are you in sympathy with the League of Nations and will you support all steps 
taken in the direction of securing permanent peace? 
7 Do you support the Legion's policy that 11 th November should be instituted as a 
National Day of Commemoration and as a National Holiday? 
8 In order to check the high death-rate of tubercular ex-service men who, having 
been temporarily cured in sanatoria, relapse owing to the prejudicial surroundings of 
slum existence, will you support the erection of village settlements for tubercular ex-
service men on the lines of the Inter-Departmental Committee Report of 1919? 
9 If elected will you co-operate with the local Branch of the British Legion in 
redressing injustice to ex-service men, widows and dependents and raise any 
reasonable questions proposed by them in Parliament? 
10 Are you in favour of the abolition of the seven year time limit in connection with 
widow's pensions and in favour of the right being given to a widow to put forward a 
claim to pension whenever her husbands death may occur, and to receive such 
pension if the death is due to or aggravated by War Service? 
11 Are you in favour of ex-service men, who have served in H.M. Forces and have 
been discharged suffering from mental trouble, being stigmatised pauper lunatics? If 
not, will you do all in your power to prevent the Ministry of Pensions transferring 
these cases to the care of the Local Boards of Guardians? 
12 Will you support the Legion's claim that the Minister of Pensions and his staff 
shall be ex-service men? 
13 Will you support the continuance of a separate Ministry of Pensions, there being 
still 870,000 disabled men, 168,000 widows, and 1,740,000 other dependents in 
receipt of pensions and allowances? 
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Appendix H: Amalgamation Proposals Between Scotland and England 1927. 
National Executive Council Meeting 2nd April 1927 
A letter was read from Mr Griffin asking the National Executive Council's permission 
to address the Council on the question of amalgamation with the British Legion. It 
was unanimously agreed to hear Mr Griffin before proceeding with the ordinary 
business. 
Mr Griffin then put forward the following points which the British legion were 
prepared to offer to the British Legion Scotland on amalgamation. 
1 Benevolent work in Scotland to remain as at present. 
2 General Organisation in Scotland to remain as at present. 
3 The Annual Conference for Scotland to elect two representatives to the Executive 
Council which meets in London. 
4 The expenses of such Representatives to be borne by the general funds of the 
British Legion. 
5 The Scottish national Executive Council to become the Scottish Council. 
6 The affiliation fees paid by branches to be reduced from 2/- to 1/6 and payable 
direct to London. 
7 Of the 1/6 so paid, 6d to be returned to the Scottish Office. 
8 The National Executive Council in London to make a grant of between £700 and 
£800 to the Scottish Council for administration in Scotland. 
9 Branches in Scotland to be eligible for representation at the Annual Conference 
held at Whitsuntide each year and to come under the arrangements for the pooling of 
fares. 
10 The Executive Council to be responsible for literature needed by Scottish 
Branches thereby bearing cost of the same. 
11 The Executive Council to be responsible for the distribution of Badges to the 
Scottish branches thereby being responsible for the financial obligations in this 
matter. 
Appendix I: Co-operation With England 1938 
Co-Operation with England 
It is recognised that the British Legion in England and the British Legion (Scotland) 
both exist for the same purpose, and it is considered that it would be to their mutual 
advantage and would strengthen their mutual interests if there was a recognised 
policy of co-operation or affiliation in regard to all National and International 
questions. 
Such questions would include: 
1) Negotiations with HM Government on questions of National importance (as for 
example national Service Schemes as exemplified by the situation with arose in 
connection with the Volunteer Forces for Czechoslovakia) 
2) Negotiations with HM Government Departments on questions affecting ex-service 
men, such as Pensions, Employment, national Insurance, etc. 
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3) The promotion of friendship and goodwill between ex-service men of all Nations 
so as to advance the cause of peace by bringing about a better understanding between 
nations. 
In order to give effect to this scheme the following interchange of representatives has 
been provisionally agreed as between the two National Executive Councils, for 
submission to their respective Annual Conference, for approval. 
1) Representation from Scotland to England 
a) Two representatives from the NEC (Scotland) to the NEC, London, with full 
powers of membership. 
b) One rep from the NEC (Scotland) to each Committee in London dealing with 
National Service, Pensions, Employment, International Goodwill, and any other 
question which is mutual to the two organisations. The Scottish member in each case 
to have full powers of membership. 
c) A representation, with full powers of voting, etc, to the Annual Conference in 
England, up to a maximum of36. 
2) Representation from England to Scotland 
a) Two Reps to the NEC with full powers of membership 
b) One rep to any Committee corresponding to those in London on which Scottish 
representatives may sit. 
c) A representation with voting powers to the Annual Conference in Scotland, up to 
a maximum of 9. 
Domestic Affairs 
The British Legion in England and the British Legion (Scotland) shall continue, as at 
present, to have complete independence and control over their own domestic affairs. 
This includes all matters of organisation, Administration and Finance, and the British 
Legion (Scotland) and the British legion in England, shall have the right, if so 
desired, to approach government Departments independently in reference to any 
question which is applicable only to the individual country concerned. 
In regard to all questions of mutual interest to ex-service men as a whole, the channel 
of communication shall be through the HQ of the British Legion in London. All 
matters affecting Scotland, apart from matters of mutual interest as above, and all 
questions affecting individuals will continue to be dealt with from the HQ of the 
British Legion (Scotland) in Edinburgh. 
Appendix J: Chronology of Legion Foreign Policy 
1920 
FIDAC founded by Charles Bertrand - HQ in Paris. 
1921 
Legion joins FIDAC, supports League of Nations. 
1922 
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Brunei Cohen at FIDAC Conference in New Orleans, suggests bringing in ex-enemy 
organisations. 
October 1922 First Meeting at the International Labour Organisation of French, 
German and British ex-service men to discuss disablement. 
1923 
Reparations quarrel at Brussels FIDAC Conference. 
Hamilton suggests holding out the hand of friendship to ex-enemies - Metropolitan 
Area Council protests. 
1924 
Legion attempts to have ex-enemy organisations admitted to FIDAC. Refused, but 
resolution passed recommending every member to make its own investigations into 
the matter. 
1925 
Rome FIDAC Conference, Crosfield and Haig impressed by Mussolini. Easter 1925, 
Crosfield visits Austrian ex-service men. 
1926 
Warsaw FIDAC Conference, Resolution adopted to make contact with ex-enemies. 
30 September first meeting of CIAMAC.(Conference Internationale des Associations 
des Mutiles et des Anciens Combattants) 
1927 
BriefFIDAC Conference, 
9 July First International Conference at Luxembourg. Reichsbanner present 
but not the Stahlhelm. Unsatisfactory due to wrangle over the wording of a 
resolution on 'respect for Treaties'. 
1928 
10-11 September Second International Conference. No large German organisations 
present, only the Young German Order and the Prisoner of War Association and 
Austria. 
1933 
19 March 10,000 ex-service men from all parts of the world paraded at Geneva -
except the Germans (due to the crisis caused by Hitler's accession to power) 
1934 
Col John Brown visits Nazi Party Rally. 
Hamilton receives the Drums of the Gordon Highlanders from Hindenburg. 
1935 
Ribbentrop approaches Legion with invitation for a delegation to visit Germany. 
Prince of Wales speech. First delegations sent to Germany, Austria, Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia. 
1936 Buxton Conference has French, German. Austrian and Yugoslavian 
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representatives. 
Further visits - one to Hungary, CZ Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. In August, the 
Thatcham branch entertained three German representatives for a week. 
In October a German delegation visits Britain. In June the Heybridge Branch go to 
Frankfurt and Berlin. 
6 November Comite Internationale Permanent (C.I.P.) established in Rome. 
Germans visit Swansea. 
1937 
18 February 
12-16 April 
May 1937 
27 June 
Germany. 
C.I.P. meeting in Berlin. 
Delegation in Italy. 
B.E.S.L. begins to participate in CIP. 
Crosfield and Thatcham Branch visit Kyfihauserbund at Kassel in 
1 July Delegation to Rumania, Hungary, Austria, and Czechoslovakia. In 
Prague, Legion influence brought about the first meeting between the 
Czechoslovakian and Sudeten German ex-service organisations. 1,700 excursions 
made by Legion representatives in 1937. 
August Germans visit Isle of Wight, and Maldon. 
22 November Italians visit London - high profile visit with Government 
involvement. 
1938 
11 March German troops invade Austria. 
18 May Second C.I.P. Congress held in London. decided to hold a peace day 
on 9 October 1938. 
August Metropolitan Area visit to Germany, Hamilton meets Hitler. 
15 September Chamberlain flies to Berchtesgaden. 
22 September Chamberlain flies to Godesberg. 800 Germans visit London. 
23 September Godesberg Memorandum. 
24 September Idea of Legion Police Force first mooted 
25 September PM's agreement to Legion proposal. Maurice flies to Berlin. 
26 September Maurice meets Hitler. 
27 September Fleet is mobilised. Chamberlain's radio broadcast. 
28 September Chamberlain announces in House of Commons that Hitler had agreed 
to meet in a four power Conference at Munich. 
29 September Conference met at Munich (until 30 September) 
1 October Second meeting of the International Commission in Berlin. 
6 October British Legion Volunteer Police Force assembled at Olympia. 
12 October Force embarks on two troopships at Tilbury and sails to Southend. 
14 October Force sails back from Southend. 
15 October 
November 
1939 
Force dispersed 
Small delegation visits Paris. 
14 March German troops occupy Prague. 
25 March Chairman breaks Legion contact with the CIP after having been 
invited to a CIP Executive meeting in the Black Forest by the Duke of Saxe Coburg 
(the CIP President). 
August 1,100 Legion members visit Paris 
269 
Appendix K: British Legion Plan for Police Force in Czechoslovakia 
The plan was handed to Hitler, at 10. am on 26 September 1938, during the 
interview between Maurice and Hitler (who insisted on being alone with Maurice 
except for the translator, Herr Schmidt) in Berlin. 
With the consent of the Prime Minister, who welcomes the idea, I am laying before 
you, Herr Fuhrer, a plan for participation by the British legion in the maintenance and 
consolidation of the peace of Europe in the following manner:-
1 The British Legion will offer to His Majesty's Govt. 10,000 picked ex-service men 
of the Legion who would be prepared within 48 hours to be sent to the Sudeten 
frontier-districts of Czechoslovakia. 
2 Under the orders of their own Commanders these disciplined ex-service men would 
be distributed throughout the area proposed by the British and French governments 
and further, if the Czechoslovak Govt. consent, in the Plebiscite areas proposed by 
the German Government, to act as observers in the neighbourhood of all Police and 
Gendarmerie posts. 
3 Unarmed and without any uniforms except for their Legion armbands and badges, 
they will be able above all to play and important part in counter-acting untrue 
propaganda and protecting the population during the period preceeding the transfer 
of the above territories. 
4 They will place themselves at the disposal of both governments in order to facilitate 
without incidents the transfer of such territories as is agreed to by the Czechoslovak 
Govt. 
5 After 1 st October or such date as may be agreed upon between the German and 
Czechoslovak Governments for transfer of the above territories, the entire Corps of 
Legion observers - reinforced if necessary to 20,000 men - will be transferred to the 
Plebiscite areas in order there to prepare and watch over the carrying out in an 
orderly fashion, of a Plebiscite to enable the population to vote without exercise of 
undue pressure. 
In this manner Britain would provide the body suggested in the German 
Memorandum for supervision of the Plebiscite. 
6 The transfer of the territories and entry of German troops, official etc - in such 
territories as may declare themselves by the above voting to be in favour of 
incorporation with Germany - will take place only after the Plebiscite has taken place: 
which will be as soon as possible. 
7 On completion of the Plebiscite the Legion-Observers will return to England. 
As ex-soldiers ourselves, we address ourselves to you, Herr Fuhrer, 
principally as head of the ex-service men of Germany, and request your agreement to 
what would alone enable us to put before the World a matchless example of 
cooperation between the ex-service men of both countries in the promotion of peace 
and of important plans based thereon. 
Immediately I have received your consent thereto I shall return to England in 
order to ensure the consent of the Czechoslovak Govt. and, with the powerful 
support of His Majesty's Govt. to set the above plan in motion. 
For the execution, once the necessary consent of the respective Governments 
has been obtained, of the plan in all its detail, we should welcome the cooperation of 
the German Railways and other departments, since our time is short. 
Appendix L: Organisation of the British Legion Volunteer Police Force 
Force Commander: 
Major Sir Francis Fetherston-Godley 
Personal Assistant: 
Mr A. McKechnie 
Chief of Staff: 
Brigadier General E.R Fitzpatrick 
Personal Assistant: 
Capt. S.W. Slatter 
Officer llC Intelligence 
Col G.R Crosfield 
Officer llC Administration: 
Lt-Col. W. Wilberforce 
0. C. No. 1 Division: O. C. No. 2 Division: 
Lt-Gen Sir lW. Q'Dowda 
2nd In Command: 
Col. Ballantyne-Dykes 
Adjutant: 
Col. A. Lowther 
Quartermaster: 
Col. C.L.Samuelson 
Col C.M. Harris 
2nd In Command: 
Capt. the Hon.B. Mitford 
Adjutant: 
Lt-Col. F.L.Gore 
Quartermaster: 
Capt. C. Gordon Larking 
Administration Staff: 
Officer llC Transport: 
Assistant: 
Camp Commandant: 
R.S.M: 
Officer llC Ordnance & Stores: 
P.Mo.: 
Chaplain: 
Assistant: 
Officer llC Pay Duties: 
Officer llC Catering: 
Col A.M. Wilson 
Capt. l Lowsley-Williams 
Lt-Col A.D. Murray 
RS.M. Hill 
Lt-Col. F. Kirby 
CoI.W. Benson CB.DSQ. 
The Rt Rev. The Bishop of Truro 
The Rev. T.R. Parsons 
Col. E.W. Grant 
MrByford. 
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